LONDON, May 7 (UPI) -- What is happening in the Red Sea and Yemen is an extraordinary example of the geostrategic influence a relatively small organized group can have.
Unlike al Qaeda, with its Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York's World Trade Center twin towers that provoked the response leading to an endless war in Afghanistan, Yemen's Houthis are able to sustain ongoing campaigns using drones and missiles.
And, it is not impossible for these Houthis to generate a crisis as massive as Sept. 11 was.
The Red Sea has been literally closed to most merchant traffic by the threat of Houthi missile and drone attacks. The U.S. Navy is maintaining a presence in the Red Sea to protect whatever shipping may risk passage and has launched air and missile strikes against hundreds of Houthi targets. The Houthis shoot back.
[President Donald Trump said Tuesday that the United States would "stop the bombings" against the Houthis after the group told the United States that "they don't want to fight anymore."]
So far, no U.S. warships have been hit or damaged. But the cost exchange ratio of weapons is hugely in the Houthis' favor.
Against relatively cheap drones and ballistic missiles, the Navy is firing far more expensive ammunition. A one-second burst from the 20mm Phalanx Close-in Weapon System reportedly costs $3,500 in ammunition. And an SM-6 missile costs $3 million to $4 million. So who is winning?
Most people know little about the Houthis. Originally called Ansar Allah and formed in the mid-1990s as enemies of the United States, the Sunni Gulf states and Israel, the organization is estimated to number between 100,000 and 200,000.
Actively engaged and having attacked Saudi Arabia in 2015, the Houthis control Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, and much of the north. In addition to acquiring foreign made drones and missiles, largely from Iran, it now has the capability of building its own drones.
That the Houthis attacked Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport last week with a ballistic missile suggests the potential they have for creating a major crisis. Israel reportedly has retaliated. However, given U.S. attacks on major Houthi installations, what Israel may accomplish militarily is an open question.
But here is what should be most worrying. In June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the pregnant Sophie, were assassinated in Sarajevo by Gavrllo Princip. That murder set off a chain reaction that ignited World War I.
Could the Houthis in essence become a 21st-century version of Princip? And there are many candidates for the role of victim, as was the archduke. Striking Saudi Arabia, as the Houthis have in the past, increasing attacks on Israel and making a maximum effort to hit a U.S. warship could have huge consequences.
Not of the magnitude of Hamas' vile Oct. 7 attacks, the Houthis nonetheless could provoke Israel to conduct further retaliatory strikes. Already and overly committed to Gaza, Israel would be militarily stretched.
Suppose a U.S. warship or warships were struck. Would this be another Tonkin Gulf of August 1964, but with a real and not imaginary attack? What would the United States do? Or suppose the Houthis concentrated on the Saudi oil fields and refineries with major raids?
This may not be the equivalent of 1914. However, the prospects for further destabilizing the region cannot be dismissed. In this scenario, are there any grounds for optimism?
Iran may hold the key. The Trump administration has restarted negotiations with Iran on limiting Tehran's ambitions to build nuclear weapons. If Iran does exercise goodly control or influence on the Houthis, what would it be worth to exercise that in deescalating the situation and allowing unimpeded passage through the Red Sea?
One suspects that sanctions relief for Iran is one quid pro quo. If the Houthis were to back away from any limits on attacking ships and neighbors, sanctions could be reimposed. And the ultimate threat is that of the Houthis being the catalyst for a major regional war.
For the completely objective observer, the proverbial man or woman from another planet, this situation is bizarre. How could a relatively handful of people that in essence are a cult have so much potential influence for good or evil? And what policies or options are available to the West to contain, deter or prevent the Houthis from further destabilizing the region? The answer is not many.
And in these considerations, it is not only drones and missiles. Iran has a huge cyber capability. Suppose the Houthis had developed their own and were using it? It is hard to imagine that retaliatory cyber attacks against a largely primitive Yemen would have much effect.
An interesting conundrum indeed.
Harlan Ullman is UPI's Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist, senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council, chairman of a private company and principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. His next book, co-written with General The Lord David Richards, former U.K. chief of defense and due out next year is Who Thinks Wins: Preventing Strategic Catastrophe. The writer can be reached on X @harlankullman.
