Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) listens during a joint press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron after their talks in the Kremlin in Moscow on Monday. Pool Photo by Thibault Camus/EPA-EFE
Feb. 9 (UPI) -- Before the United States gets too bogged down in Ukraine, history offers a cautionary note for the Biden administration and the nation. On Aug. 7, 1964, Congress passed, with only two dissenting votes, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution that consigned Americans to a decades-long war it would lose in Vietnam over attacks by North Vietnamese PT boats against two U.S. destroyers that never took place.
On Sept. 12, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the only time in its history, meaning an attack on one was considered an attack on all, and went to war in Afghanistan to bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Bin Laden escaped; the mission shifted to "nation building"; and 20 years later the U.S.-orchestrated withdrawal was a debacle.
On March 19, 2003, the George W. Bush administration went to war in Iraq over weapons of mass destruction that did not exist, plunging the region into chaos.
On March 19, 2011, with the United States leading from behind, a multi-state, NATO-led coalition began the bombing of Libya to implement a U.N. Security Council resolution to protect Libyan civilians. Some doubt existed as to the danger posed to residents of Benghazi by Moammar Gadhafi. But the bombing led to Gadhafi's death and an ongoing civil war.
Each of these disasters arose from similar causes: failures of knowledge and understanding of the conflicts the United States was entering or starting.
As the Ukraine crisis continues, with Russia massing more than 100,000 troops on that border, is the United States repeating this history of acting with insufficient knowledge and understanding of past and current conditions in Ukraine? Or is it, along with NATO, responding in part to the failure to act when Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014?
U.S. President Joe Biden does not accept or seem to understand Russian President Vladimir Putin's grievances with the United States and his negotiating positions on preventing further NATO expansion and returning to a pre-1997 security framework in Europe.
The United States and NATO are adamant that the alliance's open-door policy is non-negotiable. And Washington's negotiating strategy to reject or ignore Russia's proposals is betting that talks on missile limitations and restrictions on military exercises in Europe can resolve the Ukrainian crisis: not a smart bet.
Biden and Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky categorically disagreed on the "imminence" of a Russian military attack and on the amount of military and financial aid Washington is providing. The United States is withholding offensive military systems to Ukraine that could disrupt a Russian assault and greater financial support to bolster an economy gravely weakened by the crisis.
Zelensky is equally strong in his rejection of an immediate Russian invasion, pleading with Biden to tone down "hysterical" rhetoric he believes is eroding public morale. Concurrently, Zelensky complains that if the situation is so critical, why is Washington so frugal in providing weaponry and wallet? Perhaps Germany's shipment of 5,000 helmets will turn the tide of battle, even though they were requested by Ukraine.
Still, given these contradictions, it seems reasonable to wonder on whose side is Ukraine.
If NATO is acting to prevent a repeat of 2014, fair enough. But how long will NATO unity hold against concerted Russian pressure? To act, NATO requires "consensus," which means all 30 members must agree. One can derail any proposal.
Given dependence on Russian gas -- Europe gets about 40% of its needs from Russia --and the incentives of opening the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Germany has good reason to temper its position on Ukraine. Hungary's Viktor Orban, whose name has not been prominent and who is friendly toward Russia, met with Putin in Moscow last week. How might Orban vote if NATO decided on taking some form of decisive action?
Whether the Ukraine crisis will erupt in conflict or reach a diplomatic solution is, so far, unknowable, except perhaps to Putin. But, looking back a decade from now, would it seem irresponsible if not derelict to ask what if anything could have been done differently to have prevented a possibly disastrous outcome? Is that being done?
The U.S. track record noted above is not enviable. Yes, in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, America forced the Soviet Union to remove its weapons from Cuba. But Ukraine is not Cuba.
A critical question then: Does the United States have enough strategic understanding and judgment of the circumstances in Ukraine to resolve this crisis short of escalation? And is the failure to consider Putin's demands and the opposite assessments of Biden and Zelensky equivalent to going to war over nonexistent casus belli? Possibly. Thus, as terrible judgment produced these historical blunders, could the president become Lyndon Baines George W. Barack Biden over Ukraine?
Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council, the prime author of "shock and awe" and author of the book "The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large."
The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.
