WASHINGTON, April 14 (UPI) -- By Hussain Hindawi and John R. Thomson
United Press International
(This is the entire 6-part series on Iraq after Saddam Hussein which moved over the last week in installments.)
Settling the Dust
The dismantling of Saddam Hussein's regime is happening at last. After more than a year of feints and jabs, the dictator's much anticipated passing from the scene is upon us. Once completed, millions will wonder how arguably the cruelest regime in its history could have ruled Iraq for 35 years and the unglamorous work of rebuilding will begin.
Building the peace will be a far more lengthy battle, one that will test Iraqi goodwill and foreigners' commitment to reform and stability in the Middle East.
No one can predict the degree of dislocation and destruction, postwar. The U.S.-led allied coalition occupation of Baghdad, may result in fierce fighting in the capital, home to one quarter of Iraq's 25 million citizens.
At various times, Saddam and his sons have threatened everything from torching the country's oilfields, as in Kuwait in 1991, to using chemical and biological weapons against the advancing armies. The first would seriously hurt the Iraqi economy and leave his countrymen with even worse memories of Saddam. The second, although affecting the invaders, would have little consequences for the local population or infrastructure.
Far more dangerous and destructive for the country would be house-to-house armed guerrilla fighting in Baghdad's streets. This option has been repeatedly threatened, and -- fortunately -- thoroughly planned for by the U.S. and British forces. Most informed observers discount this possibility because:
Like destroying the oilfields, it would very negatively affect Saddam's legacy;
Saddam cannot trust in his troops' loyalty -- Iraqis remember vividly the sight of some 100,000 troops surrendering at the start of the land war in 1991 -- and is therefore unwilling to test their mettle in this most difficult form of warfare;
The local populace is completely unreliable and could well help the allies more than the Iraqi forces;
A large number -- estimates range from 2,000 to many times more -- of U.S. and British special forces are in the country, including Baghdad, gathering critical intelligence, establishing valuable contacts and generally undermining the regime's stability.
Therefore, Baghdad should remain more intact than after the first Gulf War when it sustained six weeks of heavy bombing, prior to the land war.
The Human Infrastructure.
A greater issue than destruction of physical plant could well be the status of government ministries and services. Will the most sophisticated U.S. weaponry "fry" Iraq's telecommunications and electrical grids? With layers of Saddam supporters are removed, will ministries continue to function with any degree of efficiency? Will cadres of secret Saddam sympathizers remain in key posts and thus frustrate efforts to provide effective government services?
Once again, the betting is that government services will not be much worse than they have been for years.
The United States has been reluctant to use its advanced "zapping" weaponry, not wanting to face the public relations and financial costs of destroying and then re-instituting telecommunications and electrical services. Seasoned anti-Saddam functionaries have quietly remained in virtually every ministry and are expected to keep services running as well as identify malingerers from the ancien regime. Moreover, Iraq is blessed with large numbers of men with scientific educations, capable of quickly stepping into technical and administrative positions.
Education has been a central element of the Baath regime since taking power and Iraqi parents have urged their children to study the sciences in the country's 20 universities and, when possible, abroad, as a way to get ahead and avoid becoming cannon fodder. In fact, the strongest professional group in the nation is the scientific community; the weakest, the army. In the critical oil sector, hundreds of dedicated, nationalistic professionals are in place, just below a thin layer of Saddam sycophants.
For a similar period, Saddam has systematically eliminated officers who are not from his home tribal area of Tikrit, filling their posts with incompetent sycophants. Drained of even more talent by the 1980-88 war with Iran, it was no surprise how woefully the Iraqi army fought during the first Gulf War. U.S. war planners believe they will be even less effective this time around.
The Economic Base.
Iraq is a wealthy country, with the second-greatest oil reserves in the region and, unique among Arab nations, large water supplies. Although it may take two years to upgrade petroleum extraction capacity to the 3.6 million barrels prior to Desert Storm and the Gulf War of 1990-91, current levels of 2.5 to 2.8 million bpd are enough to keep bread on the nation's table. An interim concern has been the possibility of Saddam ordering widespread oilfield fires, sharply cutting production for 15-18 months. Long-term, industry professionals estimate a huge as yet unproven estimated reserve in excess of 150 barrels. Added to proven reserves of 112 billion barrels (15 evaluated oilfields of 74 are currently producing), Iraq's petroleum potential rivals the world's largest producer, Saudi Arabia.
The importance of Iraq's water resource cannot be exaggerated. The Tigris River runs from the north through the center of Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. With the mighty Euphrates, the Tigris creates the rich Fertile Crescent in the southern half of the country. The center of the majority Shiite Muslim community, the regime drained the area's rich marshlands where the Garden of Eden and Hanging Gardens of Babylon are reputed to have existed, in retaliation for the Shiites' failed attempt to overthrow Saddam after the first Gulf War. In the process, agricultural capacity as well as the country's most important tourist attraction were eliminated; Iraq's agricultural potential is so great it can once again become a net exporter to the region within 3-5 years.
The Political Outlook.
The political arena is where the postwar battle of Baghdad will be waged. With the exception of a brief period in the 1920's, modern Iraq's experience with democracy has been non-existent (2,600 years ago, in Babylonian days, the government that replaced decadent King Nebuchadnezzar bore some resemblance to democracy).
Across the centuries, the land and people comprising present-day Iraq have been conquered by invaders from the North (Turkey and Great Britain), East (Persia) and West (Syria). Foreign-born and domestic despots have been the rule. The current challenge is whether factional leaders can put aside dreams of dictatorial glory and lead their peoples to a solution that is both representative and effective, as well, hopefully, as democratic.
Iraqis have one advantage: the different ethnic and religious groups had a long history of peaceful cohabitation, until Saddam Hussein made overt efforts to set tribe against tribe, religion against religion. It is difficult to assess the degree to which harmony among the communities has been destroyed. Opposition leaders' harmonious claims notwithstanding, the ability to once again live and work together cannot be accurately predicted. Previous peaceful history plus Iraqis' remarkably high education level, however, give the country a reasonable chance to achieve a workable political framework.
Another delicate issue is whether the United States and its allies will strike the right balance of guidance but not control during months, and perhaps years, of peacekeeping in Baghdad and the other main population centers -- Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul. Delicate but not impossible. The outcome will rest more on perception than on fact, as the prospective victors have neither historic nor evident interest in control or a lengthy occupation.
Analysis: Postwar battle of Baghdad-Part 2
By Hussain Hindawi and John R. Thomson
United Press International
(This is the second article in a 6-part series on Iraq after Saddam Hussein.
With the successful U.S., British and Australian invasion of Iraq, a new era in American-Iraqi and American-Arab relations is at hand, one that can change the face of the entire region, as well as launch a new, yet unpredictable, phase in Iraq's political history.
Many observers expect the United States to dominate postwar Iraq, creating serious long-term consequences throughout Arab nations and the entire Muslim world. Most predict guerrilla-like terrorist reaction in Iraq, other Arab countries and Israel, plus the United States and its interests worldwide.
Some Iraqi analysts do not rule out an armed Iraqi national resistance that would confront allied occupation forces in Iraq and sooner or later inflict such heavy losses that Washington would withdraw from the "Iraqi swamps," as it did 30 years ago from Vietnam. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, apparently believing in such a scenario, told a visiting Vietnamese delegation shortly before the war that his country was unable to stop an American attack but could and would survive. It is to be hoped the swamps of failure will stay drained, postwar, as well.
These analysts have reminded Washington of what happened when British forces invaded the territory that became Iraq early in the 20th century. Hundreds of their troops died during an armed revolt in June 1920, resulting in British withdrawal and eventual recognition of an independent and sovereign Iraq.
Al Thawra, the leader among Iraq's government-controlled media, wrote several months ago that the "Americans and British are trying, more than 80 years after the revolution, to impose a mandate on the Iraqi people under illusionary and foolish pretexts." Stating the two nations "falsely believe that the Iraqi people, who revolted against them in 1920, would succumb today," referring to the rebellion that resulted in 2,300 British killed and wounded versus approximately 8,000 Iraqis.
Recently, however, several Iraqi intellectuals, including Islamists and leftists, have gone the other way and refrained from prejudging U.S. intentions following their country post-Saddam. They have opted not to jump to conclusions, particularly following President George W. Bush's strong assurances of Washington's commitment to help the Iraqi people rid themselves of the ruling Baath Party dictatorship and create a pluralistic and democratic regime that guarantees freedoms and maintains control over Iraq's natural resources.
Most intellectuals, however, remain skeptical of Washington and accept the notion that U.S. interests lie in protecting and expanding American strategic interests by controlling Iraq's oil resources. They said they doubted Washington was as concerned with protecting the victims of Saddam Hussein and expressed suspicion the United States would retract its promises to the Iraqis following Saddam's removal.
A number of pragmatic intellectuals believe the Iraqis should pay the "necessary price" and grant oil concessions, in order to be rid of the current regime. As one prominent Iraqi writer wrote last month in London-based Al Quds al Arabi, the Saddam regime has "treated the Iraqi people worse than a foreign occupying power."
Bush's recent statements that changing the Iraqi regime would pave the way to positive changes in the entire region and that one "dictator will not be replaced by another dictator" have consolidated this trend of thought.
Moreover, several analysts have also received negatively, yet pragmatically, his promises that Iraq's unity and territorial integrity would be maintained and that the Iraqis alone would chose their next government.
The Commandant of the British force that occupied Baghdad in March 1917, Gen. Stanley Maude, spoke similarly to the Iraqi people on entering the Iraqi capital, "I am designated to invite you, through your representatives, to participate in administering your interests; and to assist the British political representatives accompanying the army to support you, north and south, east and west, in achieving your national aspirations."
Maude said the British aim, in opposing German territorial ambitions was to "liberate the people with final and total freedom, and establish governments and national administrations chosen by the national residents."
After recognizing Iraq's nominal independence, Britain sent 150,000 troops to the country, leaving the natives no choice other than armed rebellion to be rid of their British "liberators." Ultimately, Iraq did not effectively achieve independence until the 1958 military overthrow of King Faisal.
Through most of this time, the U.S. image, importantly based on the principles expressed in the 1776 Declaration of Independence, had shone brightly among the Arab elite, until the CIA-backed coup in Iran, overthrowing the government of Mohammed Mossadegh, in 1952.
Concerns over American intentions deepened after the first Baathist coup in 1963, in which an estimated 5,000 leftist and democratic Iraqis perished. American intelligence services' role was well-known, prompting the secretary-general of the Baath Party, Ali Saleh al-Saadi, to say years later that, "We came to power on an American train."
Until Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the Arab image of the United States was political and negative, particularly regarding the Palestinian issue and the perceived American bias toward Israel to the detriment of the Palestinians and Arabs. This, combined with Washington's strong economic interest in secure sources of oil, prompted the famous criticism of the United States' "double standard" regarding democracy.
Arab -- leaders and peasants alike -- came to doubt American sincerity, as, despite regular calls for democracy in the Arab countries, the United States allied itself with autocratic Arab regimes from Morocco to Saudi Arabia, in its quest for reliable sources of petroleum. Thus, the Bush administration's commitment to create a pluralistic and democratic postwar Iraq rings hollow in may quarters. This has been offset to a degree by U.S. support of the divided Iraqi opposition, which has seen that it is unable to topple Saddam without direct American assistance.
The poet Saadi Yousef, widely respected for the power of his poetry as well as his commitment to fighting for the democratization and modernization of Iraq, recently said, "Washington should benefit from its unprecedented influence, to push for finding a democratic alternative, with ethnic and sectarian variety, to Saddam in Iraq." He warned, however, of what he saw as the Bush administration's desire to give former and current Baathist generals "another train to Baghdad," noting the CIA had spent most of the last 10 years financing generals whom Yousef called "neo-fascists." The writer added that after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, "there is a more complicated battle facing the entire United States, which is the right of Muslim nations to liberate themselves from the religious darkness and corrupt regimes."
The challenge confronting the "coalition of the willing" in victory is to assure peaceful selection of a reasonably democratic, secular and stable successor Iraqi government. Moreover, it is imperative to refrain from actual or perceived control of the undoubtedly difficult process.
Analysis: Postwar battle of Baghdad-Part 3
By Hussain Hindawi and John R. Thomson
United Press International
(This is the third of a 6-part series on Iraq after Saddam Hussein.)
As the Iraqi regime has fought for survival, Saddam Hussein has seemed unconcerned with the fate and future of the country's armed forces – as well as the country as a whole. Massive and debilitating changes in the Iraqi army during 35 years of Baath Party rule have changed the armed forces into a force of oppression, both at home and abroad, rather than an institution that defends the integrity of the state and its citizens.
It is therefore essential that in the period immediately following a coalition victory, the armed forces are completely overhauled:
-- to defend Iraq and support the maintenance of law and order;
-- to support but not serve as the governing power;
-- to dismiss all high-ranking officers connected to the discredited Baath Party;
-- to prosecute all officers guilty of major crimes or crimes against humanity; and
-- to re-institute promotions based on merit, rather than ethnic or sectarian factors.
Several phases, most of them negative for the Iraqi military and the population as a whole, transformed the armed services from an institution in defense of the country and its sovereignty, to one primarily entrusted with preserving the ruling party's control of the country during the first decade of Baath rule.
Subsequently, the military became a huge militia loyal to the dictator, led by his family and designated for internal repression and external aggression.
The Iraqi army witnessed huge growth in numbers, armament and fighting experience during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war and was widely regarded as the fourth- or fifth-largest and most powerful army in the world when it invaded Kuwait in 1990.
Virtually every military element was severely degraded during the 1991 Gulf War. Shortly before the start of hostilities, Saddam ordered every offensive aircraft in the Iraqi air force flown for "safekeeping" to archenemy Iran, with the result the aircraft have remained there, rusting in the desert, for 12 years. Nearly 10 percent of the army surrendered shortly after the land war began, having barely fired a shot. In a single battle, two U.S. tanks destroyed 46 Iraqi tanks in a breathtaking display of tactics and firepower. Perhaps most detrimental in terms of threat potential now, Iraq's once vaunted Scud missiles proved hopelessly inaccurate and have not been replaced with anything remotely effective in reaching such targets as Doha, Kuwait, Riyadh and Tel Aviv.
With the exception of very senior military leaders – most of them members of Saddam Hussein's Tikriti tribe -- both officers and men are on starvation wages as they knowingly face a hopeless outcome of the war to come. Real wages have been devastated with steady devaluation of the Iraqi dinar since 1990 and an unending increase of prices for the most basic necessities of life.
Arab diplomatic sources in Baghdad have sharply downplayed the degree of fight the Iraqi army would mount in the event the U.S. coalition attacks Iraq. The conclusion by one senior Arab ambassador in Baghdad is that regime rhetoric of "fierce resistance" to U.S.-led coalition forces will be "very far from reality." The subject is so delicate that any kind of discussion of the armed forces by political parties and the media is taboo and considered treasonous, with the convicted punished by death.
The elite Republican Guard numbers 50,000 and is the best Iraqi fighting force. Western intelligence sources estimate the Iraqi military to number five armies totaling another 380,000 soldiers, with 2,000 tanks and very limited weaponry. What firepower the army possesses is outdated and short-range. Although the air force has a substantial number of airbases and is the best trained branch of the military, serviceable aircraft are limited in number and very outdated.
Distrust among the various national institutions -- the regime, the military and the general populace -- has become a staple of Iraqi life. In 1994, Saddam Hussein established the Fedayeen Saddam, a feared paramilitary unit under the command of his eldest son, Uday. Garrisoned in Baghdad, the 15,000-man force was equipped with tanks, armored vehicles and heavy guns, with the express mission of crushing any internal rebellion against the regime.
Two years ago, Saddam ordered creation of the "Jerusalem (al Quds) army," quickly claiming it numbered millions of volunteers dedicated to liberating Jerusalem from Israeli occupation. In fact, the aim of this new militia was to replace the "Popular army," which had disintegrated in 1991, when many of its members took part in the widespread Shiite rebellion against the regime. The Popular army and its successor Jerusalem army were actually militarized structures designed to contain and control increasingly rebellious Iraqi youth. These "armies" also conveniently absorbed discarded military officers, keeping them at a safe distance from sensitive army positions and the centers of decision-making.
Informed observers predicted the Iraqi army would be compelled to fight a U.S. and British attack. Nevertheless, even the presence of "security" forces aiming guns at their backs could not stop mass desertions, nearly on a scale of 1991, when the Iraqi army was better trained, better armed and with higher morale.
Underlying these predictions is the open distrust between the military high command and lower echelons, particularly fighting units. The Iraqi leadership has created multiple intelligence units within the armed forces to spy on each other, and ban coordination or any direct contact among brigade commanders, fearing conspiracy against the regime.
On the other hand, defecting Iraqi officers regularly praise the courage and nationalism of the regular army and revolutionary guards who might play a decisive role in changing the regime in Baghdad if officers decide to turn against Saddam. Opposition leaders believe such a possibility is very remote, however, since Saddam's tribesmen control all key positions in the armed forces and would abort any attempt to stage a coup. Moreover, Iraqi opposition parties themselves are fractious and weak, with minimal influence over the Iraqi military.
The Iraqi armed forces have become a gravely weakened, sycophantic tool in Saddam's hands and lack a figure capable of winning the respect of the people. A significant accomplishment in post-Saddam Iraq, fundamental to ongoing stability, will be return of an army dedicated to supporting legitimate government and a peaceful society.
Analysis: Iraq's chance for democracy-Part 4
By Hussain Hindawi and John R. Thomson
United Press International
(This is the fourth part of a 6-part series on Iraq after Saddam.)
There can be little doubt: Given a fair chance at it, if the Iraqis win democracy this time, they will hold on to it with all their force and defend it with their lives. Even diehard royalists, romantically loyal to the British-imposed Hashemite rule that held sway for three decades until deposed in 1958 agree that sentiment is overwhelmingly strong for a western-style democracy.
The democratic dream is far stronger than the purported divisions among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. At the London conference of Iraqi opposition groups, in fact, there was more tension among factions within each of these communities, rather between them. One mid-40's leader put it almost poetically: "We are an entire nation that has been kept in the darkest corner of a dungeon. There has been no light, no chance to lead a free life, not a spark of liberty. When we get it this time, we will hold the torch high and never let the flame go out."
Such sentiment may seem melodramatic to those who have not known repression, but the hunger among all classes and kinds of Iraqis is deep and gnawing. The trumped up demonstrations for Saddam Hussein may have looked enthusiastic; in fact, the energy expelled on these occasions was a release of nervous tension at the hopelessly depressing life led by an estimated 90 percent of the population.
Numerous non-Iraqi observers believe that installation of a successful multi-party democratic political system in post-Saddam could become an example for the entire region. The fact that examples of democratic rule are few, partial and fragile in other Arab and Islamic countries does not mean there is not a popular longing for major changes in governance. Fledgling examples such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia are viewed with longing by millions who have lived under autocratic rule for centuries.
Quite simply, there is no history of genuine democracy, anywhere in the Islamic world. Yet educated Muslim cadres have called for the equivalent of democracy for centuries. Increasingly, Muslim economists, sociologists and educators are expressing the view that introduction of democracy is a major condition for the rise of a peaceful and prosperous society.
It is also true that democracy in one country surrounded by autocratic regimes cannot possibly survive. The threat to the old autocracies is too great. There must be positive and strategic interaction among democratically leaning Arab states. Iraq, with Egypt the most developed and influential of Arab countries, is an excellent place to set the example.
Not one of the other major Arab states has a regime willing to cultivate a democratic climate. Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Sudan and Tunisia all have regimes that have no interest in handing anything more token control to elected representatives. Egypt, the single most influential Arab nation, had taken significant democratic steps under Anwar Sadat. Sadly, with Hosni Mubarak well into his third decade in the Presidency and grooming his son to succeed him, it has become a "demockery."
While there exist fears of a U.S. occupation and limited confidence in American protestations that the main aim of the war with Iraq is to "liberate" the Iraqi people; Washington's promises to introduce democracy are welcomed by a huge majority of Iraqis. There is a firm conviction that democracy can solve the country's problems at home and abroad, and put an end to the quarter century of strong-arm rule imposed by Saddam.
Iraqi intellectuals and politicians argue that the essential factors of democracy have long existed in the country, having experienced a reasonable level of democracy under a benign royal presence for three decades prior to deposing the Hashemite King Faisal in 1958. In fact, Iraqi historians claim democracy first dawned in Mesopotamia (ancient Iraq), centuries before it was discovered by the Greeks.
One factor that helps the introduction of democracy in Iraq is the "natural internal plurality," with the country home to a variety of races, ethnic groups, religions and sects grown military dictatorships.
A second factor is the shared feeling among all Iraqis that "Iraq is for all its citizens without exception." There is a genuine popular objective to create a political system based on equal rights and responsibilities for all citizens. In addition, long periods of foreign domination have produced a population as opposed of foreign influence as it is to domestic dictatorial rule. Once rid of Saddam, any prolonged occupation by foreign troops will stir thoughts of Turkish Ottoman rule and British occupation, complete with moving memories of bloody rebellion against the foreign presence. Unless benign and brief, coalition occupation will become a major problem, both in Baghdad and abroad among the disappointed opponents to the current military solution.
In Babylonian times, Iraqis believe the land then known as Mesopotamia enjoyed political, economic and cultural prosperity and attribute it to the democratic model created at the time. "People's councils" and "senates" existed under Babylonian and Sumerian rule, providing great popular decision-making powers, especially concerning war and peace.
Iraq can secure a better future after Saddam's departure, despite destruction and corruption of the state institutions by the departing regime. The key lies in one of Saddam's few positive legacies, carried over from predecessor regimes: a remarkably effective education system. This factor, plus extensive experience by the exile community, provide the capacity to re-establish viable institutions from the corrupted rubble of the ancien regime.
Kenaan Makiya, Iraqi scholar in residence at Harvard University, firmly believes his country can be "a force for democracy" in the Middle East, based on the broad consensus within the Iraqi opposition that governance in post-Saddam Iraq should be via representative democracy with a federal structure. Indeed, a democratic Iraq provides the only viable solution for the country's recovery. The widespread realization of this imperative weighs heavily in favor of its chances for success.
In Makiya's view, the Iraqi people have the ability to form and manage the new institutions needed to replace the departing governmental structure. In a recent interview, he said, "Iraq is rich enough and developed enough, and has the human resources to become as great a force for democracy and economic reconstruction in the Arab and Muslim world as it has been a force for autocracy and destruction in the past." Millions of his countrymen hope he is right.
Analysis: Iraq's oil ordeal-Part 5
By Hussain Hindawi and John R. Thomson
United Press International
(This is the fifth part of a 6-part series on Iraq after Saddam.)
More than 60 years ago an Iraqi poet predicted "Iraq will burn with its oil." Colorful imagery notwithstanding, his comment on the news of Iraq's first petroleum revenues proved to be accurate, respecting the social and political chaos that has ensued.
The sadly poetic prophecy has been emphasized countless times in subsequent decades, as the country's "black gold" proved to be a curse and the cause of manifold miseries, including foreign occupations, military coups, internal and external wars and world-class human rights violations.
It was oil that served as Saddam Hussein's weapon of choice to intimidate, coerce and kill his Kurdish and Shiite countrymen and invade Iran and Kuwait, and the means by which he amassed unimaginable personal wealth. Earlier, oil had been the overriding reason for Britain's occupation in 1941 and oil was the driving force behind the first Baathist coup in 1963 and the second in 1968, supported financially by British and U.S. oil companies.
Currently, foreign diplomats and domestic opposition leaders take as a given that Russian and French rejection of the U.S.-led coalition's drive to remove Saddam is based on hugely lucrative oil contracts and not a few believe oil to be the primary motivation behind the United States' unyielding determination to depose the dictator.
Are there more oil fires in Iraq's future, beyond those lit by retreating Saddam supporters?
The paradox, or perhaps the problem, is that there appears to be no end to oil discoveries, so much so that industry experts believe Iraq may well replace Saudi Arabia as having the largest proven reserves and highest production.
Just 15 of 74 proven oil fields are in production and of the 59 that are untapped, 10 rank among the largest oil fields in the world. Moreover, of 526 known and evaluated petroleum structures that have been classified as potential prospects, 125 have been drilled. It is these fields which French and Russian oil companies covet and for which they had been vying for signed agreements with the ancien regime.
Iraq boasts 112 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves, plus an estimated 150 billion to 250 billion barrels of as yet unproven oil, enough to supplant Saudi Arabia, currently ranked as having the world's largest oil reserves.
Production of Iraqi petroleum, limited under international sanctions imposed since 1990, stands at 2.8 million barrels per day, down sharply from an estimated 3.6 million bpd in the first half of 1980, before outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war.
Iraq's Oil Ministry had planned last year to develop 350 wells across the country under contracts with several Russian and French oil firms. Major emphasis was to be on the huge southern oil fields as part of an ambitious plan to increase production to 6 million bpd.
Some oil experts view the United States as having, at best, mixed motives for toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. The stated objective of disarming Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is considered -- important but convenient cover for Washington to reduce its dependence on Saudi oil, as well as to guarantee U.S. supervision of Iraq's oil bounty. Ultimately, America and its coalition partners had multiple objectives, including restructuring the region's numerous undemocratic regimes, starting with Iraq, appear to benefit Iraqi and liberator alike.
Paradoxically, U.S. refineries continued to be the largest importer of Iraqi oil, while the Bush administration simultaneously mobilized its forces to topple Saddam's regime. A recent report by the U.S. Department of Commerce revealed that Iraqi oil shipments to the United States had tripled in the fourth quarter of last year, constituting about 6.4 percent of U.S. oil imports.
Whatever the mix of coalition motives, oil will be a central element affecting Iraqi events. Whether the status quo is maintained, or an alternative leadership loyal to the United States is installed in Baghdad, or the victors administer the country following its occupation, oil will figure prominently.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the United States would control the oil resources from the outset, "to manage them for the interest of the Iraqi people." Nonetheless, it is widely presumed that U.S. energy companies seek long-term involvement in the rehabilitation and expansion of Iraq's oil industry.
One scenario predicts the United States will increase Iraq's oil production to 8 million bpd (compared to 2.8 million currently), with the aim of breaking the authority of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries lowering oil prices and reducing dependency on Saudi oil.
French analysts fear that contracts negotiated and initialed between French oil firms and the Saddam regime are in jeopardy, recalling former CIA director James Woolsey's warning that only if the French and Russians cooperated with the United States in replacing Saddam's regime, would U.S. companies be inclined to cooperate with their counterparts in these two countries.
One Arab observer muses on an "either or" situation: "How will Iraq's oil revenues be used? To finance the coalition occupation after its invasion without explicit U.N authorization? Or to concentrate on improving the lives of Iraqis so they may savor the taste of change?" He said it was important to differentiate between the two situations -- the first an occupation managed by Washington, and the second the empowering of a new Iraqi government.
In the first case, the United States would be the primary party responsible for all of Iraq, importantly including its oil, giving Washington a chance to weaken, if not destroy, OPEC. It would exploit Iraq's oil reserves as a means to reduce the influence of the other Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, plus enable more Iraqi oil to be pumped at lower prices to the American market. In addition, it would punish countries opposed to the U.S.-British use of force, particularly France, Germany and Russia.
How the new Iraqi government deals with OPEC and existing production and pricing commitments will have significant impact on the petroleum industry, worldwide. Russia, with $7 billion to $8 billion of aging Soviet-era loans owed to it, would have benefited significantly from exploration and production deals between Russian oil companies and Iraq, as part of a larger comprehensive economic agreement.
Just last year the French successfully negotiated an agreement to develop the Majnoun field, believed to contain 30 billion barrels of oil. This freshly initialed agreement must be considered in jeopardy, as is France's overall favored commercial position with Iraq for the past 30 years, with President Jacques Chirac a prime player.
The heat of war, coupled with steadily increasing climactic temperatures, can only contribute to the super-heated atmosphere in which occupying officials and new Iraqi political leaders negotiate and plan the country's oil future. It can only be hoped the situation will not once again burn Iraqis as they seek to build a new and just society.
Analysis: Radical change ahead in Arabia-Part 6
By Hussain Hindawi and John R. Thomson
United Press International
(This is the final installment of a 6-part series on Iraq after Saddam Hussein.)
The run-up to the second Gulf War made it clear: when the dust had settled, neither Iraq nor the Middle East would be the same. Even in the unlikely event Saddam Hussein or his Baath Party had retained power, radical change was in the air.
A new Middle Eastern order was launched March 20, with crucial shifts in the political situation in Iraq and the region. Iraq's relations with the United States and the rest of the world are still in development; however, change they will, as will Iraqi-Arab relations and other inter-Arab ties. As a prime example, the Arab League in its current form and structure, is poised to disappear, and there will be other significant political, security and economic changes, regionwide.
The war's aftermath will depend largely on Washington's ongoing strategy regarding Iraq and the Middle East as a whole. Apart from eliminating both the Saddam regime and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the next steps remain to be revealed in the coming months.
U.S. promises of a freely chosen, democratic government appear genuine but will be met with sharp challenges from the various contending political factions, as well as diehard elements of Iraq's ancien regime. It will take time to clarify the genuine will of the people, the best intentions of the victorious armies notwithstanding.
The United States must act promptly and unambiguously to fulfill the coalition's declarations that the war's aim was not to colonize but to free the Iraqi people from Saddam's dictatorship, once weapons of mass destruction have been eliminated. Despite undoubted challenges, if Washington and London manifestly help Iraqis build a democratic, unified and independent state, they will greatly strengthen their strategic interests, particularly if coupled with decisive U.S.-led efforts to achieving Palestinian-Israeli peace and creation of an independent, stable Palestinian state.
As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell projected prior to hostilities, the Iraqis gaining democracy will result in a restructuring of the Middle East that can genuinely serve the interests of the people in the region as well as the United States, very possibly contributing to settling the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. On the other hand, were Washington perceived as not having met its promised objectives, chaos would prevail, with grave damage to U.S., British and Israeli interests throughout the region.
Besides undertaking a major effort to settle the tortured Palestinian-Israeli situation, the issue of the autocratic and unrepresentative governments throughout the region must be addressed. As the war against Iraq approached, many Arab governments took Saddam's presumed departure as a fait accompli, with privately or publicly stated support. Iraqi authorities, notably supported by Libya and Syria, lashed at Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, accusing them of cooperation and collaboration with the United States and Britain. The lack of a united Arab position was painfully clear.
Most striking was the chaotic Cairo meeting of Arab League foreign ministers, where an open split erupted, between those wanting Saddam to remain and those seeking his exile. Coming only months after a similarly divisive heads of state meeting in Beirut over support for Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's formula for a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, the Arab League appears damaged beyond repair in anything approaching present form.
The disarray in what was formerly referred to optimistically as the Arab nation reflects widely diverging political and economic outlooks, which in turn provides an opportunity for genuinely popular regime changes. Years of corrupt, autocratic, corrupt rule have created huge anti-regime popular support. The result is revolutionary divisions in the Palestinian community, in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, as well as across the Gulf in non-Arab Iran.
Most Arab governments privately dread a democratic Iraq next door and have lately reacted by expressing doubt for U.S. intentions. For them, the Baath party remaining in power is preferable to it being replaced by a government antithetical to their regimes.
In Syria, the nominally Baathist regime is noticeably worried, having squashed young Syrian President Bashar Assad's reform-based attempts to maintain the party's dictatorship. In the past few weeks, Damascus has switched from support for removal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to outspoken opposition to the U.S.-led coalition.
Syria is not alone, with autocratic governments in Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Tunisia clearly concerned that a precedent-setting democratic regime could come to power in Baghdad. Many observers contend the popular anti-war protests that swept most Arab countries, with almost daily clashes between the masses and authorities, were not pro-Saddam so much as protests against their own governments.
The stage in fact is set for a reversal of the heretofore steadily increasing negative view of the United States in the Arab street. Continued emphasis by Washington on political liberalism and settlement of the Palestinian crisis are the keys to what can be a radical change for the better in popular attitudes toward the United States.
Iran's government also fears a democratic Iraq in its backyard, especially since it thwarted popular will and failed to introduce political reforms for which millions have been demonstrating for more than a year. Even democratic Turkey and Israel are concerned that a democratic Iraq will confront their expansionist aspirations -- in northern Iraq for Ankara, and in the Arab territories captured in 1967 for Jerusalem.
Arab countries bordering the Gulf are at best wary of a democratic Iraq due to the very limited steps taken to liberalize their political systems, especially in Saudi Arabia the leading member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. These regimes benefited for years from common opposition to the Iraqi regimes and adventures of Baath activists. There has been a sympathetic attitude toward the Iraqi people in the Gulf countries, whose residents generally view Iraq's history of cultural, political and educational achievement with admiration and respect.
In a recent study in the United Arab Emirates, Gulf intellectuals strongly criticized their regimes, particularly their obvious fear of public pressure for democratic freedoms following the anticipated war and Saddam's ouster. One key Gulf personality went as far as saying that Gulf peoples care about Iraq more than any other country in the world, including their own.
An article in the Kuwait daily Al-Siyassa said the Arab Gulf countries will soon face the need to accept political plurality as a result of a representative regime in Iraq "that will place the Gulf countries under pressure to accept democracy."
Several Gulf countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, have taken tentative steps toward introducing representative elements in their political systems. Saudi Arabia has called for change in the Arab political order but has done nothing tangible to implement reform at home.
Parallel to the anticipated move toward democracy, the 22-member Arab League appears on the verge of withering away or at least changing drastically. Having descended into open name calling, it has lost any semblance of consensus or ability to act. As one retired diplomat noted ironically, "The league has no credibility. It has become merely a source of employment for unwanted Arab officials and retired diplomats ... like me."
With establishment of non-dictatorial regimes taking root, it is possible to envision a multi-country association to include Iraq and the Gulf states, plus Yemen, Turkey and Iran. Such a grouping could have political, economic and military dimensions and might eventually include Israel, provided a peace settlement is achieved that creates an independent Palestine.
As peace and reform take hold in Iraq, there will be significant change in the political structures of virtually every country in the Middle East. The process will not be rapid, easy or in some cases, necessarily peaceful. Moreover, protracted patience and skilled diplomacy by the United States, Great Britain and other interested powers, if the changes are to be positive for everyone concerned.
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(Hussain Hindawi is a native Iraqi historian, humanitarian and journalist who currently serves as Editor of UPI's Arabic News Service. John R. Thomson has been involved in the Middle East since 1966 as businessman, diplomat and journalist. He has lived in Beirut, Cairo and Riyadh, and reported extensively during and after the 1967 Six Day War, and the 1990-91 Gulf War. From their differing backgrounds and perspectives, the authors assess the risks and opportunities facing those who would set Iraq and by extension, the Middle East on a positive and peaceful course.)
