WASHINGTON, April 17 (UPI) -- The UPI think tank wrap-up is a daily digest covering opinion pieces, reactions to recent news events and position statements released by various think tanks. This is the fourth of several wrap-ups for April 17.
The Nixon Center/The National Interest
(The Nixon Center is a public policy institution that is a substantively and programmatically independent division of The Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace Foundation in Yorba Linda, Calif. The National Interest magazine is published quarterly by The National Interest Inc., a non-profit partnership of Hollinger International Inc. and The Nixon Center.)
WASHINGTON -- What lies ahead
By Stefan Kornelius
States that are led by a dictator, as a rule, are plunged into instability once the potentate at the top has been overthrown, as we have seen in the last few days. In this day and age, when it does appear that international politics are being personalized, the remark by the Prussian strategist Clausewitz, that war is nothing but a duel on a higher level, seems apropos.
One could almost think that Clausewitz is right, that the second Gulf War boiled down to a clash between George W. Bush vs. Saddam Hussein. In fact, many have suggested that the conflict was little more than a blood vendetta pursued by the son on behalf of his father.
Even if this is much too shortsighted, it is correct to say that, from an American perspective, it was above all Saddam's system that motivated the war. Washington saw Saddam as the source of all evil, a mass murderer out to plunge the Middle East and the entire world into chaos. This is why, behind all the demands for disarmament and inspections, there had been, above all, one overriding objective: this man must go. Bush was never before as close to this truth as last October when he said that complete disarmament was equivalent to regime change.
In fact, regime change has always been the primary American goal, even when the United States put forward other pretexts for war: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and threats posed by Saddam to his neighbors and the Iraqi population. This grab bag of reasons to go to war was needed because the actual cause for the war was difficult to legitimize under international law and politically presumptuous. The request for a regime change is an expression of imperial design -- aspirations the likes of which the world has seen only in rare moments in its history.
This realization has embittered the friends of the United States. They were bitter about American inability to listen; bitter about its rigidity; bitter about Washington's refusal to compromise; and bitter it was willing to sacrifice all other goals to achieve that one objective.
Behind the argument between the United States and the dictator of Baghdad, a much bigger conflict has built up, which does not make the world more secure but rather more unstable.
The rift between the United States, its allies and the other main players in the international system in the pre-war phase, the almost obsessive exaggeration of the Iraqi threat, and the non-stop changing of objectives and reasons to wage war all made this conflict fraught with so much unnecessary ballast that even after a quick invasion with only a few victims there can be no question of peace.
Yes, the Americans are correct in their accusation that most European governments, particularly Germany , had not yet grasped the threats of the new era. A large part of Europe has indeed shied away from a ruthless political analysis of security issues, hiding behind a supposedly higher morality and legitimacy. The continent does not know how to use its political and economic weight to give the world a turn for the better.
At the same time, however, the United States has meanwhile been asking radical questions: does one have the right to fight a danger preemptively once it looms on the horizon? Is one entitled to overthrow a dictatorship at all costs? Does the United Nations, in its World War II setup, function in a globalized world? Is international law of any use when tyrants may hide behind it?
The answers provided by the Bush administration are troubling. As much as the imminent end of the dictator and his regime must be welcomed, circumstances that have now led to war are just as tormenting. The second American-Iraqi war lacks a political, legal, and military basis; it lacks a credible post-war vision. The risks of the war are great, the scenarios for what comes after are vague.
I fear that the United States will not have the staying power to remain in Iraq for many years to come to build a stable, democratic government there. It will founder on its claim to bring about peace and stability and be accepted as a benevolent hegemonial power. Rather, the policies of the Bush administration risk breeding anger that will be turned against the United States for a long time to come.
(Stefan Kornelius is the editorial page editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung.)
WASHINGTON -- The road to Damascus?
By Nikolas Gvosdev
With the Pentagon announcement that "major military operations" are winding down, the war in Iraq has been won. The challenge is now to win the peace -- to shape the international environment on American terms.
The United States identified Saddam Hussein as a threat to regional and international security -- citing the nexus between Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its support for terrorism and Saddam's own reckless disregard for complying with the 1991 cease-fire requirements -- and placed its blood and treasure on the line to effect regime change when it believed no other option could work to achieve these goals.
The victory in Iraq creates new opportunities for the United States to pressure other regimes around the world that engage in roguish behavior -- state sponsorship of terrorism or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction -- to cease and desist. And it is appropriate for America to capitalize on fears in Pyongyang, Tehran and Damascus that "they might be next" as a way to change behavior.
At the same time, however, the ease of victory generates a dangerous temptation -- the illusion that American military force, applied in sufficient quantity, can solve any problem. Realists, in contrast, understand that power has limitations and must be skillfully exercised. Knowing when to stop is part of that management. It is not in American interests to recklessly apply force in the region, creating a momentum of instability that eventually would harm rather than promote key U.S. interests.
This is why care needs to be exercised to ensure that the United States does not stumble into an armed confrontation with Syria -- certainly not when the North Korean crisis remains unresolved. War is not weeding a garden, where it makes sense to concentrate on clearing one patch before moving on to another section.
Is Syrian behavior troubling? Certainly. For years, overt Syrian support for Hezbollah -- a way for Damascus to indirectly apply pressure to Israel -- has been a major irritant. Syria certainly desires to possess a chemical weapons capability, something they justify as necessary to achieve a degree of parity with Israel's nuclear deterrent. But if Washington chooses to rattle the saber as a way of gaining Syria's attention, it must be careful not to box itself into a position where the United States would have to choose between using force -- or risk losing the fruits of victory in Iraq by having to back down.
In the absence of any U.N. resolutions concerning Syria and the lack of any compelling evidence of a Syrian weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, program, the United States would find it much more difficult form a coalition of the willing to act forcefully against Damascus . Syria threatens no other state in the Arab world; our Arab allies who were willing to offer their territories as staging areas for a campaign against Iraq will demur against any strike on Syria . (An immediate strike against Syria will also only reinforce the opinion of many in the Arab world that American intervention is not designed to promote Arab welfare but advance the political interests of the Sharon government.)
Nor would a follow-on campaign solidify trans-Atlantic unity. Turkey has already flatly refused to consider any aid for an American war against Syria . The temporary coalescence between Paris, Berlin and Moscow would in all probability solidify to oppose further American "adventurism" in the Middle East, and, under the current circumstances, a politically weakened Tony Blair would be in no position to act as America's junior partner.
One must also not forget that the military victory in Iraq was only a first step. Iraq must be reconstructed as a viable state and society in order to continue to maintain the current regional balance of power. This will require years of careful work, not to mention large infusions of funding.
Will America's leading partners continue to provide the funds and personnel for Iraqi reconstruction in order to allow a follow-on campaign against Damascus? Not likely. (And let us not forget that Afghanistan remains an unfinished task, and al-Qaida continues to regroup in the eastern provinces of the country and in the tribal areas across the Pakistani border).
Let us also not forget that North Korea is the real threat. North Korea has a proven track record of proliferating nasty technologies around the world. It has shown no compunction about selling to any buyer. Yes, the United States could launch a military strike on Pyongyang without any other country's involvement, but the costs of acting alone are high. Why, then, should the United States waste away its political capital -- capital that will be needed to forge an effective coalition to deal with Kim Jong Il, "the Beloved Leader" -- in order to settle scores with Assad junior?
Sept. 11 provided an opportunity for the United States to deal directly with Syria. Only a year ago, Secretary of State Colin Powell paid tribute to Damascus's cooperation in the war against international terrorism and stated that Syrian assistance had saved American lives. In contrast to Saddam Hussein, the Syrians have demonstrated a pragmatic side, a tendency reinforced by the ease of the American victory over what was the strongest military power in the Arab world. We want to encourage positive Syrian behavior, not provoke a fatalistic response that says that there is nothing to be gained by further cooperation with Washington.
The United States stood its ground vis-a-vis Iraq, even in the face of the open opposition of some of the world's other leading powers, and brought down Saddam's regime at a comparably light price in terms of coalition lives and cost. Any damage to the trans-Atlantic relationship is repairable at this stage. Let's not push our luck further.
America has skillfully wielded its power, but that power nonetheless has limits. Syria may appear to be the low-hanging fruit, easily harvested -- but the resulting stomachache might prove debilitating in facing what is the graver threat to American security.
(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of In the National Interest.)
WASHINGTON -- On to Damascus?
By Geoffrey Kemp
The Bush administration cannot be blamed for being furious with Syria. Its actions over the past few weeks suggest it is eager to take up the vacancy on the "axis of evil" created by the departure of Saddam Hussein.
When the war was perceived to be going badly in the first week, President Basher Assad gave an extraordinary interview to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Safir on March 27. Among other points, he argued that Israel will not be a legitimate state in the Middle East even if peace is accomplished. He acknowledged that the United States is a superpower capable of "conquering a relatively small country," "but" he asked, "is it able to control it?"
He cited Lebanon as a model for Iraq. The implication was that after Israel occupied Lebanon in 1982 its initial successes led to a disaster because the Arab world rallied around and fought back. In other words, if the United States retains a long-term military presence in Iraq, a similar strategy against the Americans can be mounted, provided that there is a coordinated Arab effort.
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of State John Bolton, all in different forums, have warned that if Syria interferes in the continuing Iraqi operation it will be playing with fire. Some outside advisers have gone even further. On April 2, former CIA Director James Woolsey in an open forum at the University of California at Los Angeles stated that the whole array of Middle East countries should now be worried about American power and determination to change the region. He said he would be pleased if their leaders were worried.
On April 11, Reps. Elliot Engel, D-N.Y., and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla., introduced the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 in the U.S. House of Representatives. This will "hold Syria accountable for its support of terrorism, the occupation of Lebanon and the possession and continued development of the weapons of mass destruction." As Engel put it, "now that Saddam Hussein's regime is defeated it's time for America to get serious about Syria ."
Although further confrontation between the United States and countries like Syria is possible, especially if terrorism against U.S. forces in Iraq escalates, the dangers should be highlighted. Any military showdown with Syria is likely to embroil Israel with potentially troubling consequences.
U.S. policy should focus on economic and diplomatic pressure to force Syria to change its ways, especially its support for terrorism. We should not allow success in Baghdad to trigger a march on Damascus .
(Geoffrey Kemp is the director for regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center.)
