The 2005 Review Conference of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty ended recently not with a bang, but with a whimper.
Despite efforts by conference President Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, the conference closed without consensus and lacking a final document. Many now believe the NPT is doomed as long as nuclear states insist that non-nuclear ones, such as Brazil, curtail their nuclear energy programs, while dragging their own feet in reducing their nuclear weapons.
This feeling of an inherent imbalance in the NPT, between enforcement of the non-proliferation and disarmament clauses, was underscored by one of the most influential figures in the administration of Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva during a recent interview with United Press International.
Jose Dirceu was until recently head the powerful Casa Civil Ministry and Lula's chief of staff.
When asked if Brazil would sign an Additional Protocol proposed to the NPT, Dirceu said Brazil "would analyze the possibility of adopting the Additional Protocol in light of the results of the 2005 Review Conference, from which we expect clear and concrete commitments toward nuclear disarmament."
The Additional Protocol was proposed after the first Persian Gulf War in response to Iraq's violations of the NPT safeguards through it's secret nuclear program, according to a senior U.S. State Department official involved in non-proliferation.
The additional protocol would give inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, greater "access and information" to a country's nuclear program, according to this official, through such means as "environmental sampling."
"Before the 1st Gulf War, countries were not politically willing to allow inspectors to have access to their nuclear facilities," the official said.
Dirceu was careful to emphasize even if Brazil were to sign the Additional Protocol, "the necessity of strengthening the System of Safeguards of the AIEA should not be used as a justification for further aggravation of the already existing imbalance between the obligations for disarmament vs. those for nonproliferation envisioned by the NPT."
He added the eventual "universal acceptance of the additional protocol" would simply pile on one more obligation onto the non-nuclear countries, "even as there had been no progress (in fact, some
regression) in disarmament by the nuclear armed countries Brazil (and other non-nuclear countries) have repeatedly expressed concern the NPT is unfair in its application, with increased policing of some nuclear energy programs, by evoking the non-proliferation clause, while almost ignoring the disarmament clause, which requires the nuclear powers to dispose of their nuclear arsenals.
In his book, "Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban," the late Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission under President Kennedy, foresaw the deficiencies of the NPT even at its inception. He helped to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty for JFK in the 1960s.
According to Seaborg, one of the early concerns by non-nuclear signatories in 1970 when the NPT was first adopted, was "the feeling among non-nuclear states that their renunciation of nuclear weapons should be balanced by more serious efforts toward disarmament by the major powers."
He said many felt there was hypocrisy on the part of the nuclear-armed nations; "on the one hand, the nuclear powers continue to strengthen their own nuclear arsenals; on the other hand, they urge non-nuclear nations to accept permanent and increasing inferiority."
Thirty-five years later, that weakness is still creating problems.
Asked about this apparent imbalance, the U.S. State Department official said the argument was inherently flawed.
"What this argument fails to acknowledge is the reality that the greatest threat to world peace today comes not from the nuclear-armed nations, but from the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear materials and from the threat of nuclear terrorism."
In spite of objections from the United States and other nuclear powers, Iran has used article four of the NPT, guaranteeing non-nuclear powers the right to nuclear energy, to justify its own uranium enrichment program.
Dirceu said: "The eventual impacts such a measure (the Additional Protocol) would have upon Brazil's own nuclear program are currently being analyzed by Brazil's technical experts."
In an interview with UPI, Odair Goncalves, president of Brazil's Atomic Energy Commission, said the Additional Protocol is much more intrusive than the original NPT.
"The new protocol requires many new inspections. The universities are subject to safeguards and inspections...and in Brazil this quite complicated. Universities in Brazil are proud and jealous of their independence, autonomy, and academic freedom," he said. "As I understand it, there was a similar problem on the part of the universities in the U.S., as well. They signed the additional protocol, but even so they are having problems."
Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department official expressed confidence Brazil would eventually accept the Additional Protocol.
"Brazil has played a leadership role in non-proliferation," the official said. "We expect that, with time, they will continue to play a leadership role by adopting the additional protocol."
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(Third of four parts)
