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Outside View: Battle of Barg-e-Matal

By LAWRENCE SELLIN, UPI Outside View Commentator
NURISTAN PROVINCE, Afghanistan - Afghan National Army soldiers prepare for an air assault mission in support of combat operations in Nuristan to reinforce security in Barg-e Matal July 25. (Photo by U.S. Army Spc. Vitor Egorov, 55th Signal Company, Combat Camera)
NURISTAN PROVINCE, Afghanistan - Afghan National Army soldiers prepare for an air assault mission in support of combat operations in Nuristan to reinforce security in Barg-e Matal July 25. (Photo by U.S. Army Spc. Vitor Egorov, 55th Signal Company, Combat Camera)

KABUL, Afghanistan, July 29 (UPI) -- If the battle of Barg-e-Matal ever goes down in history, I am not sure if it will be treated as a victory or a defeat or a tragedy or a comedy.

It does, however, illustrate a number of elements that can help explain why progress in Afghanistan can be elusive.

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Barg-e-Matal, in the eastern province of Nuristan bordering Pakistan, has been the scene of insurgent attacks over several years and in recent months.

About two months ago the Taliban captured the district but Afghan and NATO-led international forces retook it after heavy fighting. Subsequent to the withdrawal of Afghan forces, the Taliban overran Barg-e-Matal early last Sunday. It was again retaken a day later by Afghan forces supported by the coalition.

It is difficult to ascertain the strategic significance of Barg-e-Matal. It is near infiltration and supply routes from Pakistan that are important for the Taliban to support its operations in Afghanistan. It is an area being contested among Taliban and non-Taliban armed groups. Yet, it also represents only a tiny slice of Nuristan's population. One could argue that other areas of eastern Afghanistan should have a higher priority.

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In addition to strategic considerations, counterinsurgency is often affected by politics and perception. These factors can influence both the decision-making process and the allocation of scarce resources.

Differences in the interpretation of the tactical situation between the host nation and the coalition can lead to differences in opinion regarding the need to reinforce and the urgency to do so. Barg-e-Matal is no exception in that regard. When dealing with a host nation, politics, perception and pride will always be part of the counterinsurgency equation, as will be the need to compromise.

Agility and speed of response are critical components for successful counterinsurgency. That is, to react faster than the insurgents to disrupt their planned or ongoing operations.

Unfortunately, all governments tend to grow organizations where structure trumps function and adding bodies becomes the easy solution to every problem. There is an exponential relationship between a big, stove-piped organization and the number of misunderstandings and the amount of miscommunication it can create. It is the land of the 72-slide PowerPoint presentation and redundant programs, where office politics, turf battles and personality clashes can flourish.

Sometimes the situation can be one where there is, quite literally, "too much going on." The information being generated and shared is far greater than any organization can absorb, let alone analyze and understand.

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With so many people doing so much with so little organizational comprehension, motion becomes the equivalent of progress and a smooth process can be mistaken for an effective process. More information is not necessarily better and knowledge is no substitute for wisdom.

My former boss in Iraq was fond of saying that, he "went to war and found garrison."

Despite the best of intentions, misunderstanding, miscommunication, layers of bureaucracy and an absence of urgency all can contribute to the friction of war and reduce the agility and speed of response required to get inside the enemy's decision cycle.

No plan or process is worth the effort without effective execution.

Given the complex combination of the coalition forces and limited resources, operations need simplicity, focus and maintaining tactical priorities.

The immediate task is to destroy the Taliban's capability to wage an insurgency. That means, first and foremost, to defeat them decisively in the field.

Simultaneously we must isolate them nationalistically, culturally and religiously from the Afghan people. The Taliban are invaders and murderers, who are religious extremists, who don't respect Afghan tribal traditions and who possess foreign pan-Islamic ambitions not in tune with the needs and desires of the Afghan people.

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The task here will be difficult, but by no means impossible, even for situations like Barg e Matal.

It's time to limit any unnecessary, self-imposed impediments and roll up our sleeves. For time is not on our side.

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