The fifth annual Moscow Conference on International Security convened last week. Sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Defense and presided over by its deputy minister and general of the army, Anatoly Antonov, the conference brought together representatives from nearly 90 countries; many ministers and deputy ministers of defense; chiefs of defense staff; and other senior officials. Notably absent were officials from NATO and the U.S. government. The title of the conference was "Combating International Terrorism."
But the subplots told a better story. Russia was using this meeting to extend its global influence and provide a counter-narrative as to why its intentions were peaceful and laudable given the incursion into Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea two years ago. Russia believes NATO and the United States have been "encircling" it. MCIS was a means of breaking this encirclement by enhancing global collaboration with many of these invited states. And, of course, sponsored by a number of Russian defense companies, it was a staged but subtle arms bazaar to market weapons systems abroad.
Unfortunately and most importantly, my discussions with very senior Russian defense and civilian officials underscored the seriousness of this impasse between East and West and the diametrically opposed perceptions that, if not reconciled, could well spark the most serious crisis since before the Soviet Union imploded. That the United States and West have cut off virtually all contacts with Russia on the official and military channels meant that U.S. representation was limited to a few non-government attendees and one or two "observers" from the American embassy in Moscow.
The immediate concern is the possibility that Russian overflights of NATO warships in the Baltics and Black Sea and close-in monitoring of NATO aircraft, all in international waters, could lead to an inadvertent or accidental incident. In 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter struck a NAVY P-3 aircraft, forcing it to crash land on Hainan Island. Thirty years ago, a Navy cruiser mistook a civilian Iranian AirBus in the Persian Gulf for an attacking aircraft and shot it down, killing all aboard.
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As tensions build, such an incident is not out of the question. And unfortunately, the mechanism to prevent such events -- the U.S.-Soviet Incidents At Sea Agreement of 1972 -- has not been enforced as both sides cannot agree on how to apply it. This is a tragedy in the making. Further, by cutting off virtually all military-to-military discussions, at a time when dialogue is crucial, the chances for an unwanted incident will not be reduced.
Russia, of course believes its intervention into Ukraine and annexation of Crimea were justified by the uprising that overthrew President Viktor Yanukovych. The West saw the assault as violating the post-Cold War rules respecting international borders and responded with sanctions that Russia believes were unjustified. And NATO's response with new troop deployments and exercises in Europe were viewed by Moscow as especially provocative. Meanwhile the eastern NATO nations were fearful of aggressive Russian intentions and many Americans angered by this unilateral absorption of Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine.
Given this mutual hostility and seemingly irreconcilable differences, the Leninist question of what is to be done is overriding. And it may well be that nothing can be done for the time being. Yet that prospect is irresponsible if a crisis is to be avoided and the current tensions defused.
Here are a few suggestions: First Russia should define what specific military-to-military talks it seeks. Are the talks meant to be confidence-building measures and if so the agenda is secondary? Or should such talks focus on a specific set of issues such as applying the incidents at sea agreement as an extension of the deconfliction exchanges in Syria to prevent inadvertent contact between Russian and Western aircraft engaged in both bombing campaigns? Or can a broader discussion of the major differences of views dividing both sides be the topic?
Perhaps a private and unadvertised meeting between the U.S. chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the Russian chief of defense staff could be a first or further step. However, failing to talk is an irresponsible act by both sides. Even during the depths of the Cold War, communications channels were never severed. If they had been, perhaps the Cuban missile crisis would have had not merely an unhappy but catastrophic ending.
