MOSCOW, May 12 (UPI) -- First of two parts
It is important to keep in mind several facts when analyzing the debates on the Iranian nuclear file in the United Nations Security Council on May 9. To start with, on April 28 the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, presented a new report on the Iranian nuclear program. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported on some additional Iranian explanations. He also said that some of his previous concerns and suspicions had not been allayed. Moreover, the IAEA has not yet analyzed some of Iran's replies.
The main news so far is that the Iranians are successfully carrying out a pilot uranium-enrichment project, just as they have declared. As of May 1, enrichment reached 4.8 percent. By so doing, they are displaying total disregard for the wishes of the world community. Tehran has irritated even those who were eager to help it avoid the dangerous confrontation.
But these were merely "wishes." Under the Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, while readiness to implement voluntary confidence-building measures is not a legal commitment, and their duration cannot be indefinite.
As usual, the IAEA report displayed the unparalleled skills of UN bureaucrats to quote enough arguments to substantiate any position. But the conclusion is obvious -- there is no definite evidence of Iran's military nuclear program, and, hence, no reason to submit a resolution on sanctions to the Security Council. As before, its five permanent members are not unanimous on settling the situation.
In his report ElBaradei used a politically correct term "suspension of all enrichment." This is what the European Union Three, or EU3 of Britain, france and Germany suggested in its initial compromise proposal, which was logical and left much room for maneuver at the talks. But once U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice came into play, this potential carrot disappeared from the EU3 proposal, and was replaced with the term "cessation." In effect, this has frustrated EU3 mediation.
Moreover, it seems that neither the United States, nor Iran were too unhappy about this failure. Many analysts believe that for all the public statements of U.S. high-rankers, by and large Washington was neither interested in the success of the Moscow proposal to set up for Iran a joint uranium-enrichment center on Russian territory.
Iran's contradictory and dubious attitude to this proposal shows that it has its own plans on settling the situation around its nuclear program.
We know little about decision-makers in Tehran -- merely that they belong to a very narrow circle of the ruling elite, the dowreh. But it is abundantly clear that many of them are convinced that U.S. help is indispensable for a comprehensive solution, also involving bilateral relations. Apparently, the recent unexpected U.S.-Indian nuclear deal has made a great impression on the Iranian top leaders and convinced them that in principle it is possible to strike a deal with President George W. Bush without go-betweens.
This is exactly what Washington wants to achieve tacitly. It does not want to allow other countries, even its NATO allies, not to mention the reviving Russia, to take part in solving any major geopolitical problems, particularly when it comes to a former strategic ally and key player on the oil market.
This explains the obvious deadlock of the problem. The clandestine forces are subverting the visible negotiating process.
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(Lt. Gen. Gennady Yevstafyev, Ret., is a former senior officer of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, also known as the SVR. Now he is a senior adviser at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia or PIR Center. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
