WASHINGTON -- A National Security Council consultant in on the inception of the Iran arms affair says U.S. arms shipments and the release of American hostages were linked as a means of demonstrating the serious intentions of the United States and Iran to re-establish contacts.
Writing in The Washington Post's weekend Outlook section of commentary,Michael Ledeen, an NSC consultant on terrorism in 1985, said he went to Israel in May of that year to talk to knowledgeable officials about the situation in Iran. The discussions included talks with high-level Israeli officials and recent immigrants from Iran.
In July 1985, Al Schwimmer, the retired chief of Israel Aircraft Industries and a personal friend of Prime Minister Shimon Peres, called on Ledeen in Washington. Schwimmer told Ledeen 'an apparently well-informed Iranian named Manucher Ghorbanifar,' who was introduced to the Israelis by billionaire Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi, wanted to discuss U.S.-Iranian relations with U.S. officials.
Ledeen said he returned to Israel later in July 1985 and met with Ghorbanifar and David Kimche of the Israeli foreign ministry and Jacob Nimrodi, an Israeli businessman and arms dealer.
Ghorbanifar was described by Ledeen as a self-made businessman and 'one of those rare individuals who understands the subtleties not only of his own culture but our own as well.'
In a long conversation, Ledeen wrote that Ghorbanifar said leading members of the Iranian government wanted to improve relations with the United States. On the U.S. side, it was made clear to Ghorbanifar that better relations were possible only if Tehran stop its support of international terrorism.
There was a need for both sides to prove their bona fides, Ledeen said.
'The question of hostages and weapons first emerged in this context,' Ledeen wrote. 'Ghorbanifar raised these matters, not as a proposed swap, but as a way each side could satisfy the other about the legitimacy of the channel, and the ability of the respective governments to take steps to demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions.'
Arms shipments, involving Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi and using Israelis as middlemen, began in September 1985. One hostage, the Rev. Benjamin Weir, was released the same month.
Assigned to other duties in late 1985, ledeen said he has no knowledge of the developments in 1986 that included the sending of arms profits to the Contra rebels of Nicaragua and the firing of Lt. Col. Oliver North, the NSC staffer, who was involved in the arms shipments and covert Contra aid.
Ledeen is currently a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. In his written explanation, Ledeen admits he is reflecting his own view and his information is incomplete.
Earlier published reports said that the CIA warned against dealing with Ghorbanifar because of alleged unreliability. By January 1986, when President Reagan secretly approved new arms shipments to Iran, the United States stopped its association with Ghorbanifar. Both Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi have complained publicly that they lost money on the shipments.
The CIA reportedly considered Ghorbanifar a 'chronic liar' after failing a lie detector test in 1985 and it was CIA opposition that led to his being dropped as a participant in the arms deals. Time magazine reported this week that an angered Ghorbanifar went to Iranian associates who leaked the news that made the scandal public.
