De-mythologizing the surge

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5 (UPI) -- The surge of 33,000 U.S. troops last year in Iraq is a focal point of the foreign policy debate between the two presidential candidates. Advocates say it is solely responsible for the improved security situation in Iraq and any effort to establish a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal would undermine the gains that have been made, some suggesting this would be the equivalent of surrender. This characterization of the surge is divorced from reality and is an indication that its proponents do not understand what role adding troops to Iraq had in making that nation more secure and what were the costs of those increases.

The surge was a tactic, not a strategy. Sending in more troops was going to make Iraq more secure, at least temporarily. The problem was there was no workable political plan accompanying the surge, only rhetoric about creating political breathing space. In addition, it was not the sole reason for making Iraq more secure. The "Sunni awakening" credited with helping to remove al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) from Anbar province began months before the surge was formally announced.

Sunni tribal leaders decided that dealing with the U.S. military was preferable to dealing with AQI. U.S. military commanders in the region allied themselves with Sunni leaders, eliminating the AQI stronghold in the region and thereby making Iraq more secure. It is right to credit the courage and creativity of the U.S. military for helping to change the dynamic in Anbar, but success was not a direct result of troop increases. Other considerations, such as ethnic cleansing and a backing off of Shiite militias, contributed to making Iraq safer. We can never know for certain how much the surge was responsible for making Iraq more secure vs. other non-related factors, but we can assess some of the negative consequences that resulted from the troop increase.

Council on Foreign Relations scholar and former U.S. government terrorism expert Steven Simon argues that the surge has made political reconciliation more precarious. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs magazine, Simon writes that the surge "stok(ed) the revanchist fantasies of Sunni Arab tribes ... pitting them against the central government and against one another. In other words, the recent short-term gains have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq."

It is also useful to consider what the surge cost financially, in terms of lost opportunities in Afghanistan and with respect to its impact on U.S. troops. The price tag of the Iraq war is about $650 billion and rising, and the surge certainly added to the financial burden. Most experts agree that the central front in the war against terrorists is in Afghanistan and that in order to stabilize the situation, we need to increase our military presence. The only place we can get the troops is from Iraq. Had we shifted troops from Iraq sooner, Afghanistan -- where U.S. monthly troop casualties now surpass those in Iraq -- might be more stable.

Most importantly, the surge has contributed to the already high stress levels of U.S. forces. Some of the troops involved with the surge were on their second, third or even fourth tour of duty. Multiple tours create considerable hardships for the families and the troops themselves. Jason Forrester of Veterans for America has said, "The Army-led Mental Health Advisory Team V report (MHAT V) found that 27 percent of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) on their third or fourth tour met criteria for depression or PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder), compared to 18.5 percent of NCOs on their second tour and 12 percent of NCOs on their first tour." In addition, as of March 2008, there were 12,235 stop-lossed troops, some of whom were part of the surge.

Surge supporters have criticized those who advocate a timetable for leaving Iraq, calling it potentially destabilizing, but setting a schedule for withdrawal will force Iraqis to do more militarily and politically. Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki, President George Bush and even Sen. John McCain are now discussing timetables and time horizons as part of the mix of an overall Iraq strategy.

No one can question the bravery and effectiveness of U.S. forces. Since we ask so much of them, it is fair to ask political leaders to be more thorough and strategic about when, where and how they are deployed. Advocates of the surge see it as a panacea to respond to our problems in Iraq without acknowledging the other factors that have made that country more secure, as well as its possible residual negative effects. The ultimate questions that these supporters have not addressed are what were the costs and consequences of the surge, and was there ever consideration of getting behind a political plan aggressively that would have tied the surge to a more sustainable strategy?

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(William C. Danvers served on President Clinton's National Security Council staff. He is currently a lobbyist in Washington and an adjunct professor at George Washington University.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)