WASHINGTON, Dec. 11 (UPI) -- The Far Horizon: The Fog of War
by
December 14th, 2001
Clausewitz invented the phrase "fog of war." By that, he meant the confusion and uncertainty of war. From privates on the battlefield to generals in headquarters hundreds of miles away, cutting through that fog to see or to know what the enemy was doing was vital. But fog also exists several levels up the chain with the political leaders in charge. What does history suggest about fog at that altitude?
The fact is that at the start of any war, and certainly those of the last century, no leader had the foggiest idea of what lay ahead or how the war would turn out. In August 1914 after the Grand Arch Duke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary had been assassinated in Sarajevo, the rush was to mobilize. The strategy then, based on the swift conclusion of the Franco-Prusso War of 1870, was that he who mobilized and attacked first would win. No one ---in London, Paris, Berlin or St. Petersburg--- reckoned that the war would quickly stalemate in the bloody trenches in which millions of Europe's finest young men would be slaughtered. And there was no notion of how the war would end.
When America declared war on Japan immediately after Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt and his key advisors had not a clue about the outcome other than the United States must win. In fact, there must have been considerable frustration if not depression in the White House. The war was supposed to be fought against Hitler. Fortunately, Hitler unilaterally declared war on the United States ending that dilemma.
When Churchill and Roosevelt conferred first on the overall strategy for winning the war, the policy of "unconditional surrender" was adopted. However, no one envisaged then the occupation of Germany and Japan and what would be the immensely successful imposition of democracy on those formerly fascist states. Even the famous Marshall Plan would not be invented until two years after the war ended.
Clearly, at the beginning and through much of any war, fog is everywhere. Mandating an outcome in other than general terms is too difficult simply because of the unknowns. In August 1964 and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Lyndon Johnson and his advisors who were "the best and the brightest" of their generation had no idea about how the Vietnamese conflict would finally be resolved.
The Korean War was an exception of sorts. After McArthur recklessly attacked north to the Yalu River bringing in China, the war eventually stalemated around the 38th parallel. Hence, the initial aim of restoring the pre-war boundaries was inadvertently achieved.
During the Gulf War of 1990-91, the UN Resolution, and the subsequent vote in Congress to approve the use of U.S. force, only authorized the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait. Nothing more was authorized despite critics who continue to carp that the coalition should have gone on to Baghdad.
Since a full-scale invasion to topple Saddam's government was out of the question, it was not by accident that General Colin Powell, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs during the war, sent excerpts of a book written by Fred Ikle called "Every War Must End," to members of George H.W. Bush's administration. Someone had to be thinking about the shaping peace.
Still, a decade ago, who would have predicted the situation in the Gulf as it is today. Saddam is still around. No fly zones are enforced over northern and southern Iraq and an embargo remains in place. U.S. and British warplanes continue to fly combat missions, occasionally dropping bombs and firing missiles against Iraqi military targets.
Clearly, the matter of fog now applies most centrally to Afghanistan. In this case, the rapid collapse of the Taliban and the success of the Northern Alliance have made consideration of the future more urgent. Afghanistan is about to return to the Afghans or at least to groups that represent the various factions. Whether the outcome will resemble the chaos of the former Yugoslavia or will be made more stable is a key test facing the international community.
Plans to rebuild Afghanistan are in train. The first hurdle will be humanitarian: providing for the Afghan people during a winter that will be harsh. The second will be facilitating the transition of the interim government to one that is permanent. This will require providing the basic tools any government needs from phones and electricity to buildings. And, finally, if this is to work, Afghanistan must be moved from its state of devastation to a functioning society.
These are tall orders. Fortunately, unlike the wars of the last century, the obstacle will be less fog and more nation building. It would do well for the administration of George W. Bush, with an aversion to a strong U.S. role in that effort, to keep this reality in mind.
________________________________________________________________
Harlan Ullman is a UPI columnist.
