Around the world Somalia has become the example of what political science specialists call a "failed state." In its case that failure is particularly outstanding.
All other states between the Sahara and southern Africa had to cope with the fact that the colonial powers drew their boundaries with little or no regard to tribal lines. Their borders cut trough tribes' territories. A person in one country therefore was closer to a kinsman across the international border than to a fellow citizen.
Not so in Somalia. The overwhelming majority (85 percent according to the CIA's website) is Somali. However the Somali clans have fought one another and at times it seemed their enmity towards Ethiopia, with whom they have a border dispute, is a unifying factor.
Now Ethiopia has invaded Somalia and helped reinstall the Transitional Federal Government and President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad back in the capital, Mogadishu. The Union of Islamic Courts, which ruled there, fled.
Nicola Pedde, director of Globe Research, a Rome-based think tank that focuses on the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, noted in bitterlemons.org, that Somalis have never been strong religious zealots. Somalia does not have a strong religious tradition or history.
The Islamic courts had dealt with administrative, social and religious duties. They were a solution to the decline in the clans' traditional roles, Pedde wrote.
In 2005 the most important courts joined forces, eventually conquered Mogadishu, central and southern Somalia and relegated the dreaded warlords and the government (that comprised clan elders, foreign-educated professionals and former warlords) to Baidoa.
Somalis welcomed the new rulers as a positive element of stability. The rulers re-established order at the local level and confronted the warlords' arrogant armed militias, Pedde noted.
But over time about dozen major factions emerged in the most important courts, and conflicts mounted.
Foreign Muslim elements appeared. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait became main sources of funding and much of the money went to religious and social infrastructures in and around Mogadishu.
According to Pedde, "Elements in Pakistani intelligence along with Pakistani private entities and charitable funds were also suspected not only of financing some religious organizations but of favoring the illegal entry into Somalia of terrorists from Afghanistan."
Eventually Iran became their most important source of potential support. There were several reasons for that.
Iran wanted to transform Somalia into a "third front" in case of a major international crisis. Tehran was critical of the Saudi involvement in southern Iraq and with the Kurds in northern Iraq. The southern Iraqis are Shiite-Muslims and the Kurds have relatives in Iran.
Somalia is "an arena where Iranian financial and military support could threaten regional Saudi interests," Pedde noted.
Moreover, Iran wanted to determine whether the Somalis were right in claiming they had "rich and easy to develop" uranium mines, he added.
The Somalis had only partial and probably temporary interest in interacting with Iran. It is Shiite-Muslim, they are Sunnis but they reckoned Iran would be a good and temporary partner in their feud with Ethiopia.
Moreover, Abdulkardir Omar Addani and Adan Hashi Farah (Airo) who led Somalia's most important Shabab (youth) faction, believed Iran would be a stable source of support and a partner "linked with jihadi forces throughout the Middle East," Pedde wrote.
The Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas sent over instructors, he said.
Tensions within the courts' factions mounted and they were "on the brink of an internal clash."
They differed on political, social and religious issues as well as the Shabab's role. The Shabab was their only real armed group. It could count on some 3,000 armed and trained men as well as an additional, more poorly equipped and trained force, of about 6,000 men.
The Islamist militias tried to encircle Baidoa and the government's forces but miscalculated. They did not consider the Ethiopian army's real potential.
The Ethiopians intervened, the Islamist forces collapsed, and Mogadishu was abandoned after tribal leaders suggested that the courts quickly leave the capital.
The population expelled the Islamist militias but greeted the Ethiopians with stones and burning tires.
A renewed sense of Somali nationalism now seems to be emerging. It is the first time in more than a decade.
However, Somalia faces "enormous threats," Pedde wrote.
One is the warlords. Somalis dread the idea they will return. If the government fails to allay those fears -- and do so quickly -- the door will reopen to instability and possibly the Islamic Courts' return.
The Ethiopian presence also poses a dilemma. Somalis are suspicious of the Ethiopians and the longer they stay in Somalia, the more difficult it would be for the government to gain popular support. On the other hand, if they leave too soon the Islamist militias could regroup.
The thickly forested Lower Juba region, in southern Somalia, is a perfect place to hide and the Islamist forces could establish a temporary base there, waiting for the moment to strike, Pedde maintained.
Foreign terrorists and instructors arrived there before the latest fighting. The Islamist militias have not been totally defeated. Forces and materiel could cross the border from the already unstable territories in northern Kenya and southern Sudan, both of which are sanctuaries of terrorist cells, he added.
