WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 (UPI) -- Recent reports that the U.S. Department of Defense is exploring the development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use has nuclear nonproliferation experts concerned about the negative effects such a program could have on international geopolitics and arms control efforts.
"This administration has come to believe that nuclear weapons can be used on the battlefield," Joseph Cirincione, a senior associate and director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told United Press International. "This is an extremely dangerous idea."
The details of a scheduled August meeting of senior military officials to discuss the possible development of a new generation of these low-yield nuclear weapons came to light last week after documents relating to the meeting were leaked from the Pentagon.
The purpose of the meeting is to discuss whether the United States should reactivate portions of its nuclear weapons testing and development program to build such devices. According to the leaked documents, the officials will also explore ways the American public could be convinced that the weapons are needed.
The key weapons under consideration are so-called "mini-nukes" that could be deployed to destroy underground bunkers, and neutron bombs that could destroy stockpiles of chemical or biological agent stockpiles.
The idea of low-yield devices for battlefield use is not a new idea. Think tank analysts and state department officials said that the Bush administration has long considered them for a possible role in its plans for dealing preemptively with rogue states.
One of the pillars of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's nuclear posture review, published by the Pentagon last year, was the possible development of low-yield nuclear weapons along with acceleration of the time that detonation testing of nuclear devices could be re-instituted.
Although President George. H.W. Bush withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from service in 1991 and the U.S. government has not detonated a test nuclear weapon since 1992, nuclear analysts said the government could begin detonation testing again within 36 months under current conditions. But the administration and its allies in Congress have proposed that this time frame be shortened: The House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs released a report two weeks ago that calls for nuclear detonation testing to be reinstated in 18 months.
The report also calls for a change in the 1994 law that places the threshold for American nuclear weapons at no less than five kilotons. A low-yield nuclear device is generally defined as one around a single kiloton or less.
In addition, the Pentagon, the Department of Energy, and national laboratories have reportedly been using computer simulations and other testing methods to evaluate the potential of such weapons.
Critics of reestablishing an active nuclear weapons development program say that it would lay the groundwork for the United States to move away from global arms control efforts.
Charles Ferguson, a scientist-in-residence in the Washington office of the Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, said that the Bush administration, through its review of U.S. nuclear posture and its new preemption policies, has already shown its lack of faith in diplomacy, nonproliferation treaties and other non-military means as a means to compel other nations to forego developing weapons of mass destruction.
"This administration seems to be moving away from nonproliferation as it has been practiced over the last several decades, to a practice of counter-proliferation," he said. "They want to have sufficient firepower at their command that they could deploy at a moment's notice."
Cirincione said that the proposal for low-yield nuclear weapons also ignores the history of tactical nuclear weapons.
"This potential policy is really a throwback to the 1950s, when we thought that nuclear weapons would have use on the battlefield, and we developed nuclear artillery, nuclear bazookas, nuclear depth charges and nuclear torpedoes," he said.
"We soon realized all of those weapons were as dangerous to our troops as they were to our enemies because of the radiation," he said. "We no longer field anything like that."
He added that the development of such weapons for use today would also legitimize the use of nuclear weapons and encourages other countries to develop their own.
"In short it would make the world safe for the use of nuclear weapons," he said. "This is not in U.S. national security interests."
But Robert J. Einhorn, a senior advisor in the international security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that just because tactical nuclear weapons are developed doesn't mean they will be used.
"In my view it is extremely unlikely that any president would authorize the first use of nuclear weapons to destroy some underground laboratory for chemical or biological weapons," he told UPI. "It is very hard for me to imagine a contingency in which we would want to use nuclear weapons to destroy such a facility."
Einhorn, who also served as assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the Department of State from 1999 through 2001, said there are a number of reasons for this, including the fact that conventional weapons can usually get the job done. He added that such a strike would also need to eliminate all of the opponent's capacity to use weapons of mass destruction, and would have to be the last available policy option.
Cirincione and Ferguson said that the effectiveness of available conventional weapons is precisely why the development of tactical nuclear weapons is unnecessary. They noted that several conventional weapons currently in use -- such as high-yield explosives, fuel air bombs that approximate the yield of small nuclear devices, and missile-based weapons to destroy the entrances and exists of underground bunkers -- can accomplish the tasks for which low-yield nukes would be designed.
"There isn't any legitimate mission that requires the United States to develop new nuclear weapons," said Cirincione.
Ferguson said there are also inherent technical limitations for low-yield nuclear weapons on the battlefield. He cited recent studies that he said have shown it is next to impossible to contain the blast of a nuclear detonation, even a small one, even if the blast is far underground.
"If we are talking about bunker busters or underground detonations, chances are you are going to create a lot of fallout in the local region," he said. "Bystanders and innocent people will die from that fallout."
It is also questionable whether a small nuclear blast can effectively destroy nuclear or biological agents without additional cleanup afterwards. Some recent studies show that the yield needed for this task exceeds the limits of a small tactical nuclear device, he said.
Cirincione was also questioned the possible geopolitical impact of U.S. development of these new nuclear weapons.
"If the most powerful nation in the world says it needs nuclear weapons for battlefield use, then why doesn't everyone?" asked Cirincione. "You provide justification for other nations acquiring nuclear weapons. That would be a disaster," he said.
Proponents of such a plan argue that if other nations knew the United States possessed tactical nuclear weapons, it might deter them from pursuing the development of chemical or biological weapons.
Einhorn said that although it is hard to tell what impact a development program for low-yield nuclear weapons would have, he does not support the thinking of either the proponents or opponents to the idea.
"I think a decision by a country to acquire nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction capabilities rests on so many other considerations. I don't think it (the new tactical nuclear weapons) will be a major factor either way," he said.
