WASHINGTON, Nov. 5 (UPI) -- The Colombian government has announced a detailed plan to disarm some 3,000 members of the right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.
In a news conference Wednesday in Santa Fe de Ralito, Luis Carlos Restrepo, the country's high commissioner for peace, who has been negotiating with members of the AUC, outlined a three-phase plan to culminate on Dec. 31. The ultimate goal is to reintegrate into society the 20,000-strong group, which is on the U.S. State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations.
The first phase, which began Wednesday and ends in 15 to 30 days, aims to prepare, sensitize and educate municipal governments, citizens, military personnel and the paramilitary groups as to the reintegration process. The rebel groups will present a list of those members chosen to demobilize, transport them to a disclosed location, hand over their weapons, explosives, means of transportation, means of communication and maps detailing the location of antipersonnel mines.
The second phase, to last from two to 10 days, will include verifying the identities of the demobilized fighters, ascertaining their vocational skills so they can be reintegrated into the workforce, and identifying individuals who have committed unpardonable crimes under existing laws. Disarmament and demobilization will then proceed for those who fulfill all requirements.
During the third and last phase, the militia members will rejoin civil society. This stage, critics argue, is the least feasible for the Colombian government.
In this stage, to last eight days, former rebels will be transported back to their hometowns and "centers of reference" will be set up to aid the assimilation process. The four centers will be set up by local and regional authorities.
How to identify the soldiers, check their criminal records and help them establish stable lives are the problems facing the architects of the demobilization process.
Nearly a year ago, 850 rebels of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc were demobilized in Medellin, Colombia's second largest city, but Restrepo described the results as a "disaster." After a spontaneously "improvised" reintegration process, 70 percent of the former fighters who received "basic, basic training" turned out to be criminals and ended up controlling the drug trade in Medellin neighborhoods, Adam Isacson, senior associate for the Colombia program at the Center for International Policy, told United Press International.
Critics argue that two to 10 days are not enough to effectively verify the identities and legal histories of 3,000 men, and the result "is not going to be an effective demobilization," Maria McFarland, a researcher specializing in Colombia at Human Rights Watch, told UPI.
A lack of financial support, a disengaged business sector and an unenthusiastic international community, all of which limited the success of the first, smaller demobilization, are still problems plaguing Colombian authorities. Failure to address these issues threatens to render the exercise a meaningless "show," says Isacson.
Restrepo has learned from past mistakes, however, and has instituted many new measures to ensure things go better this time. As part of the final phase, he has added incentives to encourage former rebels to work. Some will be offered jobs as manual laborers to eradicate illicit crops in natural parks for a $$@$!100 stipend plus transportation, food and housing, for example.
New small enterprises have been set up to absorb 40 percent of the 3,000 demobilized soldiers. Companies who employ former militia members are set to receive unlimited credit and $$@$!100 subsidies for rural and agricultural development, and technical assistance.
Although international assistance is limited to the Organization of American States, there is a wide array of government support at hand.
McFarland and Isacson agree the process is missing a legal framework to define when demobilization is complete, and to ensure that justice is served in cases where former rebels have committed serious crimes.
"If the goal is to have an ad-hoc move to have a few people go through a process and then be set free it will never result in genuine demobilization, that isn't very useful," McFarland said.
Restrepo said in an interview with RCN Radio, "Today there exists a collective conscience in this country about the necessity of having a judicial framework that allows us to know what is going to happen with those responsible for atrocious crimes, which in our case is practically all the leaders of the AUC and the guerillas," hinting at the difficulty the government has had in negotiating an acceptable framework with the AUC and the country's Congress.
He denied there was an agreement with the AUC to provide immunity to its top leaders.
"Nothing. There has been no type of agreement, the AUC are very clear on that. In an autonomous manner the Congress of the republic, in accordance with democracy, will have to define that legal framework," he said.
Salvatore Mancuso, an official negotiator for the AUC, is wanted by the United States for allegedly smuggling 77 tons of cocaine into the United States. In 2002, Washington issued an extradition request for him.
Some of the 13 paramilitary groups set to demobilize their members are the Bloque Catatumbo, Self Defense Forces of CA<3>rdoba, Bloque Bananero, Bloque Calima and Bloque Cundinamarca. Since a December 2002 cease-fire with the government, killings attributed to the AUC fell 67 percent, while mass deaths fell by 80 percent, according to the Colombian government.
