SILVER SPRING, Md., Jan. 19 (UPI) -- Besides delaying justice to the victims of the 1994 Argentine Israel Mutual Association terror attack in Argentina, Britain's November decision not to extradite Iranian diplomat Hadi Soleimanpour demonstrated to Iran's leaders they could use threats and intimidation to evade responsibility for supporting terrorism.
An untimely lesson, as the British, French, and German governments were pressing to bring Iran's nuclear program into full compliance with international inspections regimes -- after 18 years of deception according to the International Atomic Energy Agency report -- while urging the United States not to take the issue to the U.N. Security Council.
Of the eight Iranians wanted by Argentina for their roles in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires in which 86 were killed and more than 300 were injured, only Soleimanpour, who was studying in Britain, was in a country where a warrant could be served.
Argentina provided 2,600 pages of documentation to support the charges. U.S. and Israeli intelligence assisted the Argentine investigation, and senior Israeli officials called it "professional, razor-sharp, in-depth, and courageous."
But after Soleimanpour's arrest, Britain's Tehran Embassy was fired on and Iran briefly recalled its ambassador to Britain, warning that Anglo-Iranian relations would suffer if Soleimanpour was not released. While the British government claimed the decision not to extradite Soleimanpour was strictly a legal ruling, a politician, the Home Secretary David Blunkett, made the decision.
Arguably, relenting on Soleimanpour's extradition might have bought maneuvering room on the nuclear inspections. The lack of resolve from the staunchest European state augured badly for the European initiative.
Now, more than two months later, Iran continues to "discuss" exactly which of its nuclear activities need to be halted -- while recent inspections show it was closer to constructing a nuclear weapon than previously believed.
Argentina's investigation of the AMIA bombing shows how terrorism is part of Iran's diplomatic toolkit (or diplomats are instruments of Iran's terror network), which makes the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran truly harrowing.
Argentina's report on the AMIA bombing is extensive and contains some damning conclusions.
First, it says that Iran and Hezbollah worked together seamlessly to execute the act. A Lebanese Hezbollah member carried out the attack and Hezbollah operations chief Imad Mughniyah assembled the Buenos Aires terror cell. The decision to attack AMIA was made by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and then President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Ali Fallahian, Iran's Intelligence minister at the time, and officials at Iran's Buenos Aires Embassy directed the operation.
"Cultural Attache" Mohsen Rabbani, the lead planner, may have purchased the Renault van used in the bombing. Soleimanpour, then Iran's ambassador to Argentina, oversaw the operation. The report also indicates the same terror infrastructure carried out the 1992 bombing of Israel's Buenos Aires Embassy.
Both attacks were quickly organized reactions to events in the Middle East. The March 1992 embassy bombing was a response to Israel's February 1992 assassination of top Hezbollah leader Abbas Musawi. The AMIA attack was a response to the Argentine government's breaking an agreement to sell missile and nuclear technology to Iran and in revenge for Israel's May 1994 abduction of senior Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani, according to the report.
The Argentina bombings were not exceptional. Bombing U.S. and French facilities in Lebanon drove Western peacekeepers out of Lebanon in the early 1980s. Hostage taking throughout the 1980s, and a series of bombings in Paris in the late 1980s, pressured the U.S. and France to reduce their support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. The 1996 attack on the U.S. installation at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia is another example of Iran sponsoring terror without retribution.
With nuclear arms Iran would be able to launch such attacks with impunity and could even threaten nuclear terror.
The willingness and ability of Iran to orchestrate terror worldwide ought to galvanize efforts to frustrate Iran's nuclear ambitions. Soleimanpour's extradition and trial would have sent a strong message that Iran would be held accountable for its actions. Instead, the opposite message was sent, thereby encouraging Iran in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons -- the ultimate guarantor that they will not have to answer for their misdeeds.
The terror attack on AMIA -- a symbolic civilian target -- foreshadowed 9/11. But it could also be the harbinger of something unimaginably worse.
-- Aaron Mannes is the author of Profiles in Terror (profilesinterror.com), forthcoming Spring 2004 and is the former director of research at the Middle East Media Research Institute.
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
