WASHINGTON, July 10 (UPI) -- Technological innovation will be stifled in U.S. government sponsored scientific research unless the government finds a better way to balance security concerns with the needs of scientific researchers at national research laboratories, according to a new report from a Washington think tank.
"It is critical to understand that excellence in science and sound security are not mutually exclusive objectives," said John Hamre, president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and chair of the commission that produced the report.
According to the report, "Science and Security in the 21st Century," scientific creativity is endangered by the emphasis on security over science at the laboratories run by the U.S. Dept. of Energy.
Moves in the final years of the Clinton Administration to shore up security at both the classified and non-classified labs -- following the now-discredited espionage case against scientist Wen Ho Lee -- are generally agreed to have been a burdensome, inappropriate and ineffective response.
For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the Lee incident, foreign scientists were prevented from continuing even unclassified research with no national security concerns at non-classified, non-weapons labs, such as Fermi Lab in Illinois, which are run by the agency.
David Albright, a physicist, president of the Institute for Science and International Security and an expert on nuclear energy and weapons issues, told UPI that the debate over security at the labs had been going on for years before the Wen Ho Lee incident.
"One of the problems you have is that security people view any leak or an accidental release of classified information as a disaster, when the reality is that there is a certain number of accidents that happen and classified information gets out just by mistake," said Albright.
According to the CSIS commission's report, the security crackdown following the Lee investigation has undermined the environment needed for scientific innovation, which is the major purpose of the labs.
Scientists at two of the labs, who spoke on the condition that their names not be revealed, confirmed that there have been significant problems, although fewer for researchers doing non-classified work. At the non-classified level, they said, the negative effects have been mostly administrative in nature, but they also said changes in security procedures have stymied efforts to recruit scientists, especially from overseas, to work on research projects across the security classification spectrum. The scientists also said that some research at higher security classifications has been jarred to the point that it has caused delays in projects.
The commission -- which was put together by CSIS in response to a request from the U.S. Department of Energy to help it find a more effective and reasonable approach to security concerns -- concluded that the health and vitality of the national labs can be assured only by restoring a balance to the currently unbalanced relationship between security and scientific concerns at these facilities.
The 15-member panel -- which included report director Anne Witkowsky, former director for defense policy and arms control at the National Security Council; Michael May, former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and Lee Hamilton, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars -- made various recommendations for reforms.
Specifically, the commission said that the lines of responsibility and authority at the labs need to be clarified to end the continuing dysfunctions that impair their ability to fulfill both science and security objectives. The commission also called for an integration of science and security needs because collaboration between both sectors of the labs has been significantly damaged in the aftermath of the Lee case.
The report cites the need for a new risk-based approach to security to allow for better collaboration between scientists, while ranking security risks by priority. In addition, the commission found that new tools and techniques are needed to address security and counterintelligence, because current systems are inadequate to meet national security needs.
The commission also recommended that cyber-security be strengthened. They found that the integrated information technology systems at the labs -- which are vital to the collaborative efforts of scientists there -- are also their greatest security vulnerability.
Philip E. Coyle, a senior advisor at the Center for Defense Information, categorized the recommendations as "excellent."
"It would be difficult for the labs or the Dept. of Energy to object to any of the CSIS study recommendations, as they are all sensible and straightforward," said Coyle.
James J. Richardson, vice president for research at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, which focuses on technology and defense matters, agreed that most of the commission's findings are on the mark
Richardson -- who worked with the labs when he held several senior staff positions at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as DARPA, which is the central research and development organization for the Department of Defense -- said that it is important to note the collaborative nature of scientific research. He says that expertise in various sectors is becoming much more broadly applied and that interdisciplinary research is now the norm.
"One of the things that doesn't come out strongly (in the report) is that work at the labs is on diverse subject matter in projects involving different levels of (security) classification (for scientists and projects)," said Richardson. "That is a difficult mix to maintain (but it is) absolutely necessary."
He says that whether it is computer science, modeling or materials, scientists need to apply all the techniques they learn -- including those learned from classified work -- to the projects they are working on. This makes it particularly difficult for those making the transition from classified projects to non-classified work to keep information they learned in a classified project from influencing their work in the more open project.
"I think this is always a danger," said Richardson. "I think this is a problem that has to be looked at harder. You don't want to negate the possibility (for scientists) to broaden their tools."
Albright believes that a risk-based security plan must accept the reality that classified information is likely to be released. He says that otherwise security will not be as effective as it should be.
"One of the things that you have to expect is that mistakes happen and you can't base your system on stopping every release," said Albright. "You have to accept that something is going to happen and try to maintain the best system. You don't try to strangle the science."
He added that lab security people have resisted the risk-based security model for some time because they don't want to be dragged before Congress to be questioned about why they do not try to stop all releases of classified material. But Albright says that given the immense amount of research that is classified -- much of is needlessly -- keeping it all classified is impossible.
Albright believes that the problem of over-classification -- which creates "mountains" of secure material -- is a significant hindrance to bringing security into balance.
"What happens, and I have seen this over and over again, is that if you try and classify everything, in the mind of people you diminish the value of important information because they become cynical," said Albright. "They treat the most sensitive information in the same way as information that never should have been classified."
He also noted that security leaks come not only from scientists but also from the administrative portions of federal agencies, where staff often come from outside the government for brief stints and are unaccustomed to classified work. Albright says he receives a large portion of classified research data used in his own policy work from such sources.
Coyle also raised concerns about the over-classification of research. "Making those judgments is a full time job and I don't think we have done it very well all the time," he said.
He says that scientists at Dept. of Energy labs also need to work with researchers at universities and in private industry, who do no necessarily have security clearance. Coyle believes that creating an atmosphere that sets clear limits will allow them to conduct their work in as unfettered a manner as possible. This requires that security personnel understand the collaborative nature of science so that rules can take it into consideration.
According to Albright, overly heavy-handed security also inhibits the government's ability to recruit the best and brightest to do critical research. He said that scientists are unwilling to work in a "black box" anymore, and have become unwilling to take on classified work if it does not allow them also to do unclassified research, which is generally a better career builder.
Despite his support for the panel's recommendations, Coyle -- who has held senior management positions at the at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and served as the director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Defense Department during the Clinton administration -- believes that to be fully effective, the Dept. of Energy and the labs must be willing to "take a fresh look at security" and abandon old habits.
"The key will be how the Dept. of Energy implements the recommendations," said Coyle. "If they implement the recommendations by adding new layers of bureaucracy or layering new rules on top of old ones, it won't work."
Albright was less optimistic.
"We are a long way from that (balanced) system," said Albright. "It is hopeless right now. The Bush security people are knee-jerk. They dominate and they are knee jerk and bent on keeping everything secret."
