WASHINGTON -- Too much cargo concentrated in the back of the plane caused a Ryan Air Service commuter aircraft to crash in Homer, Alaska, in November 1987, killing 18 people, federal safety investigators said Tuesday.
The National Transportation Safety Board said the aft hold of the Beech 1900 twin-engine turboprop contained twice the amount of cargo it should have, pulling back the plane's center of gravity eight to 11 inches past acceptable limits.
As a result, the pilots -- Capt. Robert J. Deliman, 26, and First Officer Gareth L. Stoltzfus, 40 -- lost control of the plane at low altitude when they extended its flaps for landing and did not have enough time to react to a sudden stall, the board said.
The aircraft, en route from Kodiak, slammed into the ground, killing both pilots and all but three passengers.
'The flight crew did not comply with company or Federal Aviation Administration procedures which required them to compute a center of gravity before departure, and they employed improper procedures to determine the airplane's weight and balance,' the NTSB said.
Build-up of ice on the wings, which had been suspected as a cause of the accident, aggravated the plane's stall but was not the reason the plane crashed, the agency concluded.
The board also found that the plane was more than 1,000 pounds overweight for the flight, but the pilots still could have landed safely had the cargo been properly placed so that center of gravity was correct.
The crash was one of eight Ryan accidents between 1984 and 1987, but NTSB Acting Chairman James L. Kolstad said the board found 'no common thread' among the accidents.
But in the wake of the Homer accident and a long series of safety violations by the airline, the FAA forced Ryan to ground its fleet from last February until July and replace its top management.
The NTSB concluded more passengers might have survived had the force of the crash not dislodged their seats and recommended the FAA do tougher testing of seats on commuter aircraft.
The board also found that rescue workers had difficulty pulling survivors from the crash because they did not know where it was safe to cut into the fuselage.
It asked the National Fire Protection Association to publish a manual showing the access points, fire hazard zones, interior fuselage arrangements, master power switch and battery locations for aircraft with more than 10 seats.
