SEOUL, March 5 (UPI) -- Kim Dae-jung, former South Korean president and Nobel Peace Prize winner, must be feeling a sense of vindication now that the Bush administration is speaking to "axis of evil" member North Korea. Kim was the architect of the "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea during his presidency from 1998 to 2002. The high point of this initiative, the 2000 summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang, won Kim Dae-jung his Nobel Peace Prize.
Until its recent shift in approach, the Bush administration rejected and criticized engagement with North Korea as a policy based on wishful thinking, preferring to isolate and pressure the regime there. In an interview with United Press International, Kim said that such a policy undercut U.S. long term interests in the peninsula by driving North Korea more deeply into China's sphere of influence.
The Bush administration entered office in 2001 deeply mistrustful of engagement with North Korea. Finding evidence that North Korea was secretly enriching uranium for nuclear use, in breach of earlier agreements, it reversed the Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea and refused direct talks with North Korea until it took steps to dismantle its nuclear program.
The rejection of engagement became a source of tension between the U.S. and South Korea. The U.S. believed that engagement was simply a means for the North to get aid while offering nothing in return. This position gained support when it was revealed in 2003 that hundreds of millions of dollars had been channeled secretly to the North from business supporters of Kim and from the government to open the path to the 2000 summit.
However, the tougher U.S. policy did not improve North Korean behavior. After six years the only visible results were that North Korea had test launched a variety of missiles last July and then detonated a nuclear device in October. Last month the U.S. shifted back to a diplomatic strategy and the outlines of a grand bargain were agreed at the six-party talks in Beijing, the regional framework for discussing North Korea's nuclear weapons.
While the devil is in the details, which remain to be hashed out, the agreement would offer the North energy assistance and, from the U.S., security guarantees and full diplomatic recognition in return for the verifiable dismantling of their nuclear weapons program. Successful progress in these areas could culminate in a peace treaty to replace the current armistice and formally end the Korean War.
Kim Dae-jung applauded these developments, saying that he was "cautiously optimistic" about their prospects but warning that "hardliners in the U.S. might stop all improvement" in relations with North Korea. We met at his residence next to the presidential library and museum in a room whose walls were hung with awards and photos, including several Time and Newsweek covers sporting his image.
Kim, frail in appearance but clear in speech and thought, argued that dialogue was needed because other approaches had not worked. The military option was off the table because of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and the proximity of Seoul to North Korean missiles.
The result of earlier U.S. rejection of negotiation was that "North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors" from their nuclear facilities, and "abandoned the missile moratorium" of 1999 in which North Korea declared it would no longer test long-range missiles.
As for sanctions, "they cannot resolve the issue when China is providing aid to North Korea." In fact, Kim believes that a policy of sanctions and isolation of North Korea runs counter to long-term U.S. interests in the region and damages the prospects for Korean unification. "Already China has advanced deeply into the North Korean economy," he said and such a policy will only push them closer to China. South Korea in turn will feel increasing pressure from a growing Chinese presence in the north and "that is not good for the U.S."
Engagement, on the other hand, means that "South Korea will advance into the North Korean economy and this will be an advantage." This would serve U.S. interests in the region through constraining the spread of Chinese influence. "North Koreans secretly fear China and want relations with the south," Kim said.
Kim admitted that one of his biggest concerns about the recent agreement was that "North Korea will not keep its promises." However, he believes that North Korea wants such an agreement and that its implementation does not depend on open-ended trust of North Korea. During their ten hours of dialogue at the June 2000 summit Kim Jong Il "clearly wanted to improve relations with the U.S." He told Kim Dae-jung he was ready to allow direct inspections of his nuclear sites in return for normalization of relations with the U.S. and security guarantees.
There is "no excuse for North Korea to reject such an offer if the U.S. delivers," Kim said. In any case an implementation that proceeds "step by step and action for action will not allow North Korea room not to keep its promises," he added.
The other five countries in the six-party talks -- China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, together with the U.S. -- should first agree that they "will take collective countermeasures" if North Korea does not keep its promises. Kim believes that "China would work with the U.S. on countermeasures" since "for China, North Korean nuclear weapons could be a nightmare because of the risk of proliferation" in the region.
UPI met former President Kim with Gary Spanovich, executive director of the Oregon-based Wholistic Peace Institute. Spanovich arranged the meeting to invite Kim to attend the Institute's June conference in Portland. The Institute has organized peace conferences with a number of Nobel Peace laureates and develops peace curricula for schools based on their experiences and insights.
