WASHINGTON, March 20 (UPI) -- The UPI think tank wrap-up is a daily digest covering opinion pieces, reactions to recent news events and position statements released by various think tanks. This is the fourth of several wrap-ups for March 20.
The Nixon Center/The National Interest
(The Nixon Center is a public policy institution that is a substantively and programmatically independent division of The Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace Foundation in Yorba Linda, Calif. The National Interest magazine is published quarterly by The National Interest, Inc., a non-profit partnership of Hollinger International, Inc. and The Nixon Center.)
WASHINGTON -- Determination, not recrimination
By Dimitri K. Simes and Paul J. Saunders
With the start of war with Iraq , the time for debate and second-guessing has passed and the time for supporting American troops -- and their commander-in-chief -- has arrived. Whatever one's original views of inspections, diplomacy, and the Iraqi threat, after our country's massive military and political investment in victory over Saddam Hussein -- and in the face of the mounting costs and risks of uncertainty to cooperative U.S. allies in the region, to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's political future, and to America's "frozen" economy -- it is essential to recognize that President Bush is making the right decision in going to war. All should hope for a quick victory with minimal consequences for U.S. forces, Iraqi civilians, and America 's image in the world.
No one should feel guilty about acting without yet another United Nations Security Council resolution. It is important to remember that the vast majority of the wars that have taken place during the almost 60-year life span of the United Nations have taken place without its formal authorization. The Korean War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War are the exception rather than the rule.
In fact, many of the interventions most frequently described as "justified" have not been endorsed by the Security Council. Interestingly, France takes a fairly casual approach to the Security Council in its own regular low-level military involvement in Africa. Also, Paris did not particularly object to NATO's 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia , which was not taken to the United Nations because of concern over a likely Russian veto.
The Yugoslavia air campaign similarly belies arguments that an "imminent threat" is necessary to justify an attack, or that force should be strictly a last resort. Belgrade was not a threat to NATO and, as historical evidence now demonstrates, the true atrocities occurred after the bombing began, not before. And France was much less vigorous in asking for more time to work out a deal with Slobodan Milosevic -- who had no weapons of mass destruction and had not sent military forces outside his country's borders -- than it was in seeking to prolong United Nations inspections in Iraq.
Still, while eschewing guilt over the absent blessings of the "international community," the United States should also avoid self-destructive recriminations against key allies and partners. Though some of America's longtime allies have not exactly covered themselves with glory in dealing with Iraq, all are entitled to their own opinions as both sovereign states and (in many but not all cases) as democracies. It would be not only hypocritical, but also unrealistic to demand blind allegiance from U.S. allies-particularly in the face of widespread opposition to American policy within their own political systems.
Also, while the Bush administration was right not to be deterred by the United Nations, taking into account that for decades the United States has been the most frequent user of the veto privilege, Americans should not be overly offended when others signal similar intentions. In acting without the United Nations, organizing a coalition of the willing, and sending 300,000 troops into battle, Washington has already made its point about U.S. power and determination. Rubbing our outrage in their faces would be counterproductive and petty -- and great empires cannot afford to look petty.
Fortunately, there have been some preliminary signals that France and Russia do not want to take their disagreement with the United States too far. France's Ambassador to the United Nations has said that Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction would "change everything"; Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that he hoped that despite disagreements over Iraq , the United Nations would play an important role in reconstructing the country.
While these statements sound self-serving, it is in the American interest to explore them in order to preserve important relationships with Paris and Moscow and to engage them and others in the aftermath of the war. Occupying Iraq largely alone, the United States would serve as a lightning rod for criticism and retaliation; working with others, America is at less risk. This is especially true in dealing with Arab public opinion and, no less important, in securing Arab and other financial support for rebuilding Iraq.
Victory is not the end of what must be done in Iraq. Nor is victory the end of the war on terrorism or the end of United Nations efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Under the circumstances, maintaining effective working relationships with other major powers that can help to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of U.S. intervention in Iraq should be a priority. Self-righteous indignation will only benefit Osama bin Laden and other United Nations enemies; it will not enhance American global leadership. (Dimitri K. Simes is the president and Paul J. Saunders is the director of the Nixon Center.)
WASHINGTON -- Countering a backlash in a post-Saddam Iraq
by Daniel Byman
The greatest challenge that military forces will face in occupying Iraq after Saddam's fall is the risk of a backlash from the Iraqi people. The nightmare is that Baghdad would be a new Mogadishu, where a hostile population turns on intervening forces.
Although anecdotal information suggests that Iraqis today would welcome American intervention -- something reconfirmed by Prime Minister Barham Salih in his remarks this past Friday, this welcome may wear thin over time. Already, members of the anti-Saddam opposition, including respected intellectuals, have criticized the intended U.S. role in post-Saddam Iraqi politics.
Perhaps surprisingly, even Kurdish groups have criticized the idea of a U.S. occupation; Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, declared, "If we don't accept an Iraqi general, how are we going to accept an American general?"
Even those Iraqi leaders who have no personal or ideological opposition to the United States may fear that intervening forces are threatening their power. In Somalia, for example, United Nations efforts to ensure the distribution of humanitarian relief changed the balance of power among Somali warlords. Supposedly "impartial" U.S. efforts to feed one group or encourage local elections may lead current leaders to stir up anti-U.S. sentiment to protect their power -- something even Salih noted when he said that "there will be some effort to derail our venture of building a federal democracy in Iraq."
The risk of a backlash in Iraq, however, is almost certainly overstated and can be further reduced by properly structuring the intervention. Claims that citizens of the former Yugoslavia, and particularly those of Afghanistan, would never abide foreign military forces in their countries have so far proven false. Senior Iraqi opposition leaders noted privately that anti-U.S. statements are simply posturing, as groups seek to avoid being portrayed as U.S. puppets. In addition, warlordism in Iraq is currently far less of a problem than it is in Afghanistan, Somalia or the Balkans.
But because the risk remains real, intervening forces should take several steps to ensure that current fears do not become realities. First, intervening forces should rectify the misery of the Iraqi people quickly by ensuring the provision of humanitarian relief : helping people get food, water and electricity will go a long way in dispelling suspicion of the intervening forces' intentions. Cooperation with relief agencies is imperative, and coalition forces should try to ensure that Iraqis are aware of these efforts.
Whenever possible, intervening forces should work through the United Nations to enhance the legitimacy of the occupation. Although the United Nations is rightly viewed as at best cumbersome and at worst sclerotic, the legitimacy gained is worth the frustration. This will help the United States and its allies counter charges of imperialism, which will be particularly loud in the Arab press. Quiet steps have already been taken to involve the UN in reconstruction and relief efforts.
As quickly as possible, Iraqis should be invited to join the decision process to make it clear that foreign forces are working with and for Iraqis, not for their own interests. Iraqi input would range from helping decide national questions such as the future use of Iraq's oil wealth to local ones such as policing and infrastructure repair. Transparency is also essential. Iraqis and other observers should know what the intervening forces plan to accomplish and the conditions under which they will leave.
Finally, the military forces should at times be dispersed to reduce the sense of occupation. When possible, small teams should be deployed to work with local officials, making sure that the local population supports the intervening forces' presence and is aware that the forces are there to assist the rebuilding of Iraq, not to rule.
Inevitably, force protection will become a major concern for a dispersed force, particularly with regard to al-Qaida-linked terrorism. In Saudi Arabia and other states in the region, military forces are deployed in well-guarded bases, separate from the population at large. Such a fortress approach throughout Iraq would prevent troops from carrying out their mission and gaining the goodwill of the Iraqis.
But dispersing forces to remote parts of Iraq to ensure local security will make the force protection challenge even greater. Dispersing forces virtually ensures that intervening forces will suffer some casualties -- it is impossible to protect small teams in remote regions, no matter how well armed and trained they are.
In obvious dangerous areas where local resentment may be high (e.g. Tikrit), civil affairs personnel and others responsible for liaising with the local population should be backed up by a visible and large outside force, including armor. Such an intrusive deployment, however, would be unfeasible in much of Iraq due to the country's size and because it might alienate an otherwise sympathetic populace.
In these areas, the best means of force protection is a supportive Iraqi people. If intervening forces are welcomed, then the local population will act as their eyes and ears at best, and at least not support or carry out terrorist attacks.
Liberation will produce a reservoir of goodwill. It will be important not to squander it in the weeks and months "the day after."
(Daniel Byman directs research in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corp.)
