March 19 (UPI) -- No matter what one may think about President Donald Trump, he certainly has moved to end the war in Ukraine in ways many thought would not succeed. And it may not work. But Tuesday's phone call with President Vladimir Putin seemed to start in motion a possible cease-fire or truce.
Caution is needed. As in Trump's first term, the effort to charm North Korea's boss, Kim Jung Un failed, and dealing with Putin is not without risk. In fairness, as Trump's initiative with Russia is urgently needed, U.S. and Western treatment toward Putin has produced great cynicism and resentment on his part.
In 1994, with the removal of Soviet nuclear weapons from Ukraine -- and these were not Ukrainian, but rather Soviet and controlled by the Strategic Rocket Force -- the Budapest Memorandum was intended to assure Ukrainian sovereignty. It was signed by the nuclear powers -- the United States, Russia and Ukraine. Twenty years later, Putin violated that pact.
George W. Bush may have looked into Putin's eyes and seen his soul, but that made little difference. Putin became acting president on New Year's 2000. In 2001, Bush unilaterally abrogated the centerpiece of U.S.-Soviet-Russian relations, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which came as a great surprise to Moscow. The reason was to develop a system stationed in Europe to shoot down Iranian ballistic missiles aimed at the United States.
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In Putin's view, this was absurd. Iran did not have nuclear weapons nor the means to strike the United States. Worse, the ABM system had a capability against Russian missile systems that would give the West a strategic advantage, given Moscow's paranoia over nuclear systems.
Then, Bush rejected Putin's assistance and advice in the invasion of Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and despite the failure of the USSR to pacify that country.
Putin implored Bush not to attack Iran, arguing that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, and that an invasion would send the region into chaos. Putin was correct and Bush was wrong. That made no difference. And worse, NATO continued its expansion east.
At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin unleashed a broadside against NATO, explaining his grievances. It was largely ignored. Then, at the conference for NATO heads of government and state in Bucharest in 2008, Bush made a spectacular error.
Georgia and Ukraine had applied for the Partnership for Peace program and were turned down. In his final speech, Bush tried to amend the PfP issue, stating that Georgia and Ukraine could join NATO at some future date. Putin was furious.
I was there. Putin angrily approached Bush, repeating Bush's father's statement after Hussein invaded Kuwait: "George, that will not stand." Bush tried to downplay his statement to no avail.
In 2014, February's the Maidan Revolution occurred over Ukrainian decisions to move closer to the West. Deadly clashes broke out between protesters and state forces in Kyiv. President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted. Putin saw the opportunity to seize Crimea, which he did. The United States took no serious action. Meanwhile, conflict broke out between Ukrainian forces in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Three years ago, Russia invaded Ukraine. The war has persisted. Russian casualties mounted and may have reached more than 800,000 dead. And Ukraine has obviously suffered.
That Trump has succeeded in at least getting partial agreement with Putin was a promising first step. Ukraine must agree, too. But here the issues just start. Putin will not accept Ukrainian membership in NATO or the EU, made moot because several alliance states will not agree. Who then provides the security and sovereignty assurances for Ukraine?
Trump may think U.S. investment in developing Ukrainian rare earth and other minerals will suffice to deter further Russian aggression. Perhaps. Control of occupied territory must be resolved, as Russia controls about one-fifth of the land mass. And reconstruction and return of kidnapped Ukrainian children remain open issues.
Can Putin be trusted? Would he not take a partial agreement and at some date intervene again? And would Ukraine have sufficient support to resist? Finally, what incentives do both sides have to stop the fighting, as neither is likely to be satisfied with the status quo?
Trump may prove to be a magician. At this point and given the history, this appears an exceedingly long shot. As the Gaza truce failed, so too could Ukraine succumb. There is always some hope. And there is reality.
Harlan Ullman is UPI's Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist; senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council, chairman of a private company; and principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. His next book, co-written with General The Lord David Richards, former U.K. chief of defense and due out late next year, is Arc of Failure: Can Decisive Strategic Thinking Transform a Dangerous World? The writer can be reached on X: @harlankullman.
