WASHINGTON, Feb. 4, 1991 (UPI) -- In the midst of huge uncertainties over its duration and ultimate costs in dollars and lives, talk of the Persian Gulf War is rife with speculation about how allied victory will be defined and finally achieved.
Will Saddam Hussein succumb to force and leave Kuwait, sparing Iraq further losses from relentless military attack and economic strangulation, or will he wage his threatened Islamic holy war to the point of Arab martyrdom?
Will President Bush settle for an outcome that permits Saddam simply to relinquish his ill-gotten gains in Kuwait or will he insist that Iraq be prosecuted for war crimes and forced to pay reparations for its aggression?
Will the restoration of peace and security to the region -- a stated objective of the United States and its allies -- be served if Saddam abruptly pulls the surviving elements of his military back to within Iraq's borders?
At the heart of these and other questions about possible outcomes to the war lie the unknown intentions of Saddam himself and the unpredictable course and broad objectives of American-led Operation Desert Storm.
The most immediate issue facing Bush and his commanders is when, if at all, the allies will feel compelled to move from a relatively successful and low-casualty air war to a potentially bloody ground battle to dislodge Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
And as that decision point approaches, some are wondering and worrying about what actual end Bush has in mind for Desert Storm and what political goals might underlie the primary military objective of liberating Kuwait.
In a weekend NBC News interview, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, D-Wis., an influential backer of the U.S.-led war effort, voiced concern that ''we're about to do something dangerous here'' by taking on the additional aim of ''getting rid of Saddam Hussein.''
Though Bush has denied any attempt to target or kill Saddam, allied forces have attacked his headquarters and hideaways under the guise of a broad strategic priority of eliminating the Iraqi command-and-control structure.
Aspin, however, contends that insisting on Saddam's death, overthrow or ouster from power would unwisely complicate the political and military factors that will be used to measure victory.
''The cost, in terms of time and casualties, if expanding the war aims to include getting rid of Saddam is going to be very, very large,'' he said. ''And I think we ought to give that a lot of consideration before we just automatically expand those aims.''
A senior administration official acknowledged last week that seeing the war end with Saddam still in power ''would be conceivable, however undesirable.''
While the United States has acted under specific U.N. mandate to ''restore international peace and security'' in the gulf region, the early air strikes against chemical and biological weapons facilities provided ample evidence that Bush was looking beyond the conflict at hand to Iraq's ability to wage war in the future.
But what of Saddam himself? British Prime Minister John Major said he ''will not weep'' if Saddam becomes a casualty of war. Bush has all but invited the Iraqi people to overthrow their ruthless leader and some military analysts say the massive bombardment of elite Iraqi Republican Guard ground troops may be designed to break them to the point where they rise up against Saddam.
However wishful that may seem, it is clear that U.S. aims in the war extend past victory on the battlefield of Kuwait to future restraints on Saddam or his successor. How to impose and enforce them remains to be seen.
From the outset of the gulf conflict, the evil driving U.S. policy has not been Iraq's formidable military power but Saddam's willingness to use it. However well his death or ouster would play to U.S. interests, administration officials acknowledge the desirable outcome is not always the most likely or attainable one.
Short of that, U.S. officials have discussed prospects for the future military containment of Iraq by U.N. or Arab forces. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney also said Sunday in an ABC News interview that the international community may insist on postwar sanctions, such as tight curbs on access to sophisticated weaponry and strategic technology, to deny Saddam ''the ability to rebuild that military force that he's used against his neighbors.''
And could a secure peace really be possible if Saddam, hoping to turn defeat into victory by emerging a hero of the Arab world for his stand against the infidels, remained in power?
''If we achieve our objective of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, if we're able to destroy his offensive military capability, which we're well on our way to doing now, then I think we will have achieved our objective,'' Cheney said.
