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Taliban stronghold falls to Afghan Army

Afghan National Operations continue to overwhelm the Taliban in open battle, but military personnel on the ground say the victories will not be sustainable without continued NATO assistance.

By Nolan Peterson
(Nolan Peterson/UPI)
(Nolan Peterson/UPI)

CHARKH, Afghanistan, Dec. 9, (UPI) -- For more than two years the Afghan village of Charkh has been under Taliban control; its citizens held hostage by the insurgent group's oppressive laws and brutal application of power.

Even with U.S. Forward Operating Base Shank only 15 km away, the Taliban considered their grip on Charkh so tight that the militants brazenly renamed the village "Mir Ali," after the notorious Taliban-controlled city in Pakistan, which is also the headquarters of the Haqqani network -- another anti-NATO insurgent group.

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The Afghan people in Charkh suffered while the Taliban insurgents stole their food, seized their homes, shut down schools and implemented harsh Islamist laws like banning music, prohibiting women from leaving their homes and requiring men to grow their beards a minimum length.

The penalty for violating the Taliban's rules was often death.

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But all that came to an end on Saturday when, after a week of fighting, Afghan National Army (ANA) troops stormed into Charkh's village center and tore down the Taliban flag, burning it in the street while the local citizens openly celebrated. The fall of Charkh came on the final day of a weeklong operation named Khanjar I, which was entirely planned and executed by the ANA.

The operation's success dealt both a tactical military, and strategic propaganda blow to the Taliban in Logar Province by eliminating the insurgents' stronghold in the dusty, mountainous region and proving that the nascent Afghan Army, which was formed in 2002 following the U.S. invasion and fall of the Taliban government, is capable of operating independently from U.S. and coalition forces.

"The Taliban were very proud; they thought they were very strong. But we broke them," said Brig. Gen. Abdul Raziq, commander of the ANA's 4th Brigade, which executed Khanjar I. "The Taliban thought the local people would not support the ANA, and they thought we were weak. But we proved them wrong. This operation proves the ANA is very strong, even without Americans going door-to-door with us."

Operation Khanjar I, which ran from Dec. 1 through Dec. 7, comprised troops from six different battalions within the 4th Brigade. The operation resulted in 21 Taliban casualties, including 17 killed in action. The ANA suffered 10 total casualties, including two deaths. Overall, the ANA was able to clear Charkh and 13 other nearby villages of Taliban insurgents.

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The last day of the operation saw the worst of the fighting, with the ANA suffering seven casualties, including one soldier killed by a head injury from a piece of shrapnel. U.S. F-16 and A-10 warplanes were dispatched to the area, but did not drop munitions.

The district governor of Charkh was among the injured on the final day. A Taliban sniper shot him in the abdomen while he was walking with ANA troops through Charkh's open-air bazar. ANA soldiers rushed him by truck back to U.S.-controlled Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank where U.S. medical personnel provided emergency care.

"Without our medical assistance, he would have died," said Army Lt. Col. Brian Beckno, battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, currently deployed to FOB Shank in support of the advise and assist mission. "The ANA have come a long way, but they still lack capabilities in certain areas -- medical care is one of them."

Despite the ANA's tactical military success, its greatest victory may have been in the larger propaganda battle.

"We showed the people that the ANA has enough power to get rid of the enemy on our own," said ANA Col. Abdul Sami, 4th Brigade's executive officer. "The Taliban said we weren't capable without the Americans fighting with us, but this was a very independent operation. Now the people realize that the Afghan security forces can do something for them."

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"The Taliban were proven wrong," added Raziq, who is a former mujahedin commander from the war against the USSR in the 1980s. "The ANA can be effective fighting alone. The Taliban's propaganda depends on telling the people they are defending Afghanistan from foreign infidels. But now that the ANA is fighting independently, and with Americans no longer going on patrols, the people are asking why they are fighting a war against other Afghans."

The face of the war in Afghanistan changed dramatically this year when U.S. and other NATO coalition forces transitioned to a new "advise and assist" operation, ending combat patrols and assuming a brigade-level advisory mission to help build the long-term sustainability of the Afghan Army.

U.S. military officials point to operational successes like Khanjar I as evidence that the Afghan military is tactically proficient, but still lacks the strong institutional traditions and logistical organization to sustain itself without long-term U.S. advising and financial support.

"Khanjar proves that the Afghans are willing to get after the enemy, and they have the skills to do so," Beckno said. "They definitely have the capability to fight on their own, now it's a matter of shoring up their weaknesses."

"I don't ask or need the Americans to go door-to-door fighting with me," Raziq said. "But I do need better education for my soldiers, I need air support, doctors and better logistics. It's hard to build an army while you are fighting a war."

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Afghan forces are also plagued by many of the same challenges U.S. forces faced while fighting the Taliban -- namely the inability to consolidate military victories by maintaining control of conquered territory, allowing the militarily inferior Taliban to reconquer lost ground and stay in the fight.

Raziq admits that the nascent Afghan Army does not yet have have the resources to establish enough of a permanent footprint to consolidate its gains in Charkh for the long-term.

"We don't have the forces to hold the area -- that is true," Raziq said. "But we showed the Taliban what we can do."

Raziq said he plans to leave about 50 Afghan National Police personnel in the area and establish a series of checkpoints along major transportation to deter insurgent counterattacks. He also said he is a planning a follow-on operation in the area soon.

On Sunday, however, the day after the conclusion of Khanjar I, the Taliban retaliated with a rocket attack, narrowly missing the ANA compound at FOB Shank. There were no casualties.

At a weekly shura meeting with U.S. military commanders Sunday, Raziq praised the ANA's successful siege of Charkh, highlighting the message it sent to the Afghan people.

"We took down their flags and now we will broadcast the success of our operation on the radio," Raziq said. "Local people are now passing information to the ANA about IED locations and where the enemy are hiding. Those civilians now want to help us; they want to tell us about the enemy operations. Now the civilians are against the Taliban, and it looks like the people are now in support of the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces]."

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But with his American counterparts in front of him, Raziq made certain that the success of Khanjar I did not cloud the fact that the ANA will require long-term U.S. advising and logistical support to see the war through to victory.

"Even if coalition forces do not participate in operations any more, they still help us with planning and logistics. That is a huge help," Raziq said. "It is very important that we sign a strategic plan with the Americans. It is important for the morale of the ANA, and it will keep the enemy scared."

Beckno agreed that long-term U.S. support is needed to ensure the Taliban's defeat.

"Their [ANA] progress has been undeniable, and Americans should be proud of that," Beckno said. "But I still see this as being the next Korea -- Afghanistan needs long-term U.S. support to be successful."

The morning after Khanjar I concluded, U.S. military commanders escorted Raziq and several other Afghan officers to the American medical facility at FOB Shank to visit with the Afghan district governor, who was in stable condition recovering from the sniper's bullet. After the visit, Raziq put a hand over his heart and thanked his American counterparts for saving the district governor's life.

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"Everyone in the Army appreciates what America has done for us," the former mujahid said. "We will never forget their help fighting the Russians and now the Taliban. And they never asked for anything in return. But my message to America is to not leave us now. If you leave, the terrorists will come back."

Nolan Peterson is a U.S. Air Force veteran currently reporting for UPI from Afghanistan.

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