WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 (UPI) -- Kyrgyzstan's authoritarian ruler, Askar Akayev, was ousted in March in what appeared at the time to be a democratic revolution. By contrast, the authoritarian rulers of the other Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) appear firmly entrenched in power. But for how long?
Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution, as it was dubbed, was able to occur because the Akayev government did not use deadly force against those protesting what were widely believed to be falsified parliamentary election results in early 2005. Akayev threatened to do so. He even sent riot police to beat up -- but not fire on -- the demonstrators in front of the presidential palace (a move that backfired since it provoked the much larger crowd of demonstrators to respond in kind and to seize the palace). But Akayev did not use deadly force on this occasion -- something which he himself proudly acknowledged shortly after he fled Kyrgyzstan.
It is highly doubtful, though, the rulers of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Tajikistan would show similar restraint. Indeed, the Uzbek government did use deadly force to suppress opposition activity in Andijan in May 2005. The Kazakh government has generally attempted to appear more civilized by co-opting opponents if it can or detaining them through the state-controlled judicial system if it cannot. It seems likely, however, that the Nazarbayev regime would order the use of deadly force against its opponents -- especially after it saw what happened to the Akayev regime in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, which did not take this step.
If, indeed, the other Central Asian rulers are willing and able to use force against their opponents, this alone should enable them to prevent opposition forces from rising up or (unlike Akayev) to crush them should they somehow manage to do so. This being the case, these other regimes have strong prospects for surviving in the short -- or even medium -- term.
Sooner or later, though, each of these regimes must confront the issue of succession as their rulers grow older. And there is reason to believe that, due to their nature, the succession issue may prove especially perilous for the ex-communist authoritarian regimes of Central Asia.
Central Asia's authoritarian presidents no longer rule by virtue of being the leaders of predominant political parties. Nor do they rule as leaders of their armed forces. Instead, they rule through being at the head of networks of elites who seek to retain firm control over the state both to remain in power and to advance their own private interests. Furthermore, the manner in which they have pursued their own private interests has often harmed the general public and curtailed economic development.
For instead of seeing successful private economic activity as something that can benefit the state, or even themselves, Central Asia's ruling elites appear to fear it as something that will undermine their control over both state and society. Thus, they have sought to control economic activity in order both to maximize their own profit as well as to prevent it from threatening their positions. The result, of course, is that their actions have only served to limit private economic activity.
This is a problem that affects all the Central Asian republics. Despite their different circumstances, the Central Asian states with higher gross domestic product per capita are no less corrupt than those with lower GDP per capita. According to Transparency International's 2005 Global Corruption Report, which ranked 145 countries according to perceptions of how corrupt they are (with 1 being the least corrupt and 145 the most), Uzbekistan was ranked (along with seven other countries) at 114, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (and five others) were ranked at 122, while Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (and five others) were ranked at 133.
The way that Central Asia's authoritarian presidents have exercised power is as follows: Elites are allowed to use their positions to advance their private interests in exchange for supporting the president. If any of these elites stops supporting the president, or does anything else he does not approve of, he can dismiss them from their positions, deprive them of the ability to make further private gains, and usually take away any previous ones which they may have made.
The Central Asian presidents are aided in their ability to remove anyone they distrust both by the greed of the ruling elite as a whole and by the existence of rivalries within it. Greed and fear reduce the likelihood that other elites would ally with anyone whom the president has turned against. Rivalry among elites enables the president to find allies against anyone who might develop a following.
While obviously harmful to the general population, a problem with this system has developed for the ruling elites themselves. Since independence, a degree of differentiation has arisen among them. The presidents and their "inner circles" (i.e., their families and a few other close associates) have increasingly come to control major elements of each country's economy and are widely believed to have reaped an increasingly larger share of the gains available through corruption. The "outer circle" elites are not happy about the "relative deprivation" that they are suffering, but fear risking both their positions and their ability to derive what gains that they can. Under these circumstances, the succession issue becomes crucial, for whoever captures the presidency (as well as those closest to him or her) will be able to reap the lion's share of the gains from corruption.
A succession struggle, should it occur, might end quickly with the ex-communist authoritarian regime remaining intact. Then again, it might be prolonged. If so, this might provide other forces -- be they democratic or Islamic fundamentalist -- with an opportunity to vie for power. This might occur, for example, if one or another elite leader or faction seeks an alliance with these outside forces against rivals inside the regime. And once the outcome of a political struggle appears to be going against the president or his designated successor, the rest of the elite has a strong incentive to abandon the "sinking ship" of the old regime and ally with -- and attempt to control -- whatever replaces it.
This appears to be what actually happened in Kyrgyzstan. While the Tulip Revolution broke out due to the belief that the Akayev regime had rigged the 2005 parliamentary election results to favor his supporters, these so-called pro-Akayev parliamentarians agreed to recognize Kurmanbek Bakiyev as acting president in return for his recognizing the results of the 2005 parliamentary elections.
Whether or not a scenario such as this will come about elsewhere in Central Asia cannot be foretold. What it suggests, though, is that the potential for rivalries to emerge among the elites of these kleptocratic regimes -- especially over the presidential succession issue -- may create crises which the democratic and/or Islamic fundamentalist opponents of these regimes will undoubtedly seek to take advantage of. Even if succession from the current president to the next in these republics avoids this set of problems -- either through an arranged transition such as from Yeltsin to Putin in Russia or from Aliyev the father to Aliyev the son in Azerbaijan -- this does not guarantee that subsequent transitions will be able to. Thus, while these regimes appear relatively strong vis-à-vis their opponents on a day-to-day basis even in the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution, the combined impact of corrupt economies, elite rivalries, popular disaffection, and uncertainty over presidential succession indicates that the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia could all face regime crises in the near future.
