WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 (UPI) -- After the death of the long-ailing King Fahd, the Saudi royal family acted quickly to confirm Crown Prince Abdullah as the new king, and the now King Abdullah immediately named his half-brother, Prince Sultan, to be the new crown prince.
But while this succession has gone smoothly and the next one appears set to do so, there are ominous parallels between Saudi Arabia upon the death of Fahd and the Soviet Union upon the death of Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1982.
When Brezhnev came to power in 1964, he was 57 and appeared both active and energetic. Eighteen years later, when he died in office at the age of 75, his faculties had clearly been going downhill for quite some time. A reformer, Yuri Andropov, who was then 68, succeeded him. But Andropov's health soon failed, and he died in office in 1984 at the age of 69.
Konstantin Chernenko, who was definitely not a reformer, then came into office at the age of 72 -- and died 13 months later in 1985 at 73. The comparatively youthful Mikhail Gorbachev (then 54) came to power next and launched his ambitious effort to reform the Soviet Union -- which fell apart as a result less than seven years later when he was 60.
Fahd's tenure resembles Brezhnev's. When Fahd became king in 1982, he was about 60 years old (the birthdates of the older Saudi royals are somewhat uncertain), active, and energetic. By the time he died in 2005 at about 83, he had been seriously ill for a decade during which Abdullah took over day-to-day management of the kingdom.
Abdullah resembles Andropov. Like Andropov, Abdullah has a reputation for being a reformer. But also like Andropov, Abdullah, who is believed to be 81, comes to office at an advanced age. Deteriorating health may limit his ability to implement reform during what is likely to be a short reign.
Sultan resembles Chernenko. Like Chernenko, Sultan has a reputation for opposing reform. Now believed to be at least 80, like Chernenko he too will come to power (if he survives Abdullah) at an advanced age. Nor is he likely to reign vigorously or for long.
The Saudi royal family clearly does not want a Gorbachev -- a younger ruler whose over-ambitious reforms end up destroying the country -- to become king. The problem for the royal family -- as it was for the Soviet Politburo previously -- is that the country is facing numerous challenges, including (despite oil wealth) high unemployment, restive youth attracted to extremist ideology and the impact of instability in neighboring countries -- especially Iraq. And while the Soviet Union's problems were not identical to Saudi Arabia's now, the Saudi government resembles the Soviet one of the past in that decision-making is concentrated in just a few hands at the very top and initiative is stifled at all levels below.
This is a situation that would be challenging for any leader, much less a series of aging ones. Similar to the choice faced by the Soviet Politburo before it, the Saudi royal family is going to have to decide between prolonging the succession among the aging sons of Saudi Arabia's founding King Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud), or picking a successor from among his grandsons -- several of who possess both advanced education and administrative experience.
But as many commentators have pointed out, the first king had many sons by many different wives. Picking any particular grandson -- especially one who is relatively young, healthy, and likely to reign for a long time -- may result in further successions being indefinitely altered in favor of his branch of the family at the expense of the others. Despite its problems, continuing the succession among Abd al-Aziz's elderly sons postpones having to make this choice and the divisive struggle it is likely to entail. Eventually, though, this problem will have to be confronted.
But the succession is only part of the larger problem confronting Saudi Arabia. Another part of it is that Saudi Arabia has become too large and complex a country to be ruled through the personal oversight of a relatively few members of one family. Not allowing others, even within the government, to make decisions means that the small band of princes who do wield power (a small minority within the relatively large royal family) are shouldering an enormous burden. As one U.S. diplomat I spoke to in Riyadh in May 2001 put it, the senior princes are making decisions that would be made by mid-level officials in the United States.
This is inefficient. In addition, it causes resentment. For there are now many educated and accomplished non-royals who are frustrated at not being able to exercise their talents due to the accident of not being born into the right family. And this is dangerous. Many young Saudis are attracted to bin Laden's message not just because they share his hatred of America and Israel, but because they see it as a means of achieving upward mobility through ousting the Saudi royal family from all the many important positions its members occupy.
Sooner or later, there will be a Saudi king who understands that effectively confronting the kingdom's problems will require reforming the Saudi government through more thoroughly delegating authority away from a small number of elderly princes to a larger number of younger, educated, and talented royals and non-royals.
Failure to reform could spell disaster for the kingdom. But as Gorbachev's experience demonstrated, reform can also spell disaster. Gorbachev, it must be remembered, did not launch his reforms in order to destroy the Soviet Union. He launched them because he feared the negative consequences for his country of not doing so. What he did not understand was that his country's problems were too severe to be resolved through reforming the existing system of Communist Party rule.
Like the Soviet Union before it, Saudi Arabia is now at the point where it faces danger either if it reforms or if it does not. But while failure to reform is surely a recipe for disaster, the attempt to reform need not be. Things that the Saudi royal family could do that would benefit both them and their country include:
-- Separate the offices of king and prime minister. Establish a norm whereby the king appoints a prime minister who is not his own son, is no older than 60, and cannot serve for more than five years, but whom the king can dismiss. This would keep the succession within the line of Abd al-Aziz's sons for now, permit a rotation of power among the grandsons, and allow for competent leadership even when a king is ailing.
-- Gradually move from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. Just as the Saudis have recently allowed elections to municipal councils, they should allow elections to the national majlis al-shura, which is now appointed. In addition, these bodies should become real legislatures, and not be merely advisory bodies.
-- Allow Saudi royals to run for elected office. This would ease the pain to the royal family of giving up some of its power. But it could also be stabilizing. Compared to many of those who won seats in the recent municipal elections, the Saudi princes are fairly moderate. And while non-royal Saudis complain about the royal family as a whole, many of its individual members are quite popular (sort of like how Americans think negatively of Congress, but positively about their own senators and congressman).
The best among the royals might have a far better chance of defeating extremists in open elections than any non-royal moderate.
Many might consider these suggested reforms to be "too little, too late." Gorbachev's attempt at reform, though, shows what can happen when it is "too much, too soon."
Abdullah, like any other leader contemplating reform, needs to get it "just right." The best way to accomplish this is through a reform effort that seeks to engage the talents and capabilities of the kingdom's educated younger people (both royal and non-royal), and which lets mid-level officials make mid-level decisions.
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(Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University)
