WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 (UPI) -- It was almost inevitable that years of sectarian and ethnic tension and violence in Iraq would polarize its electorate. It was equally apparent that no election held in mid-insurgency could be perfect, and that tensions were so high that some abuses were inevitable, and there would be charges of corruption and violence -- even if some were invalid or exaggerated.
Furthermore, since the Sunnis were almost certain to emerge as a minority with far less political power than in the past, and the more secular nationalist were likely to be weak relative to sectarian and ethnic parties, it was likely that they would be the key sources of complaint.
This time, however, the vote was by area and not nation-wide, and did allow much better representation by ethnic and sectarian group. Each of Iraq's 18 provinces was considered a separate voting district; the number of parliamentary seats allotted to each district was based on the population of the province. There were 275 seats in the National Assembly, and 230 were distributed amongst the 18 governorates according to the number of registered voters in each governorate. Baghdad Province, the largest Province, had 59 of the 230 seats in the Council.
The remaining 45 seats out of the 275 were distributed as compensatory seats to political entities whose proportion of the vote received nationally was lower than the number of seats they obtain. Political entities won seats in a governorate in proportion to the share of votes they receive in the election in that governorate.
The official results will not be out until mid-January, and some 690 formal complaints and thousands of additional complaints had already been made about the way in which the election was conducted by Dec. 20 -- with reports of thousands of additional complaints in process. There were at least 20 of these 690 complaints that the Iraqi Election commission already regarded as serious. Nevertheless, the preliminary results showed that some 11 million ballots had been cast in all 18 provinces, and reported on a count of some 7 million votes.
The total turnout was impressive. It showed that Anbar was the only governorate with a relatively low percentage, and even that was 55 percent. The others ranged from 62 percent to 87 percent and the national average was 70 percent.
The elections results do provide important indicators, but most are ambiguous and the election results do not reveal several key aspects of Iraqi politics. They also do not indicate whether Sunnis, and others who object to the results, will actually participate in the new government and/or support a peaceful political process. Furthermore, they strongly indicate that any government that did not act as a national unity coalition, or emphasize unity and inclusion, could trigger serious ethnic cleansing or civil war.
Voting in the four most troubled provinces where the insurgency has the most support (Anbar, Salahuddin, Nineveh, and Diyala) to some extent, showed the relative strength of the more centrist Sunnis, and more "nationalist" Sunni insurgent movements, versus the strength of the hard-line neo-Salafi religious extremist movements who oppose voting. Voting levels were relatively high, particularly compared to past Sunni participation.
Sunni voting, however, did not mean support for the government and constitution, or opposition to the insurgency. It should be noted that some insurgent organizations and many Sunni leaders opposed to federation and the constitution in its current form did call for participation. Voters can remain opponents and insurgents.
-- Some insurgents and pro-insurgents voted simply to create a counterweight to the Shiites and Kurds. One can still support violence and vote.
-- Voting pro-Sunni did not mean willingness to accommodate the new government; that will depend on the efforts over the months that follow to define the constitution and the way in which the new government operates.
-- Such voting did not mean support for the United States or the Coalition. The December 2005 ABC-Time-Oxford Research International poll showed Iraqi Sunnis still decisively reject a U.S. and Coalition role in Iraq. It also reveals they have serious mistrust about the new Iraqi government and armed forces.
Moreover, the ABC analysis of the December 2005 ABC-Time-Oxford Research International poll found that Sunnis saw a steady deterioration in their provinces when they were asked about whether conditions were good.
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(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC. This is taken from his latest CSIS paper "The Impact of the Iraqi Election: A Working Analysis.")
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
