WASHINGTON, May 18 (UPI) -- First of two parts
During April, the problem of Iraq's ethnic and sectarian militias has gained more and more attention. Some articles have claimed they have become as serious a problem as the insurgency, or an even more serious prelude to civil war.
There is no doubt that Iraq's ethnic and sectarian tensions have continued to grow since late 2004, and accelerated during 2005. The failure to form a government of any kind, more sectarian and ethnic violence in virtually every mixed area in Iraq, and a lack of local security in much of the country have all increased the risk of civil conflict.
No one can really quantify the number of force relocations, killings, kidnappings, extortions, and other acts that are pushing Iraqis apart. No one, however, doubts that thousands of Iraqis have died, and ethnic cleansing, mixed with crime and local feuds, have affected the lives of tens of thousands. The true total to date may be in the hundreds of thousands, and certainly is if Iraqis who have moved or fled from fear are included.
This cannot, however, be blamed simply on the militias. The dividing lines in Iraq are far more complex. Crime is a constant problem and a threat to security, and is often mixed with ties to sectarian groups or local political factions. If there are no local militias or security forces, there almost always are criminals. In many areas there are both, and sectarian and ethnic forces can extort while criminals can claim to serve an ethnic or sectarian cause.
The more mixed a neighborhood or area is, the more the lines are blurred. In general, the more homogeneous the area, the better organized local security forces are, although sometimes at the cost of more sectarian and ethnic "cleansing." In many such areas, however, it is not some party militia in the national sense that really is involved, but a local security force or element loyal to a local leader. In a number of areas, the police are also loyal to a given leader and there are no clear lines of demarcation. In others, the police simply do not act.
Crime is a constant problem in every troubled area, and this is much of urban and sometimes rural Iraq. Ordinary criminals, part-time criminals, and "gangs," are all a threat, and they can easily be part of the local security force, a militia, police, or ex-police with IDs and uniforms.
As was the case in the Balkans, so many young men are out of work that the term "criminal" or "gang member" doesn't mean much. "Crime" is often the key to income of any kind. The irony is that the security services, military, and police are often the only major new source of real jobs in such areas, other than the paid militias -- generally paid much lower, local security forces -- very low pay, security guards or protection forces -- often paid even less, and insurgency -- paid sometimes.
The end result is not a militia threat per se, but rather an increasingly blurred mix of all of the security elements in Iraq, of which the militias are only a part. The Iraqi forces are all plagued by desertions and AWOLs that can go into the militias, local security forces, crime and the insurgency. In addition to the actual use of militias, sects and ethnic factions make use of police and security services. The end result is a virtual "stew" of factional forces with different recruiting bases and cross-membership.
This is compounded by the real-world nature of today's militias. Today's militias are not the militias of 2003. The military, security services, and police all recruited extensively from the pre-invasion militias once they began to form in 2003, and have drawn on them ever since. Many of the best elements of the militias were blended into the Iraqi forces from the spring of 2004 onwards, although best does not mean loyalty to the nation versus sectarian or ethnic faction.
--
(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.)
--
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
