HELSINKI, Finland, Feb. 25 (UPI) -- In my 29-year U.S. Army career I have met my share of lap-dog generals and Defense Department officials. I recently noticed that one prominent example was just promoted. Well done. The system worked. With some notable exceptions one does not rise to that level in the military without political acumen, risk awareness -- if not risk aversion -- and a "get-along-by-going-along" attitude.
I often wonder why there are so few general officer resignations on principle. It is certainly true that the U.S. military is subordinate and receives its orders from the civilian executive leadership and rightly so. It is part of the military's constitutional obligations.
Nevertheless, one cannot help but question whether this also a convenient excuse for the consummate careerist military-politician. The statements of these "leaders" on controversial issues are often so vague that they easily transition, for example, between administrations with such extraordinarily divergent views of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. It is difficult not to conclude that they are just taking the easy way out.
A cynic might conclude that many of the best in the military have been weeded out when they are ultimately confronted by a definitive choice between principle and politics, between innovation and playing it safe, between embracing command responsibility or finding scapegoats among subordinates when operations fail and soldiers get killed.
The dirty little secret in the military is that general officers take care of each other, "choose" each other for promotions and, when things get messy, often keep each other "out of the bursting radius" of plans gone sour. Handing out reprimands to a junior officers or senior enlisted preserves the status quo and ensures that unpleasant news evaporates from the news cycle quickly.
The last major resignation on principle was Matthew P. Hoh, former senior civilian representative in Zabul province, Afghanistan. Hoh, a relatively minor State Department official, resigned Sept. 10, 2009, because he "lost an understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States' presence in Afghanistan." As he stated in his letter, he failed "to see the value or the worth in continued U.S. casualties or expenditures of resources in support of the Afghan government in what is, truly, a 35-year-old civil war."
One can respectfully argue with Hoh's conclusions, but, unless I've misjudged him, not his sincerity, courage or adherence to his principles. He is no longer even a remote blip on the media's radar screen. Unless he writes a book, we may not hear from Hoh again. I've kept a copy of his resignation letter as a rare act of principle in public life.
The last such military event was the so-called Revolt of the Generals in September 2006 during the Bush administration. Some of these generals were already safe in retirement, some perhaps retired early to join the public protest. Even so, it demonstrated a rare act of defiance against the Bush administration and, in particular, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld while U.S. forces were engaged in wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
One of the retired generals, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste, former commander of the 1st Infantry Division directly criticized Rumsfeld as "not a competent wartime leader." According to Batiste, Rumsfeld made "dismal strategic decisions" that resulted in the unnecessary deaths of both U.S. military personnel and Iraqi civilians.
The "Revolt of the Generals" simmered in the media through late spring 2007 and was described as unprecedented in U.S. history. There is little doubt that the stinging rebuke of former senior military officers led to a re-evaluation of military, political and diplomatic policy regarding the conduct of the war in Iraq. It is difficult so conclude how much impact the "Revolt of the Generals" had on the eventual resignation of Rumsfeld, the naming of a new commander in Iraq and the change in policy, which led to the troop surge and increased focus on counterinsurgency. It is not a great leap in logic to say it did.
Nevertheless, these publicly displayed acts of principle are rare events. There are more frequent quiet and unpublicized acts of courage in the ranks, which sadly, more often than not, lead to frustration, admonition and early retirement. In this way the military is often its own worse enemy, stifling innovation and progress in military strategy and tactics.
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it is very hard to look up to the leaders who are keeping their ears to the ground.
--
(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq . The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army or government.)
--
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
