WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The killing of Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi in a U.S. air raid is a huge success in the struggle against the Iraq insurgency.
President George W. Bush was right to say Thursday that the death of al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida's operational leader in Iraq, was "a severe blow" to the al-Qaida terrorist network worldwide. It was also arguably the most important success so far in the long struggle against the Sunni insurgency in central Iraq.
Zarqawi's death will not end the three-year Sunni insurgency in Iraq and in the short term it may even dramatically inflame it. The insurgents have shown increasing capabilities in recent months, especially in their attacks against Iraqi, primarily Shiite, civilians. Therefore a range of revenge attacks even more bloody those of recent weeks is quite possible in the next few weeks. Also, Zarqawi will now provide a martyr icon to the insurgents and that can be a potent energizing force for such movements.
It is also possible that al-Qaida associated and sympathetic groups, usually very small in numbers, around the world, may accelerate whatever plans they have to carry out terror attacks in a range of countries to try and take revenge for Zarqawi. However, this could backfire on them as it may expose their long-term planning and organization and mobilize previously complacent Western populations to take their threat more seriously.
Historically, the record of how guerrilla movements react to the death of crucial commanders and charismatic leaders is a mixed one. The Irish Republican Army forces that opposed the Irish Free State in Ireland's 1922-23 Civil War fell apart after the death of their main operational commander Liam Lynch. The communist insurgency in Malaya suffered a similar fate after its top commander was killed by British security forces in the 1950s.
However, both those movements were already facing defeat from well-organized, effective governments with broad popular support presiding over stable social and economic conditions that were steadily improving.
By contrast, determined efforts by Israel to decapitate Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon have so far always been stymied. There have always been new, young operational leaders ready to take the place of the old.
But there is no doubt that the loss of brilliant, outstandingly effective insurgency commanders is an enormous blow to any guerilla organization, whatever stage of the insurgency it is at. The IRA in Ireland's 1920-21 War of Independence could well have lost if British security forces had been able to capture and kill Michael Collins, the IRA's brilliant and charismatic operational chief. The loss of Yitzhak Shamir would have destroyed the effectiveness of the Freedom Fighters for Israel or Lehi group that fought the British in Israel's 1945-47 guerrilla struggle for independence. And the death in battle at Kastel of Abd e-Khader el-Husseini in April 1947 was a mortal blow for the Palestinian national guerrilla movement that had previously been highly effective in Israel's war of Independence.
Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap was crucial for the success of the Viet Minh insurrection against the French in indo-China and for the strategic-political success of the Viet Cong against South Vietnam in the 1960s.
Also, decapitating any guerrilla group at the very minimum cripples its operational effectiveness and buys time for the counter-insurgency security forces and government to implement their political and military strategies. The repeated elimination of top Hamas commanders did not end the second Palestinian Intifada against Israel, but it reduced Hamas' operational effectiveness and it gave time for Israeli planners to come up with the security barrier strategy that finally stopped the suicide bomber offensive dead in its tracks.
At an operational and tactical level, the Sunni insurgents in Iraq no longer needed Zarqawi. They know how to make their improvised explosive devices, prepare their suicide bombers and arm their car bombs. But at a strategic level, he had no peer. He was exceptionally ruthless and relentless, even by the harsh standards of guerrilla war and he had a clear vision of the kind of tactical operations he wanted to carry out in order to achieve his long-term strategic goals.
His death eventually may serve to make the Sunni insurgents more dependent on Iranian support and on Iraqi anti-American Shiite groups.
He will certainly be replaced, but the negative experience of al-Qaida in neighboring Saudi Arabia suggests that his death may offer U.S. and allied Iraqi forces a window of opportunity to keep the Iraqi guerrillas off balance.
The Saudi security forces have killed at least five successive operational heads of al-Qaida in their country over the past three years and -- alarmist Western media reports to the contrary -- they have as a result been able to keep al-Qaida activity ineffectual and minimal.
The killing of Zarqawi does not guarantee U.S. and allied victory against the insurgents. But after a long, dark period since January, it is a ray of genuine light for U.S. policymakers.
