LONDON -- After the American hostages were seized in Tehran, the fortunes of Iranian leaders swayed with each turn in the crisis that dramatic incident caused.
Politicians and priests suffered purges ordered by other politicians and priests. Yesterday's allies were today's foes.
The crazy quilt power struggle went on unabated.
Most Iran analysts agree that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini made a critical error when he dumped his revolutionary allies after he took control Feb. 11, 1979. Among the disillusioned were powerful groups such as left-wing Moslems, university-based intellectuals and women.
The letdown caused an early breach in the revolutionary front that had accepted Khomeini as leader in order to overthrow the shah. The split proved crucial in prompting Khomeini to take advantage of the hostages.
Although little suggests Khomeini knew of the embassy takeover in advance, the mullahs quickly persuaded him to support the militants. That destroyed within 48 hours the provisional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and paved the way for the fundamentalists' takeover of the country several months later.
No sooner had the fundamentalists gotten rid of Bazargan than they faced Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, a secular nationalist immunized by a deep bond with Khomeini, as foreign minister and then as president.
At a time when religious leaders demanded President Carter be tried along with the hostages, Bani-Sadr remained a voice of reason and persuasion, earning the charge of being 'pro-Western.'
Last August when Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Rajai formed a government on the strength of the religious majority in the Majlis (parliament) to end direct rule by the clergy, the emasculation of the moderates appeared complete.
But the months of religious rule had left Iran in greater economic and social disorder. Its isolation was aggravated by a U.S.-initiated trade embargo that helped produce food shortages, unemployment and trade dislocation.
Although the regime pretended the hostage crisis was secondary to its confrontation with the 'Great Satan' -- Khomeini's term for the United States -- Iranians blamed all their ills on Tehran's keeping of the American hostages.
When war broke out with Iraq on Sept. 22, Iran began seeing the hostages as a burden, one that some clergymen interpreted as U.S.-inspired. Clerics who had opposed Bani-Sadr's attempts to end the hostage crisis sent Rajai to the United Nations to set off indirect negotiations with the United States.
The ensuing talks were marred by further infighting. The moderates welcomed the fundamentalists' initiative to end the hostage deadlock, but they openly criticized the mullahs' handling of the negotiations.
That polarization within the Islamic regime was further complicated by the military's tacit support of Bani-Sadr.
The clergy feared the military's sympathy for Bani-Sadr might spawn a dangerous new challenge of their power. Rajai's recent praise for the army betrayed the clergy's desire to keep on the right side of the only relatively organized and disciplined element in the country.
But the military, like the moderates, wanted an end to the hostage issue and government effort channeled into the war with Iraq. The generals' impatience with Tehran's dallying on the issue was muted but could not be ignored.
