Afghanistan needs a national guard, not a national army

HELSINKI, Finland, Dec. 29 (UPI) -- The National Guard is part of the military reserve forces and operates under the authority of the governor or adjutant general of each of the 50 U.S. states and may offer an idea for security forces in Afghanistan.

Each U.S. state's National Guard may be called to active duty by that state's governor during natural disasters or civil unrest. With the governor's consent, state National Guard units may become part of the National Guard of the United States and serve with active military components during national emergencies. State National Guard units have a long history of valorous service in wartime, most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A recent article by Rajiv Chandrasekaran of The Washington Post states that two days before announcing his Afghan surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops, President Barack Obama informed Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal that he was not granting the general's request to double the size of the Afghan army and police to 400,000. Nevertheless, Chandrasekaran reported that 10 days after the president's speech, the U.S. command responsible for training the Afghans circulated a chart detailing the combined personnel targets for the army and police. The goal of 400,000 remained unchanged.

After eight years of effort and at considerable expense, the Afghan national army numbers between 88,000 and 92,000 troops. McChrystal admits that after eight years of recruitment and training, the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police are not sufficiently effective to take ownership of Afghanistan's security.

Unlike U.S. National Guard units from different states, which have operated seamlessly together in Afghanistan and Iraq, there remains little trust between the various Afghan tribal factions, especially in the Pashtun regions, where there is significant sensitivity to the presence of Tajiks, for example, who presently dominate the ranks of the Afghan national army.

There are numerous reports of illiteracy, language differences among recruits, drug use and the lack of fire discipline during combat operations. Within the Afghan national army, desertion rates have been reported to be as high as 25 percent.

This is not all the fault of the Afghans, because the Taliban are a fierce and increasingly savvy fighting force. It is largely due to trying to overlay a Western military structure on a tribal culture and setting unreasonable numerical targets with an inadequate and improper mix of U.S. training and mentoring resources.

This is less about total numbers, as the McChrystal report seems to imply, and more about effective numbers. The present estimate of 88,000 to 92,000 trained Afghan troops in no way reflects actual combat capability. By merely increasing the rate of what we are already doing, rather than changing our training and mentoring methods, we will simply increase the magnitude of the problems we have previously experienced.

The Afghan national army has to be built from the ground up and according to the language, culture and tribal norms of that region. Given the stated or implicit time and cost restraints of our commitment to Afghanistan, trying to "boil the ocean" is not the answer. It means expending our greatest effort in those regions most likely to create an immediate impact on the current negative trends.

The best means to provide the local populace with security and the rule of law is rooted in the Afghan identity or "woleswali." Afghanistan is a blend of ethnic groups, languages, tribes and clans that have traditionally provided religious, social and cultural identity, and -- in a power vacuum -- an alternative government. The Taliban largely succeeded in leveraging Afghan traditions by filling the power vacuum during the 1990s. Nevertheless, they never fully controlled many non-Pashtun enclaves in the north, and their harsh interpretation of Islam clashed with many tribal traditions, which offer weaknesses that can be exploited.

Creating Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara "national guards" with a sufficient number of joint units to maintain and further build Afghan national cohesion may present an alternative to efforts where we have previously failed to achieve our goals.

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(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army or government.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)