WASHINGTON, Dec. 11 (UPI) -- Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution, Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution and Kyrgyzstan's 2005 Tulip Revolution resulted in new leaders who advocated democracy rising to power in all three of these post-Soviet states. The success of these three democratic "color revolutions" (as they have become known) also led to expectations that similar ones might oust ex-communist leaders elsewhere in the former USSR. But after the staging of elections with results favorable to the authoritarian regimes in Azerbaijan in November and Kazakhstan in December, it appears increasingly unlikely there will be any more color revolutions any time soon. The post-Soviet authoritarian rulers have become more adept at thwarting them.
The three color revolutions so far occurred as a result of widespread protest over falsified election results in these countries. Factors contributing to these protests were 1) the presence of non-governmental organizations promoting democratization both from the West and recently democratized countries; 2) the ability of these groups to conduct exit polls that credibly challenged the results announced by the regimes; 3) the ability of the foreign and domestic media to focus national and international attention on these protests; and 4) the inability of authoritarian regimes to prevent widespread protest from erupting combined with an unwillingness to take forceful action to suppress it.
Increasingly fearful of being ousted in a similar manner, other ex-communist authoritarian rulers have taken steps to prevent these factors from occurring in their countries. They have placed tighter limits on the ability of foreign and domestic NGOs to engage in democracy promotion. They have also acted to prevent independent exit polls from being conducted on election day. They have limited the ability of foreign journalists to enter their countries or moving about in them without government surveillance. They have dealt even more forcefully with local journalists criticizing the conduct of elections. Finally, they have imposed greater restrictions on the ability of the public to protest election results, and have been quicker to use force to prevent protests from becoming too large for them to suppress quickly and easily.
The Putin administration has taken advantage of other post-Soviet authoritarian leaders' fears of color revolutions. Until recently, many of these regimes had reacted to Russia's often crude efforts to dominate them politically and economically by turning to the United States for protection. The Kremlin, however, has actively promoted these regimes' fears the United States is the instigator of democratic revolution. And indeed, many of these regimes have turned back toward Moscow for protection from what they see as a greater threat from Washington. While they see Moscow as wanting to dominate them, this is preferable to post-Soviet authoritarian leaders than being ousted.
But while the Kremlin and other post-Soviet authoritarian regimes claim America is the instigator of the color revolutions, this is simply not true. The U.S. government does not have the power to order hundreds of thousands of protesters to take to the streets for days or weeks in inclement weather. It was popular outrage in these countries over fraudulent election results that did this. Western NGOs and media, and even the U.S. government, publicized and facilitated this to some extent, but did not cause it.
Limiting and controlling the presence of Western non-governmental organizations and media may indeed result in the Kremlin and its authoritarian allies elsewhere in the former Soviet Union being able to prevent further democratic revolutions. But this will not end the popular discontent over fraudulent election results and authoritarian rule that is the principal cause of them. The suppression of peaceful democratic revolutionary movements may not lead to the stability of authoritarian regimes, but instead to the rise of revolutionary movements that are neither peaceful nor democratic. The Russians have been unable to suppress a few thousand such revolutionaries in Chechnya. It is highly doubtful that they could suppress Islamic revolutionary movements that could rise up any country in Central Asia, much less all of it.
If the net result of Moscow's efforts to suppress the impetus for democratic revolution in the Muslim republics of the former USSR is to increase the prospects for Islamic revolution in them, the Kremlin may well come to regret what it is doing now.
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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.
