Suppose the Pentagon underwent a physical exam

Jan. 29 (UPI) -- It is common sense that annual physical examinations are essential for individuals to determine their health and well-being. Why then does government not submit to annual physicals to determine how healthy or unhealthy it may be and what is needed to correct or cure any deficiencies?

Assuming this is a good idea, let's start with the Pentagon and Department of Defense.

Title X of the U.S. Code directs the Department of Defense to "train, man and equip" the services to prepare for the "conduct of prompt sustained operations incident to combat."

The National Defense Strategy defines the aims of operations to "compete/contain; deter; and if war comes, defeat or prevail over a number of potential adversaries." Assume these are the equivalents of vital signs for people, such as blood pressure, temperature and pulse rates.

The first order questions are how well or how badly the Pentagon is doing in "training, manning and equipping" for peace and war. Unlike blood pressure that is measured specifically, such as 120/68, or temperature, no exact metrics exist to evaluate these categories of defense. That means qualitative standards apply.

Using "train, man and equip" as the vital signs, how well or badly is the Department of Defense doing for each? Training to compete. contain, deter, and if war comes, defeat, should be the standard. But where and how are we competing with China and Russia? That has no metrics. So the evaluation is uncertain.

About manning, for 2024 after failing to make numbers, the services have met quotas. However, this may be temporary. Pay and benefits for service personnel generally exceed peers in the private sector. Yet, will this be sufficient?

And among the cohort of 17-to-25-year-olds who form the recruiting base for the DoD, more than half are not physically, mentally or legally qualified for service. A similar number are not interested in military service. Given these constraints and if the pay and benefits cannot make a difference over the long term, is recruiting out of the woods? Obviously, qualifications can be reduced.

This was tried during the Vietnam War with Project 100,000, which lowered the standards for service at a time when the draft was still in place. It did not work. And reinstalling the draft or imposing national service does not appear to be politically viable or practical. So while recruiting has improved, will this last?

Equipping is also highly problematic. Buying new weapons systems and having sufficient repair and maintenance capability are good metrics. But consider some of the high value items such as aircraft and ships.

Currently, the U.S. shipbuilding base is only capable of building 1.2 nuclear submarines a year. The time it takes to build a nuclear aircraft carrier takes years, if not a decade. And surface warships likewise take several years to build.

Only about 150 F-35's stealth fighters are built a year, that is insufficient to meet the demand. If war were to come, attrition would demand increasing production of warships and aircraft by at least an order of magnitude.

Yet, the United States is incapable of surging production, due to the lack of skilled personnel workers and building facilities. And repair of battle damage takes time.

Two destroyers, USS Fitzgerald and McCain, were involved in separate collisions. It took 2 1/2 years for these destroyers to be repaired and return to active duty. In war, many units would be damaged and need repair.

A review of maintenance and readiness also shows serious shortcomings in the availability of repair parts and replacement equipment. Hence, the overall grade for equipping is not good, and in some areas, such as if a long war were fought, is unsatisfactory.

Further, the effect of real, uncontrolled annual cost growth of every defense item, from precision weapons to people to pencils, is about 5 to 7%. Given inflation, of an annual defense budget about $900 billion, an additional $70 billion to $100 billion is required just to stay level, let alone grow the force.

The qualitative analysis leads to three options. The first is to spend sufficient money to maintain the force at recommended numerical and readiness levels. The second is to defer tough choices. And the third is to change the strategy to meet resource realities and constraints.

But first, it is necessary is to allow the physical examination to take place. And from that examination, whatever action is needed to rectify and correct these deficiencies must be taken. However, will we?

Harlan Ullman is UPI's Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council and principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. His next book, co-written with General The Lord David Richards, former U.K. Chief of Defense and due out late next year, is Insanity: The Absence of Sound Strategic Thinking in a World on Fire. The writer can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.