North Korea's Eighth Party Congress reveals Kim's purposes

Jan. 2 (UPI) -- The Dec. 29, 2024, plenary session of the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) was presented as a grand showcase of North Korea's achievements and a roadmap for its future. Under the stewardship of Kim Jong Un, the session ostensibly celebrated remarkable strides in national development and detailed an ambitious agenda for 2025. However, a closer examination reveals the enduring priorities of the Kim family regime: the perpetuation of its authority, the consolidation of ideological control, and the strategic exploitation of external tensions to justify domestic hardships. The plenary session's rhetoric and policies underscore the regime's unyielding focus on survival and dominance at the expense of genuine progress and the welfare of the Korean people in the north.

The illusion of progress and stability

The plenary report highlighted successes in various domains, including agriculture, industrial production, and housing construction. It emphasized increased production metrics and infrastructure achievements, such as the completion of 10,000 flats in Pyongyang and the construction of rural villages. These accomplishments were framed as evidence of North Korea's resilience and leadership's commitment to improving people's lives.

Yet, these proclamations mask the underlying economic struggles, systemic inefficiencies, and inherent contradictions of the mythical "Socialist Workers Paradise." Despite claims of bumper agricultural harvests and industrial growth, the North Korean economy remains hampered by international sanctions, limited access to modern technology, and a lack of foreign investment. The session's insistence on self-reliance and independence, while ideologically significant, continues to isolate the country and exacerbate economic hardships. The focus on symbolic achievements, such as housing projects and modernization initiatives, serves as propaganda to reinforce the regime's image rather than addressing the structural issues afflicting the nation.

Militarization and the perpetuation of hostility

A central theme of the plenary session was national security and defense, reflecting the enduring prioritization of militarization. Kim Jong Un's rhetoric underscored the need to prepare the North Korean People's Army as a revolutionary force, highlighting advancements in defense technology and military capabilities. The session outlined strategies to enhance deterrence and warfighting capabilities through accelerated progress in defense science and the radical development of the munitions industry.

This militaristic posture aligns with North Korea's longstanding strategy of political warfare and blackmail diplomacy. By framing external powers -- notably the United States and its allies -- as existential threats, the regime justifies its emphasis on military readiness and the sacrifices demanded of its population. This narrative also deflects attention from internal failures by externalizing blame and fostering a siege mentality among its citizens.

Ideological control and the weaponization of hardship

The plenary session reaffirmed the regime's reliance on ideological indoctrination as a tool of governance. Kim Jong Un's emphasis on the "people-first" principle and slogans like" Everything for the people and everything by relying on them" underscores the regime's effort to portray itself as the protector of the Korean people. Simultaneously, the regime uses rhetoric about external threats to justify the population's suffering, portraying sacrifices as necessary for national survival.

This strategy serves to maintain control over a populace burdened by economic stagnation and resource scarcity. By combining ideological reinforcement with promises of eventual prosperity, the regime seeks to sustain its grip on power despite growing internal discontent. The emphasis on ideological work within the military and civil sectors further consolidates loyalty with the intent to suppress dissent and prevent political resistance. This indicates that Kim Jong Un fears the Korea people in the north more than the militaries of South Korea and the U.S.

Diplomatic isolation and strategic calculations

The session's tone on foreign relations was predictably combative. The WPK identified the United States, Japan, and South Korea as adversaries, characterizing their alliance as a nuclear bloc for aggression. While the plenary report hinted at the possibility of proactive external activities, it is evident that the regime's primary goal is to leverage tensions for political and economic concessions.

This approach reflects Kim Jong Un's strategy of "blackmail diplomacy," wherein heightened provocations are used to coerce political and economic concessions through negotiations. However, the regime's miscalculation of its leverage -- particularly in the face of unwavering U.S. and allied positions -- has led to prolonged isolation. Without substantial policy shifts, North Korea is unlikely to achieve meaningful diplomatic breakthroughs, leaving its economy and international standing further strained.

Not discussed in the report is Kim Jong Un's renewed and growing relationship with Vladimir Putin and North Korean troops fighting for Russia to make money for the regime. Based on estimated Russian payments to North Korea, this enterprise is likely providing Kim with more funds than his global illicit activities and cyber operations. This will help sustain the regime for the foreseeable future or as long as Putin's War in Ukraine continues.

Understanding the objectives and strategy of the Kim family regime

The December 2024 plenary session of the Eighth Party Congress underscores the Kim regime's unwavering commitment to its core objectives: survival, control, and dominance. While the session's rhetoric celebrates achievements and projects optimism, the reality is one of enduring internal challenges and international isolation. The regime's focus on militarization, ideological indoctrination, and external scapegoating reveals a leadership more concerned with maintaining its grip on power than fostering genuine progress or addressing the well-being of its people.

The session provides the world with a clear understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and this should inform all future policy and strategy of the ROK/U.S.alliance as well as civil society around the world who desire to support the Korean people in the north and the universal human right of self-determination of government.

Conclusion

As North Korea enters 2025, the gap between the regime's ambitions and its realities will likely widen, posing significant risks for regional stability and the welfare of its citizens. The international community must remain vigilant, balancing deterrence, pressure, and engagement to address the challenges posed by a regime entrenched in its pursuit of absolute control and ideological purity.

The future longevity of the regime cannot be predicted and seven decades of survival appear to indicate a high level of regime resilience. It may continue to muddle through, or it could decide to execute its campaign plan to try to unify the peninsula by force. Or it could be on a path to internal instability and regime collapse which could happen gradually and then all at once, much like we just witnessed in Syria.

Regardless of the future of the Kim family regime, there is only one acceptable durable political arrangement that will end the nuclear threats and crimes against humanity and that is a free and unified Korea. This is what the Korean people, with the support of the international community, should focus on: the establishment of a new Korea, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.