What North Korea can learn from Libya's decision to give up nukes

By Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, King's College London  |  May 11, 2018 at 8:44 AM
share with facebook
share with twitter
| License Photo

May 11 (UPI) -- The North Korean nuclear challenge has lately become something of a diplomatic roller-coaster. Only a few months ago, Pyongyang and Washington were locked in an escalating war of words and increasingly confrontational military posturing -- but today, their standoff has given way to a sequence of what look like major diplomatic breakthroughs.

Besides marking the first time a North Korean leader has set foot in the South since the end of the Korean War, the recent inter-Korean summit also yielded a joint statement announcing that both sides would initiate talks on formally ending the Korean War and "denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula." Since the Trump administration has been very clear that denuclearization is a prerequisite for any negotiations over the peninsula's future, this has led to intense speculation about whether the North is actually serious about fully denuclearizing, and if so, how that might be achieved.

Fortunately for those trying to find a way forward, including Trump's national security adviser, John Bolton, there appears to be a useful model: the successful dismantling of Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs in the early 2000s.

On the face of it, the comparison seems illogical. The North Koreans themselves view the Libyan experience as a cautionary tale: After NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 helped tip the civil war against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's regime, a North Korean official openly stated that Libya's WMD deal with the United States had been used as "an invasion tactic to disarm the country." Nonetheless, understanding the Libyan experience is an important part of getting to grips with the Korean issue -- and the contrasts are more revealing than the similarities.

Step by step

Libya didn't decide to give up its WMD program overnight. Gadhafi had for decades viewed WMD as a means of deterring foreign intervention, an important priority for a regime with a highly provocative foreign policy that (among other things) included sponsorship of international terrorism against the West. In 1986, Libya's provocations even drove the United States to the point of launching airstrikes.

But by the 1990s, the balance began to shift. Libya was hit hard by U.N. sanctions, and even as global oil prices fell, it failed to modernize its oil sector. As a result, unemployment rose and living standards declined. Gadhafi found himself under political pressure at home, and from the mid-1990s onward, his approach to foreign relations began to change. He ceased his support for terrorism, and handed over the individuals suspected of carrying out the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. All this he did with a view to getting international sanctions removed, and encouraging the foreign investment he needed to revitalize the economy and quell domestic dissent.

It was these developments that made his decision on WMD possible. Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush's administrations made clear to Gadhafi that his WMD programs were obstructing full re-engagement with the United States, and when the Bush administration invaded Iraq in 2003 and toppled Saddam Hussein, it seemed to spur Gadhafi along. Crucially, Washington also signaled to Gadhafi that its concerns over WMD could be assuaged through behavior change, rather than the regime change that ousted Saddam. Tony Blair went further in 2006, assuring Gadhafi that the U.K. would come to Libya's assistance if chemical or biological weapons were used or threatened against it.

So how does this story compare with North Korea's? The differences are clear. Despite all international efforts, Pyongyang has developed and built an arsenal of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles; some of its missiles could hit the U.S. mainland, and it has reportedly even miniaturized warheads with which to arm them.

This puts North Korea far ahead of Libya in 2003. When Gadhafi's government negotiated its program away, its lack of domestic scientific expertise meant it was nowhere near developing a workable nuclear device, despite significant nuclear material and technology acquisitions from abroad. Since the Libyans did not possesses any deterrent power in the form of their nuclear program, they arguably had little to lose from negotiating it away. And while they did possess a sizable chemical weapons capability, which was included in the disarmament deal with Washington, their overall negotiating position was relatively weak.

By contrast, Pyongyang's existing nuclear inventory puts it in a much stronger position. Since Kim Jong Un appears to have a functioning nuclear deterrent at his disposal, it remains to be seen exactly what Pyongyang will be willing to give up. Is it possible, for instance, that North Korea might give up its weapons and delivery systems but perhaps retain the associated technical development infrastructure and the capability to reconstitute its program should things go badly?

In short, Pyongyang's negotiating hand is much stronger than Tripoli's was, and the potential outcomes far more varied.

Beyond gestures

Improving relations with the United States was central to Libya's 2003 decision. Seeing Washington make good on its promises to lift U.N. sanctions once the Lockerbie suspects were handed over reassured Gadhafi, and by the time the WMD talks began, some confidence had been built up on the Libyan side. But today it's North Korea, not the United States, that most needs to shore up the other side's goodwill and confidence. That much is clear from Kim's recent charm offensive, which marks a significant departure from his government's past behavior.

Washington has also been working on its relationship with the North, subtly at first and then more publicly. In mid-April, it was reported that the then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo had made a secret trip to North Korea to meet with Kim. Few details of that encounter have been made public, but it was clearly a way for Pompeo to scope out the diplomatic territory while limiting the risk of Trump losing face -- an approach that surely will have resonated with the North Korean leader. Pompeo has since returned to Pyongyang as secretary of state and overseen the release of three U.S. prisoners.

These developments are all positive, but real progress won't be secured until a dismantlement deal is first negotiated and then actually implemented. Nuclear weapons have become an integral element of the Kim regime's political legitimacy at home as well as abroad; since giving them up completely would put that legitimacy at risk, they won't be handed over quickly. And as in Libya, if progress can be made on the nuclear issue, security assurances from the United States will be critical to avoid slipping backward.

The ConversationGranting those assurances would pose challenges in itself. It's difficult to see Pyongyang following through on denuclearization without concrete preconditions. Again, there's a parallel with Libya, where different stages in the disarmament process were met with incremental recognition by the U.S. State Department to reward Tripoli's progress. If the progress that suddenly seems possible in the North Korea case actually comes about, perhaps this is how it'll be made.

Wyn Bowen is a professor of non-proliferation & international security and Matthew Moran is a reader in international security at King's College London.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Related UPI Stories
Trending Stories