AMMAN, Jordan, June 10 (UPI) -- A cartoon: Like a mythological creature, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi holds up his own bleeding decapitated head as five new Zarqawi heads are popping out of his neck.
The cartoon in Lebanon's al-Mustaqbal daily relays a general view in the Arab world that the relief over the death of al-Qaida's Zarqawi in a U.S. air strike in Iraq Wednesday might be short-lived and rejoicing premature since the conditions in the Middle east, which created Zarqawi, are highly likely to create more of his kind.
Leaders around the world did not hide their euphoria over the man's death, and victories were proclaimed from Baghdad to Washington amid speculations that the successful military operation against Zarqawi's hideout was a powerful blow to terrorism.
Jordan quietly took credit for collecting and providing much of the intelligence information that led the Iraqis and Americans to Zarqawi's safe house in the village of Hibhib just outside Baqouba in Diala province. American F-16 fighters plunged 1,000-pound bombs that killed him and five others, including a woman and a child and his spiritual guide.
Zarqawi, born in the impoverished town of Zarqa in 1966 as Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalayleh, was sentenced to death four times, in absentia, by Jordan's State Security Court on terrorism charges and was the kingdom's most wanted fugitive.
Since he claimed responsibility for a November suicide attack on three hotels in Amman that killed 60 people and injured 100 others, Jordan's intelligence services began what sources describe as "pre-emptive operations" to infiltrate al-Qaida in Iraq's network.
Jordanian covert operations inside Iraq and the capture of one of the network's Iraqi members by the Jordanian authorities last month are believed to have been instrumental in tracking him down.
While officials in Amman made a point to avoid taking much credit for the U.S. military operation against Zarqawi to avoid retaliation attacks in the country during a high tourism season, analysts insist Jordan is the "biggest winner" with his elimination.
They say the intelligence services realized that Zarqawi had chosen Iraq as the perfect venue for al-Qaida operations, having exploited the chaos and collapse of the state with the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. But his eyes were set on Jordan west of the Iraqi border, where they say he wanted to ultimately return to attempt to destabilize the "infidel" royal Hashemite regime.
While the notorious Zarqawi, who had a U.S. $25 million bounty on his head, and al-Qaida lost sympathy among Jordanians and split his Khalayleh clan after the Amman bombings, his killing in Iraq may have raised the sympathy level.
Three parliament members of Jordan's powerful Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, paid a condolence visit to Zarqawi's family home on Friday. One of the legislators described him during a Friday sermon in a mosque as a "mujahed," a legitimate fighter.
Even some affluent Jordanian men educated in the West praised him as a "hero" because "at least he was a thorn in the American side," justifying his operations as resistance against foreign occupation and colonization and disregarding the hundreds of civilians killed in Iraq.
But analysts say while Zarqawi did manage to hurt the U.S. occupation in Iraq and colluding Iraqi leaders, it was his extreme fanatic behavior that led to his demise.
Islamic militant experts say Zarqawi's extreme behavior targeting Shiites and civilians, as well as threats against Sunnis not to join the political process, was gradually losing him moral support among the Arab Sunni communities.
They say sharp differences erupted between Zarqawi and the Sunni anti-occupation resistance and was forced to leave his location from Anbar province to Diala following a February massive bomb attack against police volunteers in the Sunni town of Ramadi that left 60 people dead.
Clashes and struggles were reported between al-Qaida elements and Iraqi resistance fighters, whom analysts say their objectives were substantially different than Zarqawi's, who sought to eliminate anything that moved towards joining the U.S-sponsored Iraqi political process and establishing a fundamentalist Islamic system.
The aims of the Iraqi resistance, however, are to end the occupation and for the Arab Sunnis to receive an equal share of power and resources. The resistance does not need to exist if there is no occupation, but al-Qaida's goal is larger and seeks to replace the "infidel" regimes in the Arab and Muslim world.
Zarqawi's first video tape appearance aired in April, militant experts say, was a desperate attempt to regain some cooperation and support he lost, as he tried to show he was still functioning and urging local Islamic militants against putting down their weapons or joining the American-sponsored political process.
Experts say his biggest strategic mistake that probably led to his death was his failure to realize that the Sunni community was his only shelter and support. When he lost that, he was forced to move from Anbar to Diala, making his detection easier.
Independent Iraqi analysts say the absence of Zarqawi may pave the way for establishing a new relationship between the resistance and Iraqi political circles, which would determine the future of al-Qaida in Iraq.
If the political process manages to accommodate the Sunnis and their demands, Zarqawi's network will weaken further and start searching for another country. If the Sunnis continue to be alienated, their figures killed by death squads and sectarian fighting persists, in addition to an extended U.S. occupation, al-Qaida in Iraq can easily and strongly re-emerge.
Arab conspiracy theorists, and they are many, say the United States needs a "myth" like Zarqawi and al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden for its "war on terror," or what Arabs generally see as a pretext to expand U.S. domination in the region.
What is seen as Washington's unjust policies in the Middle East -- particularly its occupation of Iraq, support for Israel and its measures, as well as U.S. support for repressive Arab regimes -- produce conducive environments for the creation of many Zarqawis.
So-called moderate Arabs have for years been calling for uprooting the causes of terrorism that lead to despair and finding many willing suicide bombers with nothing to lose.
These calls have fallen on deaf ears, creating someone like Zarqawi, whose name did not emerge as a "ruthless terrorist" to many, a "myth" to others and a "heroic legend" to some until three years ago with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
Unless the causes of terrorism are addressed with a serious political effort, terrorism will only grow and find more grassroots support where even the educated and affluent will see the emerging Zarqawis not as evil mythological creatures with many heads, but as heroes trying to fight injustice.
