Analysis: Karzai's Ashdown Afghan impasse

BRUSSELS, Jan. 29 (UPI) -- The withdrawal of Paddy Ashdown, the British politician, from consideration as the U.N. envoy to Afghanistan should give the international community pause for reflection about the possibilities of success and the dangers of failure there.

Ashdown's candidature seems ultimately to have been scuppered by Afghan President Hamid Karzai's concern that a stronger U.N. envoy might force his government, finally, to deal with his government's corruption, the country's ballooning opium trade and a failure to contain the insurgency. Karzai reversed his earlier support and spent time at Davos lobbying against Ashdown, leader of Britain's small Liberal Democrat Party and a former high-level envoy in the Balkans.

But without strong U.N. leadership is it hard to see how the international effort can become more joined-up and ultimately successful. After 6-1/2 years, Afghanistan's reconstruction is plainly in danger.

Despite the billions of euros spent, most ordinary Afghans have yet to see the benefits in terms of security, access to justice and delivery of basic services.

All these difficulties have been exacerbated by European and American policy disagreement. The Americans are focusing on a military approach, while Europeans have lagged behind the United States in their financial and military commitments, and have even failed to coordinate their own activities.

Yet there is still good reason to believe that the international intervention to stabilize Afghanistan can succeed. The majority of Afghans genuinely welcomed Western intervention in the hope that it would put an end to decades of war and bring prosperity. The re-established state has shown real commitment to carrying out necessary governance reforms and engaging in a systematic development agenda.

First and foremost, we need a coherent, overarching political strategy. This must outline the aims of the counterinsurgency campaign, the shape of an acceptable political accommodation with the Taliban, the means for tackling governmental corruption and the narcotics problem, and an agreement on how to develop a united trans-Atlantic approach to the region.

Adopting a new approach to the Taliban is perhaps most imperative. We cannot hope to vanquish the Taliban militarily; instead we need to help Karzai engage the "moderate" Taliban, offering them incentives -- including reconstruction, jobs and money -- to defect from the hardliners and support the Afghan government. Hitherto, limited efforts to "divide and rule" in this way have been conducted on the hoof; the policy needs to be relaunched backed by a thorough plan.

The new political strategy requires clear and empowered leadership to implement it and to bring the international community together. If not Lord Ashdown, then we need someone else of his stature and skills. In this, the Afghan government should have as much say as in last month's selection of a new NATO commander -- none.

It will take many years for indigenous security forces to battle the insurgency and maintain security. International forces will have to fill the gap, and until now their numbers have been far too few.

European countries need to deploy more troops in Afghanistan and relax restrictions on their troops -- the so-called caveats. German, Italian and Spanish troops will also need to redeploy from the west and north to the east; this will allow U.S. troops to move to the insurgency-racked south in aid of the British, Canadians, Danes and Dutch.

Finally, EU governments must reverse the decline in development aid and channel it to the two or three priorities. The RAND Corp. has shown that international assistance to Afghanistan has lagged behind most other reconstruction efforts; Afghanistan received 38.5 euros per capita in the first two years of assistance, while Bosnia received 458.6 euros, East Timor 157 euros and Haiti 50 euros.

For the United States and Europe, changing course will not be an easy task. EU governments and parliaments will have to convince hostile public opinion of the necessity for further sacrifice. Germany will need to send more troops from the north to the east, deploy more trainers and be ready to fight those who oppose Afghanistan's reconstruction.

For its part, Washington will need to engage more effectively with the Taliban and to reconsider its approach to the ballooning opium economy. The allies have to make clear to President Karzai that while he remains Afghanistan's best hope, his position will be compromised if he does not take some action against corruption inside his own government.

A new strategy will bring new challenges and risks, but the consequences of the current approach threaten to be disastrous. There is a danger that the intervention in Afghanistan will become part of a major strategic debacle for the EU and Germany. Time is running out.

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(Daniel Korski is a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Until earlier this year, he was a senior British official and head of the U.K. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Basra, Iraq.)