While the changes in payments technology are good for consumers and make the industry more efficient, these changes mean that the Reserve Banks will be losing dedicated management and staffRegional banks to close check facilities Jun 16, 2004
It's true that gains in employment have been modest, and perhaps the small gains in employment shouldn't be a surprise since growth itself has been slowUS shares soar on blue-chip earnings Oct 21, 2002
The ability of regulators to contain moral hazard directly is limited. Moral hazard results when economic agents do not bear the marginal costs of their actions. Regulatory reforms can alter marginal costs but they accomplish this task through very crude and often exploitable tactics. There should be limited confidence that regulation and supervision will lead to bank closures before institutions become insolvent. In particular, reliance on lagging regulatory measures, restrictive regulatory and legal norms, and the ability of banks to quickly alter their risk profile have often resulted in costly failuresAnalysis: Moral hazard and risk - I May 30, 2002
Gary H. Stern took office on March 16, 1985, as the eleventh chief executive of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. He is currently serving a full term that began March 1, 2001. Stern has announced that he will retire from this position in the summer of 2009.
Dr. Stern was born on November 3, 1944, in San Luis Obispo, California. He holds an A.B. in economics from Washington University, St. Louis, and a Ph.D. in economics from Rice University, Houston.
Dr. Stern joined the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in January 1982 as senior vice president and director of research. In August 1983, he was given the additional responsibility of serving as the Bank's chief financial officer. Before joining the Minneapolis Bank, Dr. Stern was a partner in a New York-based economic consulting firm. He has also served on the faculties of Columbia University, Washington University, and New York University. Dr. Stern's previous experience includes seven years at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where his last assignment was as manager of the domestic research department.