WASHINGTON, July 27 (UPI) -- The nation's new intelligence chief has largely failed so far to put in place strategic planning and acquisition systems for the 16 U.S. spy agencies he manages, and "heavy-handed" efforts to expand his budgetary powers risk provoking a turf war, according to a hard-hitting report from lawmakers Thursday.
The report -- an assessment of the implementation of the huge intelligence reorganization Congress mandated at the end of 2004 -- also says these failures have put at risk the maintenance and future expansion of the nation's spy satellite capability and cost taxpayers billions of dollars.
Prepared by staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the report also criticizes a lack of improvement in three other areas: information sharing between agencies; security clearance procedures for new hires; and changes to training, personnel rules and institutional culture needed to foster a greater sense of unity among the sprawling and occasionally fractious collection of agencies called by insiders the U.S. intelligence community.
The report says that overall the record of Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte is "a mixed story -- some good, needed steps have been taken while other reforms have lagged." But it will be a disappointing read for many supporters of intelligence reform.
It says much progress has been made in better managing the intelligence community's analytic resources, and in identifying "unintended and unwanted overlaps and, more importantly, critical gaps" in the capabilities of its different agencies. It also praises the changes made by the FBI in restructuring itself and reorienting its mission more towards domestic intelligence gathering, while insisting that much more remains to be done.
A statement from Negroponte's office defended its record in general terms, and a spokesman declined to comment further.
The report "helps us take stock of our progress and chart the way ahead," says the statement, adding, "While views may differ regarding the pace of progress in several areas, on balance, we believe major improvements in how the intelligence community collects, analyzes and shares intelligence have been realized" since the office was set up in January 2005.
Some of the committee's most surprising criticisms are directed at the efforts of Negroponte's deputy for management, former State Department official Patrick Kennedy. The strategic planning process he leads -- intended eventually to form the basis for a formal multi-year planning and budgeting process like that employed by the Pentagon -- is "fragmented and not well understood across the community."
Without "a mature strategic planning process ... that links future national interests and threats to the capabilities the (intelligence) community budgets for and develops," says the report, it will be impossible for policymakers to "make the tough calls to shift resources as needed."
Also under fire in the report are the intelligence community's acquisition processes for big budget items -- which the reports authors complain have not been briefed sufficiently to Congress.
In a deliberately vague reference to ultra-secret and vastly over-budget spy satellite programs the report says that "poor program management and planning has put our imagery intelligence capabilities at risk."
But the report also criticizes what it says is a power-grab by Negroponte's staff on the question of acquisition authority, and "heavy-handed" tactics in the budget development process.
The law, the report says, gave Negroponte "specific authorities" in relation to the acquisition of major systems like spy satellite or other large technology buys, but only when they were funded solely from the so-called National Intelligence Program. The authorities didn't cover projects that were part-funded by the huge military intelligence budget, or where funding might come from a completely separate budget like that of the FBI.
The report says that some unnamed "agencies and their Cabinet departments" were concerned because Negroponte's senior acquisition executive was trying to implement a draft regulation to "expand the authorities awarded to the director (of national intelligence)" beyond those granted in the law.
"As a result, coordination of these policies and procedures has stalled in the review process," the report says, adding the new director should be concentrating on "enforcing existing statutes and executive branch requirements for a professional acquisition workforce" in the intelligence agencies.
Lax enforcement of professional standards requirements among intelligence agency acquisition staff has "cost taxpayers billions of dollars in cost over-runs and schedule delays" in big ticket programs at the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the reports says.
"A greater sense of urgency must be garnered with (the Department of Defense) to reverse this dismal track record."
The lawmakers urge Negroponte to use his power over the budget to fund these problem projects fully from the National Intelligence Program if he wants control over them.
But at the same time, they lambaste his budget team for the "heavy-handed" way they went about exercising his new budget powers.
The committee says Negroponte's staff "directed significant changes and restructuring" in way agencies prepared their "blue books" -- the documents presented to Congress to justify a budget request -- "without first coordinating the changes with congressional staff" who are, after all, the intended audience.
Nor did they sufficiently coordinate with agency staff, charges the report, and "Whether because of poor coordination, or the reluctance of agencies to follow the guidance of the director, many felt the director's staff was heavy-handed."
Such feeling risked a turf war among the agencies, says the report, "Continued directing without prior, effective coordination and collaboration with the intelligence agencies risks damaging critical relationships.
"The director and his staff must understand this danger and work with the 16 intelligence agencies towards success as a federation," it says, "not against them towards failure."
