WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 (UPI) -- Recent pronouncements by U.S. Air Force officials about their view of cyberspace as a war-fighting domain have attracted little attention. But the questions they raise for U.S. military policy and doctrine are profound.
“Cyber(space) is important to the nation,” said Gen. Robert Elder, the military officer in charge of the U.S. Air Force’s day-to-day cyberspace operations, acknowledging the dependence of U.S. commerce and banking on the Internet, “But to the Air Force, it’s really important.”
He told a recent briefing organized by the Air Force Association that cyberspace was vital because it was the key to the U.S. military’s fabled cross-domain dominance.
“When we talk about the speed range and flexibility of air power” -- to deliver satellite-guided strikes to effect the outcome of a battle on the ground for example -- “the thing that enables this for us is the fact of our cyber-dominance,” the ability to move data and control signals through cyberspace -- which as the Air Force defines it is the entire electromagnetic spectrum.
The Air Force is in the process of standing up a fully fledged Cyberspace Command, alongside its Space and Air Commands, but Elder, like other senior officials, denied that the move was a turf grab.
He elaborated on the consequences of the Air Force’s view of cyberspace as a war-fighting domain by analogizing it to the maritime and air domains, both of which were simultaneously the venues for commerce and daily life, and potential vectors for military action by or against the United States.
“We in the Air Force think the air is a war-fighting domain,” he said, “but that doesn’t mean we expect Delta or United (Airlines) to think it is.”
He said there was a diverse and overlapping series of authorities and legal frameworks for activities in cyberspace, and the full policy implications of seeing it as a war-fighting domain had yet to be worked through.
“We have had situations before where the intersections (with other agencies) … have been difficult,” he said.
He said there were “shades of gray from law enforcement (to) homeland security, (to) homeland defense to some kind of expeditionary operation (like Iraq). Where do we say, ‘We’ve crossed the line now’?” into the war-fighting realm.
He said there was also a tension between war-fighting objectives and intelligence-gathering ones.
Elder said partnership with civilian agencies like law enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security, which has the lead in securing the nation’s critical infrastructure including its cyber-capacity, was the key for the Air Force.
“What we’re really trying to do with these partnerships is close the gaps” between military and civilian authorities and agencies. “We need to have clearer interaction with these other agencies,” he said.
Some believe the laws governing cyberspace might need to be changed, he said. “Ultimately they may, but until we fully understand how it works between these very different areas of business -- law enforcement, homeland security, commerce -- we can’t just say, ‘Here’s what we should change.’”
But other Air Force officials see U.S. military policy as too timid. “Legislation, policies and international law are lagging the technology” in the cyber-domain, Lani Kass, a senior adviser to U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley, told another recent conference. “The United States is late to the fight.”
She said U.S. tactics in cyberspace were constrained by political correctness.
“Today it is much easier to get permission to kill the enemy, to drop a bomb on a terrorist hideout, than to culturally offend them. In other words, take a beheading video, take it off the net, and substitute -- whatever you like: Bay Watch? The technology is there. It’s there in the civilian world. But the policies are such that you can’t do that.”
One congressional official told United Press International that caution was appropriate in what he called “virgin territory” from a strategic theory point of view.
“If we drop a bomb on a house, we have a pretty good idea of what the collateral damage will be … if we take down a server somewhere, the possible results are a lot less clear.”
Elder said from a defensive point of view, the Air Force is interested not just in protecting its own networks, which he called “perimeter security,” but also in “getting out beyond the wire” and building “defense in depth” in the cyber-domain.
On any Air Force base, he said, the ultimate last line of defense is the sidearm that every airman carries. He said a “cyber-sidearm program” would give “every airman the tools, right on their laptop or desktop” to defend the cyber-domain.
But Kass believes “if you’re defending, you are late.”
“Cyber favors the offense. Defense in cyberspace in my humble opinion is a loser’s game.”
She said cyberspace “is a domain that allows you to deliver effects disproportionate to the level of investment,” and that could thus provide U.S. adversaries with asymmetric advantages.
“To dominate on land, at sea, in the air, and in space, you need to invest a fairly significant amount of capital, training, equipment. … In the electromagnetic spectrum of the cyber-domain a very minimal investment allows you to inflict damage totally disproportionate to your level of investment.”
