This January, in announcing a new defense strategy, the White House made another blunder. This strategy was proclaimed as "a strategic pivot to Asia."
Almost immediately, the administration reversed gears. No one easily accepts responsibility for a major gaffe and "rebalancing" became the palliative excuse.
Yet, the damage was done. And the real reason for the pivot, namely an "emerging" China -- another offensive reference -- was unmentioned by the White House as if it were a bizarre relative hidden in the attic so as not to frighten the kiddies.
Allies and friends in Europe read this pivot as a major erosion in long-standing U.S. European priorities. But given large European defense reductions, allies were too polite to complain even as the United States cut two brigade combat teams permanently based on the continent.
Other seemingly insignificant changes such as terminating the National Defense University's Center for Trans-Atlantic Security Studies reinforced this perception of downgrading Europe.
China clearly wasn't pleased. And friends and allies in Asia were uncertain as to what this pivot meant since the United States has been a Pacific power for well more than a century.
The underlying argument for this pivot was no secret. Economic power is rapidly shifting to Asia. China is strengthening its military (and some in Washington as well as the Romney camp view Beijing as the emerging military threat).
Further, long-standing regional rivalries over territorial claims, resources and North Korea's hostility and unpredictability are potential flash points.
Part of the strategic calculus, although not prominently featured at first, included the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf in particular. Given Iran's revolutionary fervor that is unsettling its neighbors; its uncertain nuclear weapons ambitions (despite strict denials) and what Israel may or may not do to eliminate that potential, with its massive oil reserves, this region remains vital to U.S., Western and Asian interests.
Currently, the United States is conducting a massive naval exercise in the Persian Gulf presumably to deter or convince Iran's leaders that pursuit of nuclear weapons is unacceptable.
A common thread in this flawed strategic thinking links the miscalculations of the Bush 43 administration in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with the Obama pivot.
While Bush had little alternative after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, except to strike Osama bin Laden and his Afghan sanctuary, the "What next?" question was never asked or addressed. This initial failure was dwarfed by the abdication of strategic thinking in planning for the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom once the Iraqi military was destroyed.
Irrespective of believing (or wishing) that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the "what next question" remained totally ignored and Iraq descended into chaos that still persists.
This latest strategic pivot follows this fundamental lapse in America's strategic ability to think beyond first order issues and ask "what next" (including Obama's original "AfPak" 2009 study).
Worse, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq forced the Pentagon to become the default setting and surrogate for the missing diplomatic, economic, political and social tools necessary for achieving at least a partially successful outcome, the same, predictable phenomenon could occur in the Pacific.
One agonizing dilemma of this strategic lacunae is how not to provoke China to respond in ways that will inflame and exacerbate the many tensions already present in Asia.
Thus far, no explanation to this quandary has been offered.
Is this geostrategic miscalculation remedial? Should Mitt Romney win the election, his current and far from clear policies suggest that China will be treated harshly. If he is true to his word, on the ex-governor's first day in office he will brand China as a "currency manipulator."
Of course, Bill Clinton campaigned against "the butchers of Beijing." And then he conveniently ignored that charge after winning in 1992.
If Obama is re-elected, will his administration have a learning curve? George W. Bush did although the cost of that education was unaffordable and came far too late. The jury is out.
However, the Obama administration has no real strategic thinkers in the White House and the president's closest advisers come from domestic political backgrounds and trusted friendships. And with a large turnover in his national security team assured, no one knows who the new appointees will be.
But make no mistake. This is a strategic pivot to nowhere. Unless it is redirected, don't be surprised by the consequences. And few will be good.
(Harlan Ullman is chairman of the Killowen Group, which advises leaders of government and business, and senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council.)
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)