WASHINGTON, Feb. 5 (UPI) -- The UPI think tank wrap-up is a daily digest covering opinion pieces, reactions to recent news events and position statements released by various think tanks. This is the first of three wrap-ups for Feb. 5.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies
WASHINGTON -- Powell presentation to U.N.: Secretary makes compelling case, more focus needed on post-conflict Iraq
CSIS analysts made the following statements regarding Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations:
-- Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy.
"Secretary Powell made a case that is likely to become steadily more convincing as experts read it over and interpret the details. It was not flashy or dramatic, but it involved a great deal of technical data that is new, and makes a strong case that U.N. inspections will not work and that Iraq's threat is more imminent than previously reported. The content of the Powell speech is particularly impressive, given the fact that the United States had to be extremely careful to avoid giving up key targeting data, revealing intelligence sources and methods, and giving Iraq advance notice of what UNMOVIC and the IAEA intend to inspect." Extended commentary from Cordesman on Powell's presentation is available on the CSIS Web site at csis.org/burke/comment_powell.pdf.
-- Jon Alterman, director, CSIS Middle East Program.
"Many in the Middle East will not believe Powell's charges. But it's important not to ignore the United Nations. The Arab world will often find reason to be angry at the United States, but it will have a harder time being angry with the entire international community. Showing deference to the United Nations, and maybe even gaining a new resolution, will go a long way toward making clear that this is not about the United States, it is about Saddam."
-- Rick Barton, senior adviser, CSIS International Security Program.
"Secretary Powell had two jobs at the United Nations: to move U.S. and global public opinion and to patch up the coalition. He did an effective job of providing some new evidence of weapons violations. What he did not do, however, was to reaffirm U.S. support for post Saddam actions that will benefit the Iraqi people. He did not touch on the removal of sanctions, the termination of claims from the Gulf War, or the prospects for international investments in safe water, education, and open government. These topics would have had a direct appeal to people in the region and allies who are concerned about the benefits of a war."
-- Patrick Cockburn, CSIS visiting fellow.
"The Powell statement will be known immediately all over Iraq because people obsessively listen to foreign radios in Arabic. It is unlikely to have much impact within Iraq either at the popular or official level. But it will reinforce the belief that a conflict is increasingly unavoidable, though it might elicit some last minute revelations from the Iraqi government."
CSIS notes that these are the views of the individuals cited, not of CSIS, which does not take policy positions.
Institute for Public Accuracy
(The IPA is a nationwide consortium of policy researchers that seeks to broaden public discourse by gaining media access for experts whose perspectives are often overshadowed by major think tanks and other influential institutions.)
WASHINGTON -- Colin Powell in the spotlight: The record behind the image
A new USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll found that -- "when it comes to U.S. policy toward Iraq" -- Americans trust Secretary of State Colin Powell more than President Bush 63-24 percent. With Powell appearing before the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday, the following IPA analysts offer perspectives on Powell's record that run counter to conventional wisdom:
-- Norman Solomon, co-author of the new book "Target Iraq," which includes an extensive assessment of Powell's role in relation to Iraq during late 2002. The book also critiques milestones of Powell's career in Washington, including his participation in major events such as the Iran-Contra scandal, the invasion of Panama, the Gulf War and the public-relations battle during the Florida recount after the 2000 presidential election. Solomon is executive director of the Institute for Public Accuracy.
"Contrary to popular belief, Powell has been a powerful asset for Washington policymakers committed to launching an all-out war on Iraq. Today, Powell is a more effective war advocate than people like (Vice President) Dick Cheney and (Defense Secretary) Donald Rumsfeld. This is consistent with a pattern that has held steady with Powell for decades -- cultivate a 'moderate' image while developing strategies in collaboration with extreme militarists in high places." An excerpt from "Target Iraq" dealing with Powell is posted at accuracy.org/unilateral.pdf.
-- Elombe Brath, producer for the radio program "Afrikaleidoscope," went to high school with Colin Powell.
"Powell's image of a reluctant warrior masks his take-no-prisoners attitude, which he displayed in the slaughter of retreating Iraqis in the Gulf War. The image he tries to foster among people of color is a more humane figure, but he offers no contradiction to Bush; rather, he helps the administration find methods to better achieve their ends."
-- Rahul Mahajan is the author of the forthcoming book "The U.S. War on Iraq."
"The arrogant imperial rhetoric from 'hawks' like Rumsfeld prepares the stage for the diplomatic arm-twisting of Powell; we saw it before the passage of the U.N. resolution in November and we're seeing it again. The dismissal of the need to provide evidence also lowers expectations, making it possible for Powell to offer a cobbled-together pastiche of innuendo, inconclusive claims, and possibly minor violations as a justification for a major war. Powell's 'sudden' shift to a hawkish stance is just as choreographed as the rest of the administration's performance over the past eight months."
The Cato Institute
WASHINGTON -- U.S. military inadequately trained for chemical and biological attacks
A new Cato Institute report concludes that as the United States continues to prepare for possible military action against Iraq, U.S. armed forces are not adequately prepared for the most severe threat Iraq can muster: weapons of mass destruction.
In "Are Our Troops Ready for Biological and Chemical Attacks?" Eric R. Taylor, a former captain with the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, argues that the military is poorly prepared for nuclear, biological, and chemical, or NBC, attacks as a result of unrealistic NBC field training, only several hours of training annually, and a lack of emphasis on such training by senior officers.
The prospect of Saddam Hussein using NBC weapons in the event of a U.S.-led attack is very real, Taylor argues, because "Saddam now knows he is to be removed from power, so he has little to lose by using any and all weapons at his command."
In the report, Taylor, an associate professor of chemistry at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, documents observations made in the field during visits to various military installations where NBC training is conducted. Despite glaring deficiencies revealed in post-Gulf War chemical and biological weapons preparedness reports, those same gaps in readiness exist today, he says.
Taylor writes:
"The core problem with NBC readiness training by the military services is that it is considered less important than 'shoot and scoot' combat training," adding that annually only four hours of NBC training are required by each of the four services for new recruits, with two hours of refresher training.
"The lack of regular, in-depth, unit-wide training devoted to NBC is reflected in the lack of instant recall of responses by troops to questions about NBC. The time, dedication, and interest in NBC training seem as deficient now as they were three decades ago. Examination of training attitudes among the command structure -- indicated by training time and practices -- suggests that the mindset of the command structure of the U.S. armed forces has undergone little improvement -- even in the wake of Desert Storm."
The report is available as Policy Analysis no. 467 on the Cato Institute Web site at cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-467es.html.
