LONDON, Feb. 22 (UPI) -- The current heightened cycle of violence in Israel marks a crucial turning point in the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It reflects both the complex political maneuvering of both sides, and the deep relationship between respective military strategy and international opinion.
The tactics of both sides have been heavily influenced by the political restraints imposed upon the respective leaderships by world opinion. But much of this opinion remains ignorant of the true nature of the conflict.
Since the outbreak of Palestinian violence on Sept. 28, 2000, Israel military tactics have largely been static based around a general policy of containment, avoiding large scale clashes in Palestinian urban population centers, and targeting specific individuals that Israel believes to be the ringleaders of the violence.
Much of the Israel Defense Forces' strategy is based on the lessons it learnt from the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising, that took place between 1987 and 1992. This however, is a flawed point of reference.
The current conflict between Israeli and Palestinians is not a second intifada, despite the almost universal use of this name. This time the Palestinians are increasingly heavily armed.
The central focus between 1987-92 was on popular unrest including mass demonstrations that often ended in bloody confrontations between Palestinian stone throwers and Israeli soldiers. This time there has been a marked absence of any real mass popular demonstrations by the wider Palestinian community, and the violence is characterized by more conventional exchanges between two armed forces such as shootings and bombings and ambushes.
While the international community, with the possible exception of the Bush administration, perceives that Israel is fighting a second intifada the truth is that Israel is at war with Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian paramilitaries. This in turn, however, causes problems for the Israeli political leadership on whether to unleash its full military might to deal with Palestinian militias.
To date, ignoring the increasingly strong political rhetoric coming from Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the fear of further inflaming the wider Palestinian population, and world opinion, has led to the canceling, or scaling down, of several planed Israeli military operations against the Palestinians. Even the current round of intensified attacks by the IDF against Palestinian Authority targets has been limited by these two constraints.
While Israel tactics have been static, and largely defensive, the Palestinian militias have been much more fluid. The central thrust of their strategy has been to engage the enemy without creating the conditions in which Israel would feel able to unleash its full-fire power.
To some this is classic guerrilla warfare. Just as the Irish Republican Army never wanted to escalate the military situation in Northern Ireland to levels that would bring a substantial British response, so the Palestinians groups have not wanted provoke massive retaliation from Israel.
The exception to the rule here are radical Islamic groups whose suicide attacks on Israel cites are aimed at provoking a massive Israeli military response, which in turn would be used as legitimacy for launching additional attacks. This difference in tactics remains the biggest bone of contention between Palestinian Authority President Arafat and the Islamic resistance movement, Hamas.
On the surface there appears to have been a change of track by Arafat and his military commanders during the past week. There are two schools of thought here.
The first is that Arafat has realized that attacks against Israel cities and within Israel proper have become counter-productive for the Palestinians in light of the international condemnation of the attacks.
As a result, Arafat has ordered that the Palestinians militias now adopt a more classic guerrilla style warfare in which attacks are concentrated in the 'Occupation Zones,' and are directed against Israeli soldiers and settlers. In an attempt to further strengthen the Palestinian position in the international community Arafat will constantly call for cease-fires in order to make Israel appear the aggressor.
The second is that Arafat has strengthened his central control over various militias (and indirectly over Hamas and Islamic Jihad), but remains unsure over a strategic plan for using these groups against Israel. As a result of this void many of these often-competing factions and groups are acting on the orders of their local leadership. In short, Arafat has not ordered an escalation, but rather it is the result of events on the ground.
Whatever the reasoning behind the change it is abundantly clear that we are entering a new more complex, and dangerous phase of the war. The question is where do we go from here?
The key here surprisingly lies with Israel. There is little doubt that it would prevail in any major military confrontation with the Palestinians, but politically it would gain little.
A glorified or dead Arafat would be worse than the present situation for future prospects for peace. History has taught us that the Palestinian leadership would not seek to make peace out of defeat, and the international community, apart from the United States, would increase its hostility to the Jewish state, portraying the Palestinians as victims once more.
Therefore the Israeli government needs to enter into a political dialogue with Arafat. For all his faults, he remains the only Palestinian leader capable of preventing all out war with Israel. As late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin once said about making peace with Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization, "it isn't pleasant but someone has to do it.'
Neill Lochery is director of the Center for Israeli Studies at University College, London
