Where Afghanistan is heading and what it means for the Arab Gulf

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, July 24 (UPI) -- Afghanistan is one of the most intense areas of in­ternational instability in the world, affecting the dangerous rivalry be­tween nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan and extending its strategic significance to the Mid­dle East.

The rise of the Islamic State has increased terror levels around the world and redrawn much of the map of the Middle East. However, as its affiliates seek to establish a foothold in Afghanistan, they could imbue the country's long-standing internal conflict with new and more pressing strategic significance. Consequently, the establishment of IS operations in Afghanistan will force a revision of policy positions and priorities inside the country as well as among its various interna­tional stakeholders.

The most credible counter to IS expansion within Afghanistan is not the country's troubled govern­ment but its Sunni insurgent group, the Taliban. Since 2001, the Taliban has proven resilient in the face of overwhelming allied military fire­power and still seems as unlikely as ever to fizzle out of existence. The Taliban has more money, more fighters and more territory now than it has had at any time since the U.S.-led invasion. It is showing no sign of halting its activities.

However, as IS emerges it does so at the expense of the Taliban, a group that has declined to ally with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's fabled cali­phate. As the only serious check on IS expansion in central Asia, it is the Taliban rather than the embat­tled government of Afghan Presi­dent Ashraf Ghani that many view as a potential ally.

Iran is adapting its approach to Afghanistan. Having recognized the utility of the Taliban as an anti- IS bulwark, Iran is developing low levels of engagement with Taliban field commanders. Given their dra­matically opposed religious views, the development of Iran-Taliban ties seems unthinkable. Iran had supported the American toppling of the Taliban as well as the establish­ment of Afghanistan's post-conflict administration.

However, Tehran has adopted a more pragmatic line. First, by de­veloping ties to the Taliban, the Ira­nians may exert influence over the direction of the Taliban's attention and add another lever by which to challenge or deter U.S. interests.

Second, a key Iranian priority has been to ensure IS does not gain a foothold anywhere near its borders, especially the one it shares with Afghanistan. To that end, coopera­tion with the Taliban is beneficial to both sides.

Third, Tehran has accepted the prospect of the Taliban outliving the diminishing military campaign directed against it. Consequently, it makes sense for Iranians to im­prove ties with the insurgent group and preserve options for the future.

In addition to reaching out to the Taliban, Tehran is supporting the Kabul government, strengthening its influence beyond the Shia Af­ghan communities it supports and limiting its potential political expo­sure in the event of a major change. Consequently, Iran's evolving posi­tion is moving it closer to the ap­proach of Pakistan, Afghanistan's most influential external stake­holder.

The last two years have seen Moscow shift its policy in Afghani­stan, especially with regards to the Taliban, fearing IS's international agenda will generate instability from extremists in the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. Beijing is also stepping up efforts to facili­tate a peace process in Afghanistan as it constructs its Silk Road trade corridors, so Tehran's moves are not in isolation from key regional stakeholders.

At a time when Riyadh is seeking to include Islamabad in its anti-Iran camp, such growing Iranian con­vergence with Pakistan on Afghan policy is unhelpful to the Saudis, even if it is coincidental. Afghani­stan will remain the most impor­tant strategic issue for Pakistan for some time, especially considering the nature of its intense rivalry with India.

Arab Gulf countries will need to maneuver soon if they are to con­tain Iranian influence in Afghani­stan, with the Taliban and Tehran's growing convergence with Pakistan on Afghan policy. One option for the Arab Gulf might be to establish diplomatic momentum toward supporting a serious peace process between Kabul and the Taliban. This was an option previously, if unsuccessfully, explored by Qa­tar. However, Doha's role probably needs to shift elsewhere.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, together with Pakistan, were the first countries to recog­nize the Taliban government when it took Kabul in 1996. Though all three later supported the U.S.-led invasion, this does not need to be a fundamental obstacle to progress. With al-Qaida crippled years ago, providing IS a strategic opportu­nity by failing to work out a politi­cal road map for Afghanistan that addresses the Taliban's future role may be unwise.

Aside from countering Iranian influence, adapting Arab Gulf po­sitions on Afghanistan may prove helpful in allowing the United States to focus more fully on Iran. Crucially also, by helping force a breakthrough in Afghanistan through a national reconciliation effort, the Arab Gulf countries can ensure Afghanistan does not return to the days when al-Qaida oper­ated out of its territories without restraint.

This article originally appeared at The Arab Weekly.