Outside View: Rebuilding Afghan tribes and militias

WASHINGTON, Nov. 3 (UPI) -- The Oct. 9 Congressional Research Office report "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy" says that from 2003-08 the United States spent nearly $10 billion training and equipping the current Afghan National Army force of roughly 90,000 soldiers. That is approximately $110,000 per soldier.

In his Aug. 30 report U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal states that the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are not sufficiently effective to take ownership of Afghanistan's security. One of his four main pillars to accomplish the mission and defeat the insurgency is to increase the size of the Afghan National Security Force.

He said, "The Afghan National Army must accelerate growth to the target strength of 134,000 by fall 2010," a 50 percent increase in its present strength to be accomplished within one year.

The CRO report also documents a late 2008 agreement between the Bush administration and the Karzai government to establish the so-called Afghan Public Protection Program to rebuild armed militias and improve local security. Although probably U.S.-funded, the program is led by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which pays local volunteers $200 per month and provides them with weapons and ammunition. The APPP was initiated in Wardak province this year and might be expanded to Ghazni, Lowgar and Kapisa provinces, eventually including as many as 8,000 Afghans.

By some criteria the APPP could mean that for a "mere" $216 million per year we can create a force equivalent to the present size of the Afghan National Army to enhance local security and have it entirely administered by Afghans. One wishes it could be so.

It is interesting to note that since 2003, the United States and the United Nations have been doing the opposite, spending millions of dollars demobilizing and disarming private local militias because they contributed to lawlessness and fragmentation along ethnic and tribal lines. According to the CRO, the goals of demobilization and disarmament were not met by the December 2007 target date in part because militias in the south said they needed to remain armed against the Taliban. The report also suggests that the recently established APPP may "contradict the intent and perception" of the demobilization and disarmament effort.

The APPP is linked to a broader effort to improve local governance known as the "Independent Directorate of Local Governance." The CRO notes, "Since the beginning of 2008, there has been a major U.S. and Afghan push to build up local governance, reflecting a shift from the 2001-07 approach of building only the central government. The approach represents an attempt to rebuild some of the tribal and other local structures, such as 'jirgas' and 'shuras' -- traditional local councils -- that were destroyed in the course of constant warfare over several decades."

The purpose of the IDLG is to tie tribes and localities more closely to the central government. The "Social Outreach Program" also pays tribal leaders and others a similar $200 per month to participate in this effort, including reporting on the movements of the Taliban.

It is difficult to predict how much success the IDLG will achieve, but it is a step in the right direction. The rise of the Taliban has been largely predicated on filling the vacuum left by the destruction of traditional tribal structures in Afghanistan. The Taliban itself is not a tribal-based movement but is ideological and pan-Islamic. It has, however, successfully and undeservedly leveraged Pashtun nationalism by proclaiming itself the defender of Pashtun independence in the wake of what many construe as foreign interference.

The Afghan government could increase bottom-up support by positioning itself as the champion of traditional Afghan culture and fostering effective security, governance and services locally. Afghanistan is a complex mix of ethnic groups, tribes and culture, without a history of strong central authority. It will always be a delicate process of balancing and leveraging the interests of these factions. The ultimate role of a central government may be to enable rather than control.

The tribal-based approach of the IDLG program could be one of those levers to generate and maintain opposition to groups with ideological or transnational motivations, like the Taliban and al-Qaida. Afghanistan's center of gravity remains the Pashtun community, which comprises 42 percent of the Afghan population and inhabits much of western Pakistan. Both President Hamid Karzai and Taliban leader Mullah Omar are ethnic Pashtuns but originate from different tribes, the Durrani and the Ghilzai, respectively. The Ghilzai are the largest Pashtun tribe, and their importance to any outcome should not be understated.

The situation must not be allowed to devolve into tribal battles. To be successful any central government must regain the Afghan political and cultural "high ground" through a respect for individual independence and tribal and cultural traditions.

A modicum of peace will eventually return to Afghanistan either through hegemony or balance of power. The former can only be achieved through sustained outside influence, while the latter is ultimately for the Afghans to decide, if given the opportunity to do so.

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(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)