According to American instructors who helped train Georgian units, the country's officer corps is riddled with corruption. There are no trained sergeants, and troop morale is running low. Only about 50 percent of the military equipment is operational, and coordinated operations in adverse conditions are impossible.
The Abkhazian armed forces pack a more devastating punch, because they would resist an aggressor that already has tried to deprive the republic of its independence.
Abkhazian units are commanded by officers trained at Russian military schools. Many of them fought in the early 1990s. Analysts agree that the combat-ready Abkhazian army does not suffer from corruption.
Moscow recently has beefed up the local peacekeeping contingent. Neighboring Caucasian nations, including North Ossetia, are siding with Abkhazia and are ready to square accounts with Georgia.
Chechen volunteers, who had fought in Abkhazia in 1993, could also join a hypothetical conflict and minimize Tbilisi's chances still further.
The Georgian army would be quickly defeated if Tbilisi tried to settle the conflict by force. The situation could change in case of foreign intervention. For instance, the United States could provide weapons, reconnaissance and other intelligence information to Georgia. New NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which are close U.S. allies, could even send their units to the conflict zone.
The possible outcome could be that Abkhazia's eastern and southern parts would secede. Although NATO peacekeepers would be stationed there, military involvement is highly unlikely because its unsuccessful outcome would undermine the alliance's reputation. The European Union and the United States realize this and are in no mood to conduct another protracted counterinsurgency operation.
Behind-the-scenes bargaining and saber-rattling also seem possible. However, a Balkans-style "divorce" is more likely, because Georgia does not want to recognize Abkhazian independence, and Abkhazia flatly refuses to consider itself part of Georgia.
Although a de facto "divorce" already has taken place, both Russia and the United States would have to recognize it de jure after bilateral talks. The Kremlin and the White House should search for troubleshooting options and find the required bargaining chips.
Still, it is unpleasant to realize that human destinies, rather than missile sites or oil wells, are at stake.
Hopefully, the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry will consider the human factor to be more important than even the most attractive missile-defense proposals or lucrative energy contracts.
--
(Ilya Kramnik is a military commentator for RIA Novosti. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)
--
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)


