The Independent Institute
(II is an independent public policy research organization whose goal is to transcend the political and partisan interests that influence debate about public policy. II aims to redefine the debate over public issues and foster new and effective directions for government reform by adhering to the highest standards of independent scholarly inquiry, without regard to political or social biases.)
OAKLAND, Calif. -- Iraq and the United States: Who's menacing whom?
By Robert Higgs
The recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings highlight a development that ought to have inspired a great public debate but hasn't.
From the very beginning, the administration of President George W. Bush has been intent on waging war against Iraq, and by now nearly the whole country seems resigned to a U.S. attack.
Within the government, discussion concerns matters of timing, strategy, mobilization of military resources, provision of bases, and so forth. Hardly any prominent person has questioned the attack's underlying rationale.
Yet the justification for this war remains extremely problematic.
"If we do this," said Anthony Cordesman, military guru and Iraq specialist, "it will in many ways be our first pre-emptive war. We will not have a clear smoking gun."
Once upon a time, such an attack would have been labeled naked aggression; nowadays, it's swallowed with ease as the Bush Doctrine.
Is everybody really in favor of a unilateral, unprovoked U.S. assault on a small, faraway country that has never attacked us and does not now pose a serious threat to us?
Ever since the build-up prior to the Gulf War, the U.S. government has undertaken to demonize (Iraqi President) Saddam Hussein. No Herculean effort has been required along these lines, because by all accounts Saddam is, in fact, a murderous thug who rules Iraq with an iron fist.
It stretches the limits of credulity, however, to accept characterizations of him as another Hitler. A bit of searching might have turned up even more despicable leaders in other countries -- Kim Jong-Il, for example -- whose principal occupation seems to be starving to death the North Korean people.
The presence of a murderous thug in control of a small country is hardly front-page news. Such rulers are dime a dozen. Yet the United States does not stand on the verge of attacking all of them. What's so special about Saddam?
It is claimed, of course, that his government actively seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological and nuclear. Again, however, the same claim might be made about many countries.
Moreover, many of those countries have already succeeded in developing such weapons. Yet the United States does not propose to launch attacks on India, Pakistan, China or Russia, not to speak of France or the United Kingdom.
The story line seems to be that Saddam not only seeks to obtain weapons of mass destruction but, once he has them, he will immediately use them against the United States. This nearly-always-unspoken assumption, when brought into the open, has less than overwhelming persuasive power. Why would Saddam take the assumed action? What would he gain by it?
Well, most likely, he would gain less than nothing. As former United Nations weapons inspector Richard Butler told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Saddam understands that making first use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies would guarantee his own destruction.
Whatever else one may think about Saddam, no one can deny that he has been a wily leader, keenly concerned about his personal survival. He hardly qualifies as a potential suicide bomber.
Nobody has presented any evidence that the Iraqis now possess weapons of mass destruction or the effective means, such as ballistic missiles, to deliver such weapons over long distances.
Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., himself admits: "We haven't found the evidence."
During the Gulf War, when the Iraqis were under ferocious attack, the Scud missiles they fired at Israel were equipped only with conventional explosives, not with the chemical or biological warheads that everybody feared Saddam might use. Why would he act more recklessly in the future, when not under attack, than he did during the massive attack on his country in 1991?
At the recent Senate hearings, Sen. Lincoln Chafee, R-R.I., identified the crucial issue when he said: "The key here is the existence of the threat. And there's some dispute."
But is there any genuine dispute? All that's been shown is that Saddam, like many other national leaders, is working to develop weapons of mass destruction, and even that part of the story has been spun out of proportion by the administration and its friends in the media.
There's many a slip, especially in a small, impoverished country such as Iraq, between working to develop such weapons and succeeding in developing them as well as the effective means of delivering them against the United States -- leaving aside the critical question of Iraqi motivation for such a suicidal attack.
The truth of the matter seems to be that the Bush administration, apparently for reasons of political expediency, is obsessed with defeating Saddam's regime. To achieve this desired end, it is eager to launch a gigantic attack on a country that the United States first devastated in 1991 and has been provoking with aggressive overflights of Iraqi territory and sponsorship of anti-Saddam factions and intriguers for more than a decade.
It's almost as if the principal grievance of the Bush administration is sheer frustration, piqued perhaps by the president's yearning to vindicate his father by finishing the job that George H. W. Bush did not finish.
Who knows? Given the manifestly shoddy case the administration has made for its proposed war, one can only fall back on speculation about its real motives.
In 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams declared that this country "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy." Now, however, it seems that doing so, by means of aggressive "pre-emptive" attacks, is to be the government's official policy.
If the American people accede to this policy, we will suffer the fate that Adams himself feared would ensue.
"The fundamental maxims of (United States) policy would insensibly change from liberty to force," he said. America "might become the dictatress of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit."
(Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy at The Independent Institute and editor of The Independent Review.)
The Competitive Enterprise Institute
(CEI is a conservative, free-market think tank that supports principles of free enterprise and limited government, opposes government regulation and actively engages in public policy debate.)
WASHINGTON -- The anti-energy manifesto of the state attorneys general studies
by Marlo Lewis, Jr.
In their joint letter of July 17, 2002, the attorneys general of Alaska, California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont urged President George W. Bush to adopt mandatory controls on emissions of carbon dioxide, the principal greenhouse gas targeted by the Kyoto Protocol, the non-ratified United Nations global warming treaty.
Carbon dioxide is the inescapable byproduct of the hydrocarbon fuels that supply 70 percent of U.S. electricity and 84 percent of all U.S. energy. Like the Kyoto Protocol, the AGs demand, in effect, that the United States institute a regime of energy rationing.
That these particular AGs should lambaste Bush's energy policies and call for carbon dioxide controls is hardly surprising. The AGs are politicians, and nothing is more ordinary than a politician pursuing partisan advantage.
Also quite common is the attempt to use tax and regulatory policy to reward home-state interests and penalize out-of-state competitors. Ten of the 11 AGs are Democrats, and none is a Republican.
Ten are from states where all or most electricity comes from fuel sources other than coal. On average, the AGs' 11 states generate only 16 percent of their electricity from coal, compared with 59 percent for the rest of the country. Carbon dioxide regulation would make coal-generated electricity less, or non-competitive.
The AGs build their case for energy rationing on chapter six of the Bush administration's Climate Action Report 2002, known as the CAR. That chapter makes scary projections of U.S. temperature increases and climate impacts over the next century. The AGs claim the president's refusal to regulate carbon dioxide is "inconsistent" with the CAR's "dire findings and conclusions."
There is a massive problem with this line of argument. Chapter six of the CAR is a summary of the Clinton-Gore administration's "U.S. National Assessment on Climate Change," known as USNA.
Out of 26 available computer models, the USNA picked the Canadian Climate Center Model and the British Hadley Center Model. Both are "worst-case" calculators.
The Canadian model is the "hottest" or most "sensitive" to "forcing" by greenhouse gases. The British model is the "wettest," projecting the largest increases in rainfall.
When Virginia State Climatologist Patrick Michaels analyzed those models, he found they are no better at replicating U.S. temperature trends over the past century than a table of random numbers. The climate scenarios on which the AGs build their case for energy rationing are computer-aided story telling -- science fiction, not science.
The Bush administration has stated that the USNA climate scenarios "do not represent government policy" and "are not policy positions or statements of the U.S. government."
Yet the CAR -- an official statement of the U.S. government -- incorporates the USNA scenarios.
Rather than embrace energy rationing, the Bush administration should withdraw the CAR from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and redact it from the public record. Otherwise, it will continue to lend the color of legitimacy to those who, like the 11 AGs, advocate economy-chilling restrictions on energy use.