Views are mixed on success of loya jirga

WASHINGTON, July 12 (UPI) -- Despite reports that the United States played a significant behind-the-scenes role in activities and outcomes of the recent loya jirga conference in Afghanistan, the Bush administration's key official on the region said at a recent think tank forum that the American government held no real influence over decisions made by that body.

"They had a choice to make among themselves," Zalmay Khalilzad, special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and the United States special envoy to Afghanistan, said July 11 at the event, which was sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, known as SAIS. "We do not give much of a damn, frankly, of X and Y being in certain positions ... as long as it works for Afghanistan."

But as reported by United Press International, senior western diplomatic sources have confirmed that American diplomats in Kabul during last's month Afghan grand council, or loya jirga, pressured the former king of the country, Mohammad Zahir Shah, to withdraw his unexpected and unexpectedly popular candidacy for presidency of the country.

The move ensured that Hamid Karzai, the interim president who is supported by the United States and other Western governments, would continue to hold the post for another 18 months. Shah -- who was seen as potentially winning approval from the council for the post -- reportedly was privately convinced by U.S. officials that his rule would mean the newly formed Afghan government -- and possibly the country -- would collapse.

Critics contend that this helped ensure that warlords could retain control of the fledgling government and continue to hold tightly to their regional dominions. This is an outcome they believe threatens the success of the new government.

At the conference, Marin Strmecki, former foreign policy assistant to Richard Nixon and vice president of the Smith Richardson Foundation, added fire to reports of United States intervention in the loya jirga process. He believes this moved the new government in the wrong direction by legitimizing the power of the warlords.

"The U.S. was frankly intimidated by the threat posed by (Northern Alliance leader and regional warlord) Mullah Fahim," said Strmecki.

Citing "credible sources," Stremcki said that despite assurances prior to the loya jirga that the then-acting defense minister Fahim would leave his post to allow the government cabinet to better reflect the ethnic and tribal diversity in the country, Fahim actually threatened to plunge the country into civil war using substantial Northern Alliance forces if the United States did not back off insisting he give up the position.

The Afghan-born Khalilzad -- a naturalized United States citizen who is the lead National Security Council official dealing with the region and who was present for the loya jirga meeting -- specifically denied this account, saying that the United States was not involved in decisions regarding the makeup of the new Afghan cabinet.

He says that under the agreement worked out among various Afghan interests in Bonn, Germany following the downfall of the Taliban, Northern Alliance officials agreed to give up one of two key ministerial positions they held -- defense or interior.

"As far as Fahim is concerned ... we did not confront him with secret demands to which he threatened civil war," said Khalilzad. "They had a choice to make among themselves. He had to give up one of the two security ministries. We did not get involved."

Stremcki was doubtful about the effectiveness of the loya jirga in moving the country in a positive and stable direction.

"The government is still narrowly based in one dominant and single political faction. That faction is dominated by the Northern Alliance," he said adding that two-thirds of president Karzai's cabinet is made up of Northern Alliance officials or those with close ties to the group.

Ultimately, Stremcki believes what is needed is a government that is a better reflection of the country's regional ethnic groups. Such a cabinet, it is believed, would be more successful in garnering support from around the country for a centralized government. It would also be more effective in assuring international financial and developmental assistance to bring Afghanistan out of its political and economic doldrums.

Nevertheless, Strmecki said that the West has so far failed to dedicate assistance to create, "a broad-based and stable government in the country."

Omar Zakhilwal, senior research economist for the Canadian government and a founding member and deputy director of the Institute for Afghan Studies, believes that the loya jirga failed because many in the country hoped it would help break the power of the regional warlords.

"It was little more than a tool for warlords to legitimize their power and rule," he said.

He added that before Sept. 11 the warlords were pushed into the corners of the country and it was only with United States assistance that they could seize power in Kabul.

"What we (critics) say is please don't help them (now)," said Zakhilwal. "Our suggestion is that they were irrelevant. It was the United States that made them relevant."

Strmecki agreed, saying the United States is perpetuating the problem by giving warlords money to guarantee their assistance in fighting the last vestiges of the Taliban and searching for al Qaida. "The money is still flowing," he said.

Ali Jalali, chief of the U.S. Voice of America's Farsi service and an expert on Afghan military history, explained at the conference that as long as warlords continue to have access to funding -- from Western sources or through illegal collection activities and drug smuggling -- there will be little incentive for soldiers to leave their militias. This bodes badly for United States efforts to develop a centralized Afghan military structure, he said.

Strmecki also believes the current Western policy focus on whether the United Nations' International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, should be increased in size and expanded outside of the capital of Kabul, ignores more important issues.

"That is not even the primary question in terms of the progress of Afghanistan at this point," Strmecki said. "We really have to think about the political order we want the ISAF to defend, and what do we want to do. We have a deep political problem in Afghanistan that undermines any contribution that the ISAF can make in stabilizing that country."

Khalilzad indicated a potential change in U.S. policy toward the use of international security forces. The Bush administration has long opposed moving and expanding such forces outside of Kabul into the country's regions to secure peace.

"We are not against that," said Khalilzad. When questioned later, Khalilzad qualified the remark by saying that the administration supports such a move "in principle."

But according to one expert on Central Asian affairs who was at the forum, the administration takes that position only because it has seen that other countries -- even those with soldiers already acting as peacekeepers in the country -- have shown little willingness to expand the efforts of international security forces.

"It is easy for them (the Bush White House) to say this now," said the analyst. "There is no risk."

Ultimately, Khalilzad believes that the loya jirga was a success if one takes a broad view of its place in the future of Afghanistan.

"My overall impression of the loya jirga was very positive," said Khalilzad. "It took place on time according to the Bonn agreement that was the foundation for the change in Afghanistan."

Khalilzad indicated that the Bush administration sees the government established by the loya jirga as a good first step. He said that although there is a need to "shift the ethnic balance of the government as we move forward," this first cabinet is part of a longer process of establishing a functioning state.

"It is a stage of Afghan evolution toward elections for the people," he said. "This was a step forward in my view and a step in the right direction."