NEW YORK, March 8 (UPI) -- Talks between U.S. and North Korean diplomats in New York this week, on top of the Feb. 13 agreement in the six-party talks on initial actions for the implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement, represent meaningful progress toward resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, at long last.
Clearly, the stage is set within the framework of the six-party talks to resolve an issue that has festered since 1990: ending North Korea's nuclear program. But what is required to move forward is a deeper understanding of what North Korea really wants and the dynamics of its political culture. If these are properly understood, the North Korean nuclear issue can be resolved much more easily.
For years North Korean propaganda called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula, but in fact, that is the last thing Pyongyang wants. Yet evidence indicates North Korea's top leadership does not wish to remain permanent enemies with the United States. There is a desire to change the adversarial relationship. North Korea has assessed the "colonial" management styles of the United States, China, Russia and Japan, and concluded that only with the United States would they be able to maintain their status as an independent nation.
Meanwhile, the North's position on China has changed. It no longer trusts China as a guarantor of its independence. North Korea's top leaders hold animosity toward China for the way, in their perception, China has used them for their own benefit, including in the six-party talks. Furthermore, the DPRK leadership fears that China considers Kim Jong Il too independent. North Korea does not feel its security is guaranteed in its relationship with China, even though it temporarily accommodates Beijing to sustain its economy.
North Korea perceives it is under enormous pressure from China, with whom it shares an 880-mile border, and fears its days of national independence may be numbered. It considers China's "Northeast Project" an attempt by scholars to claim that northern Korea historically was part of China, to be a "shot across the bow." Chinese investment in the DPRK economy has skyrocketed since 2002.
While a revived North Korean economy will benefit China's three northeast "rust belt" provinces, there is a growing concern that an invigorated DPRK economy could be compelled to integrate into China's.
In principle, the six-party talks are an appropriate format for resolving not only the nuclear issue, but matters related to creating a permanent peninsular peace regime. After all, each of the four major powers bears some responsibility for Korea's division, or maintaining it. The United States has given astonishing responsibility to China to host the six-party talks on the premise it is the one nation with influence over the North. But this has also bestowed considerable regional prestige to China at the expense of American influence. Will the end result of China's work in the talks eventually be the economic absorption of the North? That would indeed bring long-term stability to the region, a chief U.S. objective, but would also be another historical injustice inflicted upon the Korean people.
A number of American experts on Korean affairs argue that the long-term solution to the North Korea problem is its economic absorption, preferably by South Korea but even by China. The reality is that South Korea has limited economic influence with North Korea at present, despite its potential; yet, China's economic leverage over the North is overwhelming and intimidating.
The problem with U.S. economic and political pressure on the North is that it pushed the DPRK further into the hands of China. Another byproduct would be the further decline of U.S. influence on the peninsula, and in Northeast Asia as a whole. It makes more sense for the United States to have normal relations with both Koreas, just as China maintains ties and influence with both. The United States should preserve its influence in East Asia for the sake of keeping the balance of power among China, Russia and Japan.
While maintenance of U.S. pressure on North Korea has made sense from a limited perspective, it did not take into account the wider picture and its implications. The U.S. may win the battle by successfully circumscribing North Korea's room for maneuver, causing it to make choices it could previously avoid, but it could lose the war by placing North Korea into Chinese custody, wittingly or unwittingly, and disengaging from the peninsula.
While the idea of engaging North Korea may be repugnant to some Americans, it in fact is the best avenue not only to solve the nuclear issue, but to ensure Korean reunification does not become a lost dream. There is a way to effectively engage North Korea: through senior-level engagement, not merely through mid-level bureaucrats with limited authority.
North Korea is anxious for high-level U.S. visits, such as by Condoleezza Rice, James Baker, or even former President George Bush. Once trust is built on that level, and in the North Korean public eye, it will bring about attitudinal change, new dynamics and new possibilities for both sides. In the end, we may find North Korea slowly willing to trade the security guarantee of its nuclear weapons for the security guarantee of a strategic friendship with the United States. In this sense, we have before us a historical opportunity with North Korea much like President Nixon had with China.
U.S. insistence on legitimate but simultaneous demands -- such as North Korea ceasing criminal activities in addition to dismantling its nuclear program -- has been counterproductive, and the North simply dug in its heels. It is easy to see that North Korea's nuclear test last October was to demonstrate it will not bend to U.S. pressure, and to strengthen its bargaining position.
The status of existing nuclear weapons is a new wrinkle that did not exist when the Joint Statement was signed in September 2005. By placing the nuclear issue as the top priority in the context of senior-level engagement and leadership trust-building, the Bush administration is likely to see a major breakthrough with North Korea because of the North's strategic need to forge strong ties with the United States.
In the end, the United States should take responsibility -- in alliance with South Korea and Japan -- to ensure the best possible international environment that can lead to Korean unification supported by the four regional powers. Let's hope that a date will be set in the near future for Condoleezza Rice to visit Pyongyang.
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(Dr. Mark P. Barry coordinates the Northeast Asia Peace Initiative of the Universal Peace Federation, an NGO in consultative status with the United Nations, in Tarrytown, New York.)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
