Outside View: Counterinsurgency is not nation-building

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1 (UPI) -- A report by Jordan Fabian in The Hill's Blog Briefing Room said U.S. Rep. Phil Roe, R-Tenn., stated that nation-building in Afghanistan similar to what the United States undertook in Iraq would unlikely achieve success because Afghanistan is "medieval" compared with the "20th-century country" Iraq.

Roe said that winning the war in Afghanistan would take decades. He emphasized that the government needs to re-evaluate the mission there and define victory in the conflict against Taliban and al-Qaida insurgents.

True, Afghanistan is not Iraq and no one can predict when "victory" will be attained there. Roe is also quite correct in noting that "victory" will depend upon how that word is defined. I disagree with the honorable gentleman, however, in regard to his comment about nation-building. Counterinsurgency is not nation-building and U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal has clearly described his strategy in Afghanistan as the former.

According to Army Field Manual FM 3-24, counterinsurgency is a combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations. The components of stability operations include civil security, governance, essential services and economics. Successful stability operations is the ability to shape the environment through the appropriate application of all instruments of national power, build capacity with local partners and integrate more effectively civilian-military operations through ongoing interagency and multinational collaboration. Combat operations should be done in coordination and sometimes simultaneously with diplomatic, informational and economic efforts, focusing less on enemy attrition alone than on desired end states. In any counterinsurgency environment, the proportion of offensive, defensive and stability operations will vary over time according to the situation, geographic location and echelon.

The objective of counterinsurgency is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government through the balanced use of both military and non-military means. The end state is not solely to provide "basic infrastructure -- roads, water, sewer, schools, education," but elements of these may be part of a solution depending upon local requirements. A counterinsurgency "victory" does not require installing a model democracy or transforming Afghanistan into a 21st-century economic marvel. Although perhaps desirable from the standpoint of some, they are not practical end states based on current assessments, as Roe suggests.

According to McChrystal's leaked, redacted report, his recommended strategy is based on four main pillars:

-- develop a significantly more effective and larger Afghan National Security Force with radically expanded coalition force partnering at every echelon;

-- prioritize responsive and accountable governance -- that the Afghan people find acceptable -- to be on par with, and integral to, delivering security;

-- gain the initiative and reverse the insurgency's momentum as the first imperative in a series of temporal stages, and;

-- prioritize available resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened.

Although economic support is an important component of our efforts in Afghanistan, the McChrystal report clearly states that "Economic support to counterinsurgency is distinct from and cannot substitute for longer-term development initiatives."

Nowhere is there any mention of nation-building. He reiterates throughout the report that resources alone will not win the war in Afghanistan, but under-resourcing it, on the other hand, could lose it.

It is a false premise to dissect out or attempt to define victory only in military terms, i.e., the courage of our troops, the quality of our training and the effectiveness of our technology. It is also a false argument to state that it is only a choice between fighting a war "military" or engaging in nation-building. The circumstances in Afghanistan are far more complex and the consequences of inaction may have secondary effects far more deadly and dangerous than the situation with which we are now presented.

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(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)