WASHINGTON, May 4 (UPI) -- India and Pakistan blocked official channels of communication during the 2001-02 border crisis, increasing the possibility of a nuclear conflict in one of the world's most populous regions, says a new report released in Washington.
"The lack of official channels and agreed methods of communication during the crisis had dangerous implications for the two nuclear-armed states," says the report released by a Washington think-tank, the Stimson Center.
The author, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, argues that the 2001-02 crisis had three distinct phases. In the first phase -- Dec. 13, 2001 to May 14, 2002 -- India threatened the use of conventional force against Pakistan. In the second phase -- May 14, 2002 to June 17, 2002 -- this threat was supplemented by an appeal to the international community to pressure Pakistan to stop supporting jihadi groups.
During both phases, New Delhi played down nuclear dangers to avoid lending credence to Pakistan's claim of Kashmir as a "nuclear flashpoint."
During the third phase -- June 17, 2002 -- April 18, 2003 -- this policy was reversed, as New Delhi sought to reaffirm nuclear deterrence as well as conventional military options if Pakistan continued to support unconventional warfare against India.
"This important analysis clarifies that contradictory signaling can be expected during a crisis in South Asia since national leaders will be addressing domestic, cross-border, and international audiences," says Michael Krepon, the Stimson Center's director of programming on South Asia. "Given these inconsistent messages, it follows that nuclear risk reduction requires the avoidance of war and crises."
Roy-Chaudhury asserts that Indian and Pakistani leaders will need to find ways to keep channels of communication open during an intense crisis; improve the clarity and understanding of signaling; limit the number of "actors" engaged in nuclear signaling; understand better the internal dynamics of each other's political systems and principal signalers; and create and maintain a reliable "back channel" of communication during a crisis period.
He points out that during the 10-month long military mobilization of 2001-02, New Delhi deliberately downgraded its relations with Islamabad. It withdrew India's ambassador to Pakistan, and eventually asked his Pakistani counterpart in India to leave, and halved the strength of respective diplomatic missions. This increased the dependence of both states on public diplomacy and rhetoric as the most significant channel of bilateral communication, he observes.
During much of the border confrontation, India and Pakistan used the media to send "signals" on nuclear as well as conventional matters, the author says. "These signals were multiple in nature, carried out at multiple levels, and addressed to multiple constituencies -- internal, regional, and international."
For both India and Pakistan, he explains, the most important constituencies were the domestic public, each other, and the United States, which had the most influence in the region.
"Although India attempted to convey clear messages, its nuclear signals appeared confusing, and, at times, were at cross-purposes with one another. It is also not clear whether these signals were even perceived as intended by Pakistan or the other parties. If they were, it is not clear whether they were fully understood, or even taken cognizance of, especially by Pakistan," says Roy-Chaudhury.
The nuclear signaling by both New Delhi and Islamabad was unprecedented in terms of the duration as well as the variety and multiple levels at which the signals emanated. The 10-month border confrontation, December 2001 -- October 2002, was the longest period of military mobilization by both countries since their independence in 1947.
"A variety of nuclear signals took place -- flight tests of ballistic missiles, public speeches -- to the public and the armed forces -- and press briefings. These also emanated at multiple levels in both countries -- the political, military, and bureaucratic leadership," the report said.
Prior to the nuclear tests of 1998, there were two instances of nuclear signaling -- during the spring 1990 Indo-Pakistani military crisis and India's military "Exercise Brasstacks" in 1987. During the Kargil conflict of May-July 1999, nuclear signaling by Islamabad was restrained.
During the 2001-02 border crisis, the author says, the first nuclear signal from Islamabad came from President Pervez Musharraf in his March 23, 2002 speech when he spoke of teaching am "unforgettable lesson" to India if it dared to attack Pakistan.
The second nuclear signal from Islamabad came on April 6, 2003, when in an interview to the German weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel, Musharraf, said that if the (Indian) pressure on Pakistan became too great, "as a last resort, the atom bomb is also possible."
In his response, Indian Army chief Gen. Padmanabhan said if any country was "mad enough" to initiate a nuclear strike against India, then "the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished severely."
In the third phase, India increased its rhetoric, and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee claimed that if he had not attacked Pakistan it was not because Pakistan's nuclear deterrence had worked. "If Pakistan had not agreed to end infiltration, and America had not conveyed that guarantee to India, then war would not have been averted," he said.
Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes went a step ahead and said: "We can take a bomb or two or more ... but when we respond there will be no Pakistan."
Later, in an interview to BBC, he warned: "Pakistan has decided that it wants to get itself destroyed and erased from the world map, then it may take this step of madness (using nuclear weapons), but if (it) wants to survive then it would not do so."
